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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
In recent years economists have provided a multitude of ideas regarding 
economic development, especially from the theoretical point of view. Many 
theories have been formulated by economists from more developed nations 
concerning problems of the less advanced countries. Ifhereas most of these 
theories analyze the growth process in terms of a two-sector aggregative 
model, none of them has dealt adequately "...with the interaction between 
the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural sector throughout the 
growth process" (1, p. 1). Moreover, there is a lack of consistent,theory 
that satisfactorily describes the contribution of the agrarian sector to 
economic development if viewed in terms of "institutional sub-sectors" with 
incentives, technological knowledge, and capital as various inputs that go 
into the production process to produce various institutions that are conducive 
to economic development and social improvement. 
Thus, whereas the objectives of the traditional growth theories are to 
help understand the functioning of the economic mechanism with the hope of 
improving it, they generally assume away or ignore institutions and values 
which are deeply involved in generating and in implementing the initial 
take-off phase of economic growth. In this study, attention is focused on 
the initial take-off phase of growth which is logically prerequisite to 
subsequent phases. Furthermore, this study focuses upon structural vari­
ables, especially land tenure structures, which inhibit or facilitate the 
initial thrusts toward economic growth. An analytical frame^^ork is elabo­
rated for the purpose of identifying, developing, and testing various land 
tenure structures as variables in the initial stages of economic growth. 
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This framework is applied, insofar as data will permit, to the situation in 
Sudan. In the application process, land tenure structures in Sudan, as well 
as a variety of structures from other countries, enter the analysis. It is 
expected that this study will provide a basis for identifying and under­
taking research needed to understand current problems in Sudan and to chart 
directions for remedial action. This basis consists of the development of 
appropriate methodology, testing available data through application of this 
methodology and specifying the needed relevant data which remains to be 
obtained. 
Thorbecke defined economic growth very broadly as the changes in the 
economy that permit the creation of an increased capacity to satisfy the 
physical wants of the individuals (2, p. 2). This definition implies partly 
the recognition of "structural" changes as preconditioning factors in the 
process of economic growth geared to increase the productive capacity of an 
economy. It serves the purpose of this study well if the changes attributed 
to economic growth are specified into what Kuznets has conceived of as the 
"aggregative", the "structural", and the "international" aspects (3, p. 56). 
The aggregative aspect is measured in terms of a sustained increase in the 
nation's total output and output per head, necessarily dïTtstripping the 
sustained rise in population. The "structural" aspect recognizes the 
modernization of the economy where the new is gradually replacing the old 
and where a relatively higher degree of commercialization and industriali­
zation are showing up. To measure the structural characteristics, Kuznets 
suggests, "the familiar distribution of products, capital, and labor among 
industrial sectors; among regions; between the private and the public 
sectors, and by further divisions within each; and among various social 
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economic groups" (3, p. 57). For this study, the "structural" aspect of 
"land" is most important but this will be the topic of our discussion in 
later sections of the study. 
The "international" aspect of economic growth stresses the contributions 
that the nations advanced and less advanced can make to their well-bein% 
through cooperation in international trade, finance, and communications. 
It should be noted here that the "international" aspect fits into the frame­
work of this study only insofar as it relates to borrowing the technological 
potentials, foreign investments, aid, and grants from the rest of the world. 
No emphasis is given to international trade per se. 
A consideration of the inter-relations among these three aspects of 
economic growth is essential in determining the contribution each sector in 
the economy can and does make toward the achievement of a given end. Thus, 
an integrated approach to economic growth requires a thorough examination of 
the role each sector can play jointly in all the three aspects of the 
process, and then pursuing the various avenues through which such a role 
may be rendered successful. However, this study concentrates not so much 
on industry as it does on agriculture. The basic view held in this disser­
tation is that the agrarian sector is crucial in the early stages of economic 
development. This may be more so in economies which have a comparative 
advantage in the production of primary commodities. The line of reasoning 
pursued heretofore does not preclude the possibility of "heavy industriali­
zation" as a prime propeller of economic development. Indeed, industriali­
zation and agrarian development, each with a causal nexus of its own, are 
but one and an inseparable part of the over-all process of economic develop­
ment. Such possibilities of development are related to indices constructed 
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for its measurement. The literature provides a variety of terms which are 
subject to misinterpretation. To avoid confusion, and in order to describe 
the development of economy in terms of possibilities that are open for 
maximum production, the concept of development proposed by Viner appears 
suitable for the purposes of this study. The definition given by Viner 
states that: 
A more useful definition of an 'underdeveloped' country is 
that it is a country which has good potential prospects for 
using more capital or more labor or more available natural 
resources, or all of these, to support the present population 
on a higher level of living, or, if its per capita income 
level is already fairly high, to support a larger population 
on a not lower level of living. This definition puts the 
primary emphasis where I think it properly belongs, on per 
capita levels of living, on the issue of poverty and pros­
perity, although it leaves room for secondary emphasis on 
quantity of population. On the basis of this definition, 
a country may be underdeveloped whether it is densely or 
sparsely populated, whether it is capital-rich or a capital-
poor country or whether it is an industrialized or an 
agricultural country (4, p. 98). 
In this sense the concept encompasses agricultural development within 
the general framework of economic development. It does not undermine the 
importance of the interdependence of the various sectors as laying the 
necessary foundation for facilitating rapid development and social 
progress of the nation. 
Background and Setting 
In the light of Viner's definition, Sudan is a less-developed country. 
Per capita productivity is low, when compared to that of advanced countries. 
In agriculture there exists a low ratio between capital and labor. Per 
capita income remains relatively low because the marginal value productivity 
of labor approaches zero. 
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The recent political upheaval and social unrest in the Sudan points 
forcibly to a needed improvement in the standard of living of the Sudanese 
people. Consequently, positive change in per capita productivity is 
essential if such a need is to be realized. With at least eighty-six 
percent of the Sudan's population deriving its livelihood from agriculture, 
and being heavily dependent on one cash crop, Sudan's agricultural develop­
ment is crucial in the context of over-all economic development. Not only 
is the increase of agricultural production per producer related to the 
increase in the aggregate productivity, but also the increase in the 
consumer demand generated within the agrarian sector for the non-farm goods 
and services is inextricably related to development of the country as a 
whole. 
Land tenure structures and economic development 
Within the agrarian sector, defects in land tenure structures impede 
the process of agricultural and, consequently, over-all economic development. 
In the past few years, professional economists continued to emphasize the 
need for a comprehensive general framework of economic theory that develops 
and extends methods to analyze land tenure structures as both defects and 
potential contributions in the path to development. As Professor Timmons 
writes: 
To date, structural changes in land tenure, while widely 
recognized in the literature of development, remain outside 
the main stream of economic theory and analysis, and most 
land tenure reforms have been planned and carried out without 
the help of economists (5, p. 4). 
Professor Raup also feels that there is "an acute shortage of compre­
hensive studies that draw together the experiences of many countries and 
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areas into an articulated framework (6, p. 2). The discontent with the 
existing body of theory is explained by Raup to be due to: 
...general unwillingness of economists to tamper with broad 
organizational and structural frameworks within which eco­
nomic activity occur. Available theories of economic be­
havior have been made from the systematic study of firms 
and individuals. Built into these theories is a strong 
tendency to hold the institutional framework stable in order 
to analyze the response of firms and individuals to economic 
stimuli that can be reduced to manageable proportions. 
Formidable complexities arise when economic dynamics are 
applied to institutional frameworks (6, p. 2). 
Since the area of agrarian structures as related to economic develop­
ment is one of the main tributaries of economic theory in the initial stage 
of less-developed countries, it would appear that such an area is a start­
ing point in integrating the institutional framework into general economic 
theory. One of the objectives of this study is to contribute to this 
integration by indicating, where possible, that land tenure structures are 
basic to social organizations in less-developed countries and consequently 
are of prime importance in forming and fostering the attitudes and motives 
that lie at the roots of economic behavior. 
The conditions under which land is held are of far-reaching importance 
for the development of agriculture. If Sudanese agriculture is to become 
productive, close attention must be given to changing the nature and role 
of the current land tenure structures. The issue of implementing agrarian 
reforms^ as necessary structural means toward economic development as 
previously defined and social improvement^ has not acquired a new relevance 
Agrarian reform means structural adjustments within the agricultural 
sector contributary to and consistent with economic development in other 
sectors of the economy (5, p. 2). 
2 Social improvement as used in this study means the development of the 
individuals in the country toward higher levels of living as informed and 
participating members of the country's social, economic, and political life. 
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since the time the country gained its political independence in 1956. The 
various national plans submitted by the government on economic development 
and social improvement do not recognize fully the importance of land tenure 
structures in light of the developmental goals. A primary explanation for 
this inadequacy may be that the policy-makers overemphasize broadening the 
agricultural base through the extensive cultivation of the potentially 
unutilized arable lands. The argument is well-supported by the following 
citation from the Ten-Year Plan of economic and social development: 
The predominant role assigned to agriculture and irrigation 
in the plan has been governed by a number of considerations. 
Since availability of stored water is a crucial limiting 
factor in expanding agricultural output, the development of 
irrigation has necessarily been given the prime place..,. 
Again the agricultural base of the economy has to be 
strengthened before any sustained growth can take place. It 
is no less essential that the excessive reliance on a mono­
culture crop, cotton, has to be gradually reduced by deversi-
fying the agricultural cropping pattern. This entails the 
development of various other crops besides cotton (7, p. 83). 
Besides investments of an infra-structural nature, accommodations have 
also been made in the plan for improved agricultural services, agricultural 
research J agricultural credit, livestock development, better land utili­
zation, and soil conservation measures. 
All these suggested improvements are indeed great and urgent. But they 
do point out the lack of an integrated 'agrarian reform' approach which is 
described by Warriner "...as a comprehensive policy, including not only the 
'opportunity of ownership', but also a variety of other measures to assist 
farmers by means of greater security of tenure, better credit systems, 
better marketing facilities, agricultural advisory services.and education, 
and so on" (8, pp. 3-4). 
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Another reason for the deficiency referred to above might have been an 
outcome of the imprecision surrounding the use of such a concept as broad 
as land reform^; including such a wide variety of measures to improve 
agricultural organization that it shifts the emphasis from the foundation 
to the accessories. Consequently, the original aim of greater social and 
economic equality tends to be obscured. 
This point has been well made by George Hakim who writes: 
As generally used in international discussions, the term 
"Land reform" has come to refer to a wide gamut of problems 
of legal, social, and economic character. This large 
conception does not give sufficient emphasis to the basis 
of the land tenure system. It was this that was mainly in 
the minds of those who originally raised the subject of 
agrarian reforms in the United Nations and elsewhere. At 
the heart of the problem of land reform in underdeveloped 
countries, is the question of who owns the land. This 
fundamental question has been confused and overshadowed by 
the attention paid to other factors, such as settlement of 
legal title to land, agricultural indebtedness, and land 
taxation, which, though undoubtedly related to the main 
problem, are not more than manifestations of this, the basic 
malady of the agrarian structure (10, p. 6). 
Therefore, to avoid the danger of shifting the emphasis from the 
foundation to the accessories and for the sake of clarity and perspective, 
the vague concept of land reform is discarded. Inasmuch as land tenures 
and their associated structures are subject to a wide range of interpre­
tations, it seems proper to define these terms in the senses in which they 
will be used in this study. Following Professor Timmons' suggestion 
"...land tenure means a body of rights and relationships between men that 
^Land reform in general usage means the redistribution of large holdings 
with or without compensation, with the objective of benefiting the small 
farmers and the agricultural workers. The concept has now come to mean a 
variety of measures concerned with improvement of agricultural economic 
institutions (9, p. 375). 
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have been developed to govern their behavior in the use and control of land 
and its resources. It includes any interest in land or its income, varying 
from the creditor who lends money on the land to the laborer who works the 
land. It includes the relationships between men as individuals, as groups, 
and as public entities in the use and control of land"(5, p. 6). 
"Land tenure structures" include the system of rights that has been 
fashioned in a particular culture. Included are ownership systems, tenancy 
systems, inheritance systems, as well as those aspects of tax systems, 
workers' rights, and credit systems that effect or are effected by land 
tenure structures. Modifications in land tenure structures include changes 
toward the objective of development. In this context, land tenure 
structures are conceived as less broad than, but a part of agrarian 
structures which also include marketing, credit, taxation, and other infra­
structures. 
Defects in land tenure structures affect agricultural productivity 
adversely. Rural people in Sudan have barely nothing besides land and 
labor with which to earn a living. Information about opportunities for 
betterment is limited. Few alternative opportunities for making a liveli­
hood exist. Consequently, people are tied to the land. Threats to their 
position on the land are a threat to their lives. Insofar as land tenure 
structures hinder agricultural productivity, their existence without modifi­
cation will mean a sustained lower income per person and consequently a 
lower standard of living. And because land tenure structures are an 
integral part of the social, political, and cultural structure, they can 
either contribute satisfactorily to social improvement and political sta­
bility or they can become a detriment to the achievement of these goals. 
As Jacoby writes: 
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...A good tenure system may be helpful in providing the farmer 
with an income as stable as is feasible under the local con­
ditions, at a level which will permit him to meet the needs of 
himself and his family as human beings, and to become a 
valuable and responsible member of the political system of his 
country (11, p. 8). 
In view of the recognition given the problem emanating from land tenure 
structures in national and international efforts toward agricultural and 
national development, the importance of this study is to determine the role 
which modifications in Sudanese land tenure structures can perform in the 
attainment of a positive increase in agricultural per capita productivity. 
However, it should be borne in mind that, even though land tenure structures 
are important, they are only one of the numerous complexities and issues 
surrounding the development of the nation. Accordingly, direct and major 
concern with modifications in land tenure structures may have only limited 
effects if not coupled with ameliorations'in related fields and a compre­
hensive corresponding program for overall economic and social improvement. 
Problems Investigated 
The problems engaged in this study may be conceived more clearly if we 
set the ends in view to be pursued. The national government of Sudan has 
recognized the need for economic development and social progress. In view 
of this, the following goals are given prominence (7, p. 6): 
1. The strengthening of the Sudan economy and the broadening of 
its structure by: 
a. increasing the national income at a greater rate than 
the rate of population growth, with the object of 
achieving a continuous and substantial increase in the 
average per capita income, 
b. removing the barriers which prevent population of the 
backward areas from participating in the modern monetary 
sector and laying the necessary foundation for a multi­
lateral basis facilitating quick development and progress. 
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c. increasing, diversifying, and improving agricultural 
production. 
2. The establishment of industries that help to substitute for 
imports, especially those industries that depend on primary 
materials which are produced locally. 
3. Creation of opportunities for a regular and continous 
employment and the training of manpower at all levels of skills, 
both technical and professional. 
4. Improvement of educational and health services and other 
social services with the objective of creating a cultural and 
social environment capable of coping with the requirements of 
the new economic life. 
5. Continuation and expansion of investigation and scientific 
research and experiments in order to assess the country's 
resources and potentialities, and the possibility of utilizing 
these resources for the preparation of consequent developmental 
plans. 
The extent of realizing most of these objectives, excepting number 
two depends partly on how much of a role the land tenure structures will be 
allowed to play in attaining them. The main tenet of our argument is that 
the existing land tenure have acted as fertile ground for inhibiting the 
developmental goals of agriculture, and, consequently, of the economy. The 
available statistical and documentary evidence of the problems the economy 
is facing, as presented in chapter three, though inadequate, supports this 
argument. Also, observation and experience are reliable — though incon­
clusive indicators of the problems to be delimited in the third chapter of 
this study. 
Objectives of the Study 
This study is an endeavor to analyze the role land tenure structures 
play in the overall economic development of Sudan guided by incentive, 
knowledge, and capital criteria. The objectives of the study are the 
following: 
1. To develop conceptually a model of economic development with par­
ticular emphasis placed on land tenure structures as a means of 
providing the necessary conditions for a movement toward achieving the 
objectives of agricultural development, and at least partly, of 
overall economic development. The model will serve to identify and 
evaluate defects in land tenure structures. 
2. To provide hypotheses concerning the capability of the tenure 
structures to induce a movement toward the goals which may be tested 
empirically through application of the model as the required data 
become available. 
3. To suggest modifications in the domestic land tenure structures on 
the basis of the conceptual analysis. Such curative measures may be 
accepted or rejected on the basis of verification or rejection, 
empirical or otherwise, of the hypotheses upon which they (the cura­
tive measures) are founded. 
Procedures 
Since the first objective of this study is to elaborate a model which 
will help seek an answer to the agrarian problems of the nation in terms of 
identifying "development" criteria for appraising the contribution tenure 
structures can make in attaining the goals of agricultural development, it 
is important to enumerate these goals and show how they are derived before 
looking into the procedures used. 
The following goals of agricultural development are explicitly derived 
from the ones given in the Ten Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 
of the Sudan mentioned previously: 
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1. Improvement of production and the use of resources, 
2. Equalization of income and wealth distribution, and 
3. Raising total production and per capita real income. 
For the purpose of appraising the extent to which the tenure systems 
satisfy the necessary conditions of efficiency as means toward -achievement 
of agricultural development and of the economy, three criteria are used as 
a guide in resource allocation. These criteria center on: 
1. human incentives and opportunities for sustained economic 
production, 
2. technological knowledge with emphasis on the scale of land 
operation and the pattern of cultivation, and 
3. favorable conditions for capital formulation and productive 
investment. 
Hypotheses suggested by these criteria will be developed in the 
chapters to follow with the aim of discovering the strategic operating 
factors within the various tenure models that will contribute to the reali­
zation of developmental objectives. 
Within the conceptual framework to be formulated, certain "failure" 
and "success" elements in the existing land tenure structures will be 
identified through a comprehensive study of four tenure classes: communal 
tenure in the South, individual freehold in the Northern Province, annual 
leasehold in the Gedaref District, and share-cropping in the Gezira Scheme. 
It is also our concern to survey different tenure structures from 
particular parts of the world that might be adapted to Sudanese conditions. 
Five such tenure structures are chosen. These are: the family farm either 
owner-operated or tenanted in the United States, the Kolkhoz in Russia, the 
Kibbutz in Israel, the Ejido in Mexico, and the proportional profit farm in 
Puerto Rico. The justification for such a choice lies in the contrasts such 
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experiences offer. Some of the essential variables that have contributed 
to or impeded the success of the heretofore mentioned tenure structures 
will be described. The relevant characteristics of these tenure systems 
will be related to the Sudanese examples in terms of the contribution they 
can make in reshaping the existing local land tenure structures without 
necessarily violating the basic ends-in-view of the society. —In a broader 
economic sense, the five land tenure experiences thus chosen are viewed as 
primary inputs whereas Sudanese land tenure structures are regarded as 
intermediate inputs. The end product will be an output of institutions that 
are derived from world and local experiences, compatible with Sudanese 
objectives. 
Finally, suggestions will be made in regard to the purposeful col­
lection of data of field origin that are required for empirical investi­
gations, and from which conclusions concerning specific changes in 
structures can be drawn. 
Plan of this Report 
In view of the importance given to land tenure structures as a focal 
point of economic development, specifically in agrarian societies, the 
contribution of this study, then, is to construct a framework of agri­
cultural development for the Sudanese economy of which the contribution of 
land tenure structures constitutes the major part. 
This study has six major parts. 
The first part is introductory and consists of background and setting; 
problems investigated; objectives of the study; procedures; and plan of 
this report. 
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The second part deals with the development of a theoretical framework 
which presents the basic structural assumptions of the model with heavy 
emphasis on the relevant procedures that can be used to determine the 
contribution of the land tenure structures to agricultural development. 
Ample use will be made of the methodological device of "ideal types". How­
ever, complete analysis of the process of agricultural and consequently eco­
nomic development can be conducted only within the whole framework of eco­
nomic, political, psychological, social, and cultural aspects of human be­
havior. Consequently, as Schickele argues "there are no ideal t}'pes in 
empirical reality, just as there is no absolute vacuum in nature " (12, p. 
187). But, without the aid of abstraction, a process of change and dis-
equalibrium may be difficult to predict "within probability limits as de­
termined by fact and logic" (5, p. 10). In this report, however, major 
emphasis will be directed mostly tot/ards the economic aspects of tenure 
structures. An endeavor will be made to define the specific purpose(s) the 
conceptual scheme is supposed to achieve by enumerating delimiting hypothe­
ses, diagnostic hypotheses, and remedial hypotheses. 
Evaluation of the model, and its usefulness presented later in the 
second chapter of the study will not, however, be free from certain limi­
tations which will be relaxed by extending the analysis to non-economic 
considerations. 
The third part of the report will contain a more rigorous treatment of 
the interrelationships between goals, means, and consequences of the various 
land tenure systems. The tenure models derived from world experience will 
also be evaluated along the same lines. Even though "tenure experiences" 
per se are of limited importance to our study, yet they will prove helpful 
in understanding modifications in tenure structures. 
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In the fourth part of the report, the specific concern is to identify 
the relevant factors within both the domestic and the 'international' tenure 
structures which provide a basis for improvement. The present pattern of 
land tenure which is the outcome of rooted tribal customs and habits in some 
instances, accompanied by the primitive system of land utilization practiced 
in most areas, have served to submerge the largest part of the economy r.^ith 
its most valuable human resource into a sea of subsistence activities and to 
keep the production process direct from hand to mouth. Imperfections of 
this nature, together with incentive inefficiencies, technological and 
managerial limitations and the extreme scarcity of capital; all being 
associated with defects in land tenure structures, will be of particular 
interest in carrying out the diagnosis of the problematic propositions using 
the framework set forth in the preceding part of the report. 
The fifth section of the report proceeds with developing possible 
alternative forms of land tenure structures. The experiences of the 
countries examined together with local "success" elements provide the 
'vineyard' from which 'fruits' for modifications in Sudanese land tenure 
structures can be gathered under the three necessary conditions developed 
in the previous phase of the study, namely, incentives, knowledge and 
capital. 
Finally, the study concludes by enumerating its limitations and short­
comings, and with suggestions for further research in the extension and use 
of the methods presented. 
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CHAPTER TWO: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
African Economic Man versus Hicksian Economic Man 
The postulates of utility and profit maximization are fundamental to 
most economic analyses. The supply of and the demand for products and 
factors of production are related to prices in attempting to determine the 
behavior patterns of both producers and consumers in pursuit of profit maxi­
mization and utility as influenced by changes in prices. Price guided allo­
cation of resources and products is an indispensable frame of reference for 
the economist who seeks to detect and measure quantitative and qualitative 
restrictions that impair an optimum resource allocation. Consequently, it 
is essential for a study that seeks a solution for the productivity problems 
in a more liberal laissez-faire setting, to determine whether the producers' 
response to price and income incentives is in the expected fashion, whether 
they are indifferent to price, or whether they respond perversely. Jones 
faces this issue when he describes the feeling of economists becoming 
critical of the fundamental propositions of their discipline when con­
fronted with "seemingly perverse behavior" in the following passage; 
Economists who have studied the societies of tropical Africa 
may find it particularly easy to attribute economic backward­
ness to the absence of economic motivation -- of a desire for 
material things — in a people apparently as different from 
the Europeans and Americans as the Africans. Just as some 
nineteenth century Americans denied the negro a soul in an 
attempt to justify slavery, so have some twentieth century 
Europeans denied the African negro an economic spirit in an 
attempt to justify colonial rule (13, p. 108). 
The fact that the African economic man attaches a relatively higher 
weight to non-material goals (relative to material goals) does not by itself 
make him irrational in the economic sense of accepting the ends but question­
ing the means. It is not so much the absence of motivation as it is a lack 
of opportunities and inadequacy of information that distinguishes the 
African economic man from the Hicksian economic man. Herskovits adds more 
to the clarification of the situation when he argues that; 
It is ironic that the Africans, not politically free 
agents in most of the continent, are presumed by many persons 
to be passive in the situations that affect them. This is 
exemplified by the fact that proposals for change have 
perhaps nowhere else been drawn so unilaterally and with 
so little consultation with the people most concerned 
(14, p. 232). 
Both of the quotations above add to our insight in dealing with the 
problems facing the African but inherent in them is an oversimplification 
of the issue of the relevance of economic analysis under African conditions. 
To insure that consumers and producers in an economy will react to price 
changes in a predictable fashion, may itself require a vast institutional 
change in the countryside. The types of adjustments needed in land tenure 
institutions can only be indicated on the basis of conceptual analysis aided 
with some of the available tools of economic theory. 
The colonial era in Africa has been associated with various forms of 
social injustices and compulsion in the minds of many Africans. Reports 
written about the Sudanese economy, for instance, during the colonial rule 
have pointed out a number of perverse behavioristic characteristics. Ex­
amples have been given of schemes such as the Zande Scheme (15, p. 2) in 
the south that has failed for several possible reasons. Hostility of the 
Azande tribesmen to Hakuma (government) crops is one reason. Cattle wealth 
that is valued for social prestige rather than for supplying protein and 
source of income is another example of perverse economic behavior. Difficult 
wage worker supply because the natives — both Arabs and Sudanese — are not 
industrious, of cattle owning tribes that regard cultivation as unpleasant, 
degrading work, which within living memory was performed by slaves bought 
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with wealth derived from their cattle, and of the Ge%ira tenants who react 
to higher cotton prices at certain seasons by lavish consumption habits and 
reduction in output are other frequently cited examples to support the 
proposition that Sudanese farmers do not respond to economic incentives. 
These modes of behavior and many others influenced by what Parsons^ de­
scribes as the "value orientations regnant in a society" play down the im­
portance of material things, and in general generate aspirations that are 
unfavorable to economic growth. If it is true that the African economic man 
responds to price changes erratically in a random fashion and if he is not 
capable of making the economic choice that suits him most when he is con­
fronted, with many alternatives, then it will be difficult, if not impossi­
ble, to achieve an efficient allocation of resources in a supposedly price-
guided economy. These allegations can easily be dismissed on the grounds 
that unorthodox economic behavior is nothing but a manifestation of the 
African's unfamiliarity with the workings of economic markets. Bauer, has 
also argued that those who dispute the relevance of the propositions of eco­
nomics to less advanced countries usually do so by reflecting imcomplete 
observations or imperfect understanding of economics as they relate to 
differences in comparative attitudes and institutions (16, p. 15). Examples 
of economists' paying short visits to many African countries and who upon 
getting home immediately set out to offer comprehensive explanations for the 
functioning of African economies are by no means uncommon and they clearly 
support Bauer's reasoning. However, there are various explanations offered 
for unorthodox price response by the African economic man that run in 
^Parsons defines a "value orientation" as "a generalized and organized 
conception influencing behavior, of nature, of man's place in it, of man's 
relation to man, and of the desirable and undesirable as they may relate to 
man — environment and inter-human relations" (17, p. 411). 
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opposite directions to some basic propositions that economic theory claims. 
Jones gives a substantial list of these explanations (13, pp. 109-111). 
Some of these are summarized in the following four points: 
1. For the assertion that Africans are not unwilling to consume more goods 
and services, but that they value leisure so highly that their response to 
price incentive is extremely weak, the explanation given is that most 
communities are self-sufficient. Consequently, an increase in the price of 
farm products, or an increase in output per acre or per man hour, would lead 
the fanner to reduce factors of production until his total net return is no 
greater than it has been before. 
2. Custom and African conservatism is also given as an example that ac­
counts for the failure of supply and demand to respond to price changes. 
Under Sudanese conditions, an example that elucidates this is the human 
feeling of responsibility for one's extended family which is an important 
factor in inhibiting the development of Sudanese entrepreneurship and conse­
quently impedes the functioning of the price mechanism. Capital is diffi­
cult to build up, since any success by one implies the attraction of more 
and more dependents to one's household. 
3. Lavish consumption, sometimes of useless imported goods; a higher 
preference for festivities related to productive investment and cattle only 
as a desirable form of wealth, all find their explanation under what is 
generally called 'irrational' behavior. 
4. Finally, prices are assumed not to perform their duty in the internal 
markets because of the unfamiliarity of the Africans with economic exchange 
in general and with markets and money in particular. A consequence of this, 
pointed out by Neumark, is the phenomenon knoim as target demand, a demand 
for money "largely derived from a demand for specific things for which there 
is a felt need," in a community where life necessities can be obtained 
without money (13, p. 62). 
The above explanations show only one side of the coin. And because 
institutional regidities in the Western World have not prevented the 
economist from using his normal tools of analysis, so will be the case for 
the African economist. In fact, unorthodox economic behavior should be a 
source for enriching the standards of economic theory. This is so because 
an economic activity or a choice from among policy decisions can be evalu­
ated as to its effect on economic efficiency or on welfare only if such an 
effect can be judged as to its movement toward or away from the established 
standard. On the other side of the coin, however, explanations may be 
offered in support of the idea that hypotheses of economists will yield 
successful results under African conditions as shown in the following three 
examples: 
1. The Southern region of Sudan is regarded as less advanced even by 
African standards. Taxation has been introduced as an instrument for making 
the people work harder and to raise their level of wants, which is regarded 
to be low. The Nilotic tribes which are mainly cattle owners are allovred 
to pay their taxes in the form of cattle on the grounds that this is an 
economic source of revenue to the government. This method has not been 
effective because the cattle-owning tribes paid their taxes in old beasts 
which usually die before being sold in the market. This illustrates a 
response to minimize cost. 
Also, the Southerner has been and still is averse to cultivating more 
land than he requires for his own immediate needs. He is suspicious that the 
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introduction of any cash crop would only provide a tangible income that 
would be taken by the government in the form of taxes. On the other hand, 
he has exhibited the willingness to work even at very low wages. This 
indicates that he takes even a risk premium into consideration. In other 
words, he does not adopt the cash crop because he is not sure that such a 
crop will be saleable when harvested and even if saleable, the return he 
might get out of it will be relatively lower than his immediate earnings as 
a laborer because of the government tax, 
2. The withholding of grain supplies by grain producers in Sudan, parti­
cularly in the mechanized crop production schemes, in anticipation of higher 
prices, is a common feature of the operation of the grain market. This is 
largely true of other crops and in other grain producing areas as well. 
Experience of the author, being the son of a farmer, also indicates 
the frequency of the prompt response of producers to price differences in 
Sudan, notably to the readiness to adjust the production of the various 
varieties of dura (sorghum) to the price differential offered, and to 
expand the acreage under cultivation in anticipation of higher prices, 
3. Many people claim that the low level of wants in less advanced countries 
including Africa can destroy the functioning of the market mechanism in 
these economies. Bauer indicates that this is not so by arguing that "even 
a static pattern of wants would not destroy the relevance of economics, 
because the population would presumably wish to satisfy these wants with 
least effort" (16, p. 22). 
It is difficult, however, to disagree with the general tenor of this 
argument which recognizes a Robinson Crusoe economy but on the realization 
that progress means more wants and consequently more effort, Bauer's 
23 
statement becomes an over-simplification of the issue. The argument about 
the level of wants really gives way by the mere observation of the extent 
to which the economic life of the African people has been influenced by 
modern methods of communication and exposure to new frontiers. Empirical 
evidence that further supports this elucidation is readily available from 
the statistics given in Table 1. The symbols used in Table 1 refer to 
different groups of incomes studied together with their characteristics. 
The footnote to Table 1 explains these symbols (18, p. 323). It is seen 
from the table as Kubinski writes that "the expenditure on goods and 
services represents a high percentage of gross incomes of Sudanese — with 
the exception of income 7F and 8G — the two highest incomes in this %roup 
-- this percentage never falls below 90 while, for relatively low incomes 
it is higher" (18, p. 324). 
Among the numerous reasons that he gives as an explanation of this, 
high income propensity to consume and increase in the level of wants as a 
result of increased contact with the outside world comes foremost. All that 
this indicates is that African responses, unfamiliar though they may seem, 
are within easy reach of the tools of economic analysis and consequently are 
predictable within certain probability limits. Unorthodox economic responses 
in Africa do not make of the Hicksian man a stranger in African economics. 
Economic theory does not fail because of institutional rigidities since 
these are prevalent in advanced societies too. 
2 The calculations given in the table are based on statistical infor­
mation contained in a survey of one economic region — the "Three Towns". 
To this extent, the conclusions obtained are not applicable to all the 
population of the country. 
£L ID Table 1. Various expenditures out of gross incomes as percentage of corresponding gross incomes 
IP 2Q lA 3Q 6Q liQ 2B 
1. Expenditure on goods and 
services as percentage of 
gross income 99.8 96.8 95.3 95.6 97. 3 97. 5 93.7 
2. Expenditure on consumption 
goods domestically produced 
and imported as percentage 
of gross income 81.6 80.2 80.4 77.8 73-1 72.8 79.8 
3. Expenditure on imported 
consumption goods as per­
centage of gross income 31.7 33.4 37.5 32.6 27. 5 28. 1 37.4 
4. Expenditure on imported 
consumption goods as per­
centage of expenditure on 
consumption goods 38.9 41.7 46.7 41.9 37. 7 36. ,6 46.8 
7R 5ft 30 4c 8s 9T 5D 6e 7F IB 8G 
1. 95.4 94.9 93.8 93.0 94.2 92.1 92.1 91.0 Ô9.0 57.3 84.1 
2. 72.1 72.0 65.9 64.1 69.6 67.0 62.9 62.8 63.1 37.2 56.8 
3- 29.1 29.0 22.6 22.4 28.4 27.4 24.7 28.0 28.5 26.8 25.1 
k. kO.O 42.6 34.2 34.9 40.8 40.9 39.2 44.5 45.1 72.3 44.2 
4B 6B 2BB 5B 3B 
1. 61.0 62.3 55.4 56.1 53.9 
2. 33.4 33.9 40.1 29.5 27.6 
3. 23.3 24.3 20.8 20.6 20.0 
k. 69.6 71.7 51.9 69.9 72.6 
^Source: (l8, p. 327). 
Id c  
Different groups of incomes with their characteristics 
Group 1 Symbol used 
k. 69.6 71.7 51.9 69.9 72.6 
^'Source: (I8, p. 327)• 
Id c 
Different groups of incomes with their characteristics 
Group 1 Symbol used 
Low income Sudanese unclassified staff IP 
Non-householders : Single 2% 
Married 3Q 
Householders : Single 
% 
Married 6Q 
7R 
88 
9T 
Group 2 
High income Sudanese classified staff: 
Non-householders : Single lA 
2B 
Householders : Single ' 3C 
Married 4c 
5D 
6E 
7F 
8G 
Group 3 
British persons: All single persons IB 
All married persons 2BB 
Married persons 3B 
Married persons with 2 children 5B 
Married persons with 1 child 6B 
^Source; (18, p. 323). 
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The African man is born and bred in hard surroundings and he is in 
constant conflict with the forces of nature. To describe him as non-
industrious does him neither justice nor does it contribute to the solution 
of his problems. Professor Schultz in presenting the economists' image of 
the farmers in traditional agriculture expresses the view that: 
Much of our trouble in understanding agriculture in poor 
countries arises from misconceptions of the preferences of 
the people concerned and of the role of preferences in 
economic behavior. It is fashionable to attribute to them 
preferences which characterize them as indolent, as 
squanderers, and as unfit culturally to modernize. 
According to this fashion, what must come first is a 
cultural reform. Some economists have even dropped their 
tools to march in this reform movement. But the analytical 
core of economics cannot provide a basis for such cultural 
reforms; economists are not experts on how to change 
people's preferences and personalities; farm people in 
traditional societies are not indifferent to earnings from 
work and to returns from investment; and these people 
have long had a bad press (19, p. 22). 
That the farmers of traditional agriculture are not apathetic to economic 
incentives is true. It is not so much the indifference to economic in­
centives and the exhaustion of investment opportunities that retard develop­
ment, but rather the prevalence of structural traps. In other words, land 
tenure structures trap the farmer by an array of defects which leave him 
little room for improvement. The role of economic analysis then becomes to 
identify these defects and seek an extension of the successes that tenure 
structures could make if the agrarian sector is to be transformed. With 
this attitude and with great faith in the tools that economic science offers 
for the solution of man's problems, we proceed into an analysis of land 
tenure structures as restrictions and contributors to agricultural develop­
ment and overall economic development in the Sudan. 
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Conceptual Approach to the Analytical Framework 
A cursory analysis of the developmental problems facing agriculture in 
the Sudan might be most revealing if pursued through a conceptual framework 
that seeks to identify defects in land tenure structures which obstruct 
agricultural and national development. An appropriate framework that helps 
identify, develop, and test various land tenure systems as variables in the 
initial stages of economic grorfth is what Dewey describes as the "means-end 
continuum". In this continuum, ends perform a "twofold function in social 
inquiry". They serve to establish the norm from which the problematic 
situation may be determined as "the gap between the norm and the present 
situation". Ends also serve "as criteria for evaluating particular means" 
to determine the extent to which the means yield consequences which narrow 
the gap or reduce the difference between the present and the desired 
situation. 
Within this logical framework, Gittinger argues that: 
...every immediate goal or end becomes an end-in-view in 
relation to a more ultimate goal until the basic ends are 
reached. Each end-in-view can be looked upon as a means 
to reach another end-in-view (20, p. 130). 
Presumably the basic ends that are common to all societies, the Sudan 
being no exception, are life, liberty, and opportunity. In view of this, 
even though overall economic development is treated as an end in this 
study, its position in the "means-end-continuum" makes it a means to su­
perior purposes. So is the case with industrial development, agricultural 
development, etc. until we come to the lowest-order point at one end of the 
scale line. The initial "take-off" point for our analysis, however, is the 
land tenure structures. 
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Within the context of the "means-end-continuum", agricultural develop­
ment is understood to entail a deliberate and purposeful modification in 
land tenure structures as means to attain given ends. The ends-in-view for 
the agricultural sector are improved productivity and use of resources, a 
more equitable distribution of the gross value of agricultural output in 
terms of factor payments or earnings and a positive increase in total agri­
cultural production accompanied with an increase in per capita real income 
for the agricultural labor force. It is obvious that some of these goals 
are in conflict. This is particularly the case when these goals are re­
lated to the means through which they could be achieved. For example, if 
the objective is to improve productivity and use of resources, the scale of 
operation must be enlarged to allm; investment of indivisible capital equip­
ment and the use of modern techniques. If it is to equalize income and 
wealth distribution, land must be redistributed and private ownership re­
stricted. Given the other two objectives, if the end-in-view is to increase 
total agricultural output and maintain a sustained increase in per capita 
real income of the agricultural labor force, labor productivity must be 
raised and job opportunities should be provided to siphon out excessive 
labor released from agriculture. Extension of the land base is also another 
means of contributing towards this third objective. 
However, if agricultural development is identified to mean all of the 
three goals in combination, then our logical framework should serve as a 
basis as Gittinger emphasizes to resolve the "conflict between ends-in-view" 
where "the extent to which each is emphasized and the criteria for balancing 
one end-in-view against another are the more ultimate ends-in-view" (20, p. 
130). The competitive and complementary relatiohships among the three goals 
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mentioned above will also influence the choice between means that are used 
to attain them. 
The complexity of the process of change in agriculture through modifi­
cations in land tenure structures engendered by the uncertainty surrounding 
the outcome makes it imperative to develop a conceptual scheme that will e-
valuate the possible consequences of change in terras of their contribution 
to the developmental goals. Such a scheme is illustrated in Figure 1 which 
attempts to formulate certain means-end-continua with emphasis on the ends-
in-view of agricultural development and economic development. The means-end 
flow diagram is a modified form of the one given by Van de Metering in his 
attempt to evaluate the short-run impact of agrarian reform on agricultural 
production and prices and the distribution of agricultural income (21, p. 
583). 
The impact of modifications on tenure structures is constrained by 
variables under the control of the policy-maker and conditions relating to 
the general level of development of the economy associated with the forces 
that have an impact on its future grov7th. Agrarian reform, by itself, is 
not sufficient to assure increased agricultural production. Product change 
has to be preceded by changes in the resource mix. Accordingly, an expand­
ing industrial sector with well developed distribution and transportation 
systems is necessary for the provision of innovations and factors at in­
centive costs to farmers. In this sense the agricultural sector is an 
integral part of the rest of the economy. The benefits of economic growth 
in the industrial sector are at least partially transferred to agriculture 
and vice versa. A sufficiently rapid development of the industrial sector 
will work towards the alleviation of problems in agriculture. 
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Agricultural Sector Efficiency of Resource Allocation 
1. Change in ownership of 
resource base: 
a. social security for laborers 
b. improved tenancy arrangements 
c. owner-operatorship 
2. Provision of factors at incentive 
cost 
3. Extension services, education, 
research and technical assistance 
k. Adjustments in taxation structure 
World Experiences 
1. Family-fann tenanted and owner 
operated 
2. Kolhoz 
3. Kibbutz 
4. Sjido 
5. Proportional profit farm 
Industrial Sector 
1. Industrial growth distribution 
and transportation 
a. job opportunities 
b. market structures 
2. Socio-political developments in 
the nonagricultural sectors 
—» 
1. Change in resources 
a. incentive 
b. technical knowledge 
dissemination 
c. capital creation 
2. Change in production 
possibilities 
Maximization of returns 
Rational choice 
1. Population 
2. Per capita income 
3. Preference patterns 
1. Facto 
2. Produ 
1. Dome si 
demanc 
2. Groverr 
3. Export 
Figure 1. Impact of modifications in land tenure structures on agricultural de 
Lo cat lofa 
Agricultural development 
coupled with industrial growth 
to attain economic development 
Basic Ends 
1. Factor demand 
2. Product supply 
1. Domestic private 
demand 
2. Grovemment 
3. Exports 
1. Improved productivity and 
use of resources 
2. Increased total production 
of goods and services and 
per capita income 
3. More widespread per capita 
distribution 
—  - 4  
1. Life 
2. Liberty 
3- Opportunity 
I on agricultural development and overall economic development in a means-end framework 
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Within the agricultural sector, land tenure structures condition produc 
tivity per worker and hence the potential market for non-agricultural goods 
and services, capital creation and labor release for industrial development. 
Consequently, structural variables, as structures fashioned by Decree and 
legislation are basic for initiating change within the agricultural sector 
compatible with the goals of development pursued. Among such structural 
variables we find legislation towards a change in the ownership of the re­
source base, more secure and equitable tenure arrangements, the provision of 
agricultural credit at incentive cost, the establishment of rural service 
facilities, the development of agricultural education supplemented by re­
search and extension activities, the elimination of an inequitable tax 
structure, and the adoption of world tenure experiences that promote cooper­
ative activity in production and distribution (Figure 1). Examples of these 
experiences are the cooperative forms: ejido. Kibbutz, and proportional 
profit farm as well as their various combinations. Structural variables 
such as the ones indicated above have an indirect impact on the instrumental 
variables. These latter variables as the former ones are subject to control 
by administrators, both public and private. It is less likely, hovrever, 
that policy instruments will be effective in stimulating development without 
structural changes on a broad front. As stated by Giles: 
Instruments are used to make small and frequent changes within and 
between various sectors and are within the control of adminis­
trators and managers. However, the use of instruments in changing 
tax rates, interest rates, capital investment and wage rates, ..., 
assumes that the structures have been fashioned which permit the 
exercise of the instruments. In more developed countries instru­
ments constitute the main policy means used for stimulating eco­
nomic development. Horfever, in the less developed countries 
structures are not yet developed to provide the policy-maker 
with the instruments which he may use in economic development 
(22, p. 6). 
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This entails that inquiry should be directed towards ascertaining the 
relationships between changes in structures and their impact upon the nu­
merical characterization of the production process. Technically, the pro­
duction process is represented by production functions defining input-output 
relationships. For a realization of efficient allocation of resources, 
profit maximization in production and rational choice in consumption are 
assumed. 
Variables that are beyond the control of the policy-maker and which are 
part of the conceptual scheme presented in Figure 1 also merit consideration, 
since they are related to the ends-in-view pursued. Changes in demand for 
agricultural output due to increases in population and rising per capita in­
come, affect the welfare of the rural people. Similarly will changes in 
market potentials preceded by integrated expansion of the industrial sector. 
Formulation of Hj'potheses 
The conceptual framework described in the foregoing pages is of rele­
vance in formulating a set of hypotheses on the basis of interrelationships 
between means, goals, and consequences. These hypotheses can be derived 
from the goal of economic development. The definition of economic develop­
ment proposed for this study includes the concept of a progressive increase 
in the economic and social capacity of the people to produce, simultaneous­
ly with a rise in their per capita levels of consumption and living, within 
a fairly equalitarian social structure. Implications of such a goal for the 
agricultural sector are broadly three-fold: 
1. The productivity of the agricultural sector has to increase pro­
gressively and the use of resources has to be improved. 
2. The per capita level of consumption and living of the agricultural 
population will have to rise to the extent permitted by the rise in 
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the productive capacity and the needs of the country. 
3. Some measure of equality in income distribution has to be achieved. 
These criteria lead to a number of hypotheses emanating from the micro-
structure of the agricultural industry and adequately represented by the 
land tenure systems. The formulation of these hypotheses will determine 
the nature of the theoretical analysis (model) to be attempted for this 
study. 
Hypotheses suiting the above criteria can be classified into three 
categories (5, pp. 11-15): 
1. Delimiting hypotheses: These indicate the extent to which particu­
lar land tenure structures obstruct and impede the achievement of de­
velopment goals within agriculture and the nation. It has already been 
recognized that incentives, knowledge, and capital are essential ele­
ments of agricultural development. Consequently, problematic hypothe­
ses can deal with tenure structures (both domestic and international) 
consequences that defeat the existence of some of these elements. 
2. Diagnostic hypotheses: These evaluate the various classes of land 
tenure structures in terms of their defects and contributions. 
Diagnostic hypotheses can answer questions such as: 
a. How and why do the particular land tenure structures affect 
adversely or favorably the incentive for the human agent in 
agriculture to increase his productivity given ample capital and 
knowledge? 
b. How and why do the particular land tenure structures affect 
adversely or favorably technical and managerial innovations in 
agriculture given ample capital and incentives? 
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c. How and why do the particular land tenure structures affect 
adversely or favorably the formation of capital or access to 
capital given the incentive to use capital and the necessary 
technical and managerial knowledge? 
3. Remedial hypotheses: These hypotheses seek to remove the defects 
inherent in the domestic land tenure structures, to expand their 
contributions and to introduce the contributions that the tenure 
structures of international origin can make as identified by the diag­
nostic hypotheses. The modifications in domestic land tenure 
structures to be suggested are to be appraised in terras of the simul­
taneous achievement of the goals of agricultural development. The 
conformity of these goals with the ones for overall economic develop­
ment can also be assessed using the same procedures with which the 
defects are identified. 
The tentative propositions that are used as guides in this study will 
be specifically concerned with the effects of land tenure arrangements upon 
agricultural development. It must be pointed out, however, that most of the 
hypotheses to be formulated subsequently will not be tested in this study 
since data required in terms of empirical verification is not available. 
Major hypotheses can be formulated within the framework of the objec­
tives of agricultural development to identify and evaluate the performance 
of land tenure structures in contributing to these objectives. 
If the objective is to increase farm income, it is then necessary to 
define efficiency conditions derived from the production function which, if 
met, will imply the realization of the objective. Specifically the impli­
cation here is that the existing land tenure structures do not provide the 
necessary incentives for farmers to maximize their returns in a way 
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consistent with an increase in national income and general well-being. 
Partially they also act as obstacles to the farm production process in the 
sense that they do not provide the required atmosphere for capital creation. 
More so, they are not efficient media for the grafting and dissemination of 
scientific technical knowledge in the form of fertilizers, insecticides, new 
high yielding varieties, and modern agricultural machinery. Within this 
setting land tenure structures are evaluated only in terms of their contri­
bution to improved productivity and use of resources, a prerequisite to much 
of what is desired in the way of nonmaterial human goals. Since the funda­
mental goal is sustained productive efficiency, the attempt will be to judge 
any land tenure system from the way in which it contributes to the efficien­
cy by which inputs are transformed into farm products needed by the people. 
If we assume the existence of an ideal economy where the price vector 
reflects accurately consumers' preferences and aids in guiding the allo­
cation of resources in the production sphere then producers can maximize 
their returns in a manner consistent with the wishes of the consumers by 
(1) utilizing the factors of production such that their costs, are a mini­
mum, and by (2) producing that particular output which will equalize the 
marginal costs to marginal returns. The lack of fulfillment of these two 
necessary conditions by any particular "property establishment"^ implies an 
A property establishment as used in this study refers to the way in 
which the land is held. It constitutes a bundle of resources formed of 
knowledge, minimum capital, and an incentive to produce a certain output. 
A property establishment is considered superior to another property es­
tablishment if the output it produces with the given bundle of resources is 
relatively higher or if by using a relatively smaller bundle of resources it 
produces the same output. 
The above definition is broad enough to allow the assessment of the via­
bility of a tenure system in terms of the surplus of inducements over contri­
butions it endows its members with and narrow enough to grant a discussion of 
optimality conditions in terms of the theory of the firm (23, pp. 172-173). 
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imbalance in resource use, in the product-mix, or in both. 
Such economic rules can be translated into specific hypotheses which 
can be applied to domestic tenure structures and "international" ones as 
well. Many students in the general area of land tenure structures and agri­
cultural development (5, 6, 11 and 12) have suggested numerous propositions 
in their attempts to relate agrarian reforms to overall economic develop­
ment. By and large they involve a discussion of the "security" of tenure, 
the set of technical^ or productive opportunities as conditioned by tenure 
and the interdependence between tenure arrangements and the process of 
capital formation. 
These propositions support the tenet that "traditional" agriculture is 
confronted with structural traps that limit progress. With this sketch as 
a premise and following the classification of hypotheses by the three cate­
gories defined previously, several hypotheses are derived. 
I. The problematic hypothesis indicates that the existing land tenure 
structures (domestic) yield consequences that impede the achievement of the 
developmental goals within agriculture and the nation. Presently the 
Sudanese economy is characterized by a "modern" sector existing alongside a 
near-stagnant agricultural sector. Expansion in the "modern" sector, though 
not pronounced, cannot by itself be relied upon to raise the level of pro­
duction and to improve the use of resources in the agricultural sector. 
Programs for development so far have not been geared to rid the "tradition­
al" sector of problems that stand in the way of a progressive integrated 
agriculture. Problems such as labor redundancy in agriculture, limited 
^Technology is defined specifically "as the complete set of processes 
available or potentially available for production" (24, p. 62). This defi­
nition is general enough to grant a consideration of farm size, managerial 
innovation and the adoption of new farm practices, etc. 
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technological opportunities and capital insufficiency hinder agricultural 
development. Land tenure structures within the agricultural sector tend to 
harbour these problems. The low levels of productivity per worker and/or 
per acre prevalent under the various Sudanese tenure arrangements do not 
permit the agricultural sector to contribute to a positive increase in per 
capita real income. Therefore, if conseouences compatible with the goals of 
agricultural and economic development are to be realized structural changes 
designed to attain a stated increase in annual per capita real income and to 
raise the standard of living of the population are essential. The problem­
atic hypothesis then, is to identify the gap that exists between the present 
situation and the one that will permit the attainment of the developmental 
goals pursued. 
II. In seeking to explain the problematic situation, three diagnostic hy­
potheses are proposed. Such diagnostic hypotheses may be referred to as 
"structural traps". Three of these traps are recognized; the incentive 
trap, the technical trap, and the capital trap. For example, the dissoci­
ation of benefits from costs under Gezira partnership is an incentive trap. 
High fixed costs of operation under the annual leasehold system in the 
Gedaref District is a capital trap. Fragmented holdings in the Northern 
Province, and dispersed units of cultivation under tribal tenure in southern 
Sudan represent a technical trap. Following the terminology adopted the 
diagnostic hypotheses indicate that: 
1. Given sufficient technological knowledge and capital, land tenure 
structures cause incentive inefficiencies that prohibit the decision­
maker and resource-holder in agriculture from contributing satisfacto­
rily to the goal of improved productivity. Incentives as used in this 
study are of two types: 
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(a) farm incentives that relate to "security of tenure", and 
(b) incentives for occupational opportunities. 
I'Jhereas (a) is applicable to the human-agent under particular tenure 
situations, (b) applies to human-labor in general. It is hypothesized that 
under both incentive types the value marginal productivity of resources is 
not concomitant with the resource efforts expended under various tenure 
systems. Under type (a) incentive, the deviation between an estimated value 
marginal product and the price, for different tenure "firms" may serve as a 
test for this hypothesis. Incentive condition (b) is related to the in­
flexible nature of tenure structures resulting in immobility of resources. 
This is also related to the lack of job opportunities off the farm. A 
comparison of resource opportunity costs may be a valid test for this part 
of the hypothesis. 
2. Given necessary incentives and access to capital, improved produc­
tivity and resource use depends on the level of technical knowledge as 
conditioned-by tenure arrangements. The level of technical knowledge 
is partly reflected by the scale of operation. The scale of operation 
as used here refers either to the "economic" farm size^ or farm's 
layout. A farm size that is not optimum as a result of a particular 
tenure arrangement, and a layout of farms which is a consequence of 
excessive fragmentation are both causes of inefficient resource allo­
cation. I'Thereas the former reveals intraspatial misallocation of re­
sources, the latter reveals interspatial misallocation of resources. 
Inefficiency in both is exhibited by: 
^It has been argued by Carroll that uneconomic farm size might be the 
result of factors other than tenure such as population pressure in certain 
areas (25, p. 585). The implication here, however, is that these factors 
do not hamper efficiency as much as the prevailing tenure system does, 
particularly in reference to size optima. 
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a. the hinderance to investment of indivisible capital, 
b. the obstruction to the use of modern techniques, and 
c. wasteful use of the labor resources and of managerial 
capabilities and potentials. 
It follows from the above that different tenure systems may reflect 
constant returns, increasing returns, or decreasing returns to scale. By 
studying a range of farm sizes under different tenure situations, it should 
be possible to estimate different production elasticities for the various 
productive services used. Knowing the scale relationship that a particular 
tenure structure exhibits, it may then be possible to compare different farm 
sizes with the optimum^ size as defined by the following equation: 
MPn MPk MPl MPm 
\ Pl = ^X Pm = 1'° 
where P^ refers to the price of the product, MP refers to the marginal 
product of the resource denoted by the subscript, and P^, P^, P^, and P^ 
refer to the prices of labor, capital, land and management respectively 
(26, p. 380). 
3. Given incentives and sufficient knowledge, land tenure structures 
condition capital use and generation in agriculture.? Tenure status 
impedes optimum capital allocation in agriculture through (a) high 
The optimum size may be restricted by the environmental and economic 
characteristics of a particular region. Such is the case in the Northern 
Province in Sudan. These characteristics and other limitations have to be 
taken into consideration in determining the "optimum" tenure system. 
^Within the general framework of economic development, capital invest­
ment in agriculture is strongly related to the pattern of capital investment 
in the industrial sector. The connection between the two is superficially 
touched upon in dealing with credit institutions. 
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fixed costs of ownership and operation and (b) the diversion of a 
large proportion of earnings into unproductive expenditures. 
VThen tenure arrangements are related to the operation of a credit 
system, they exhibit symptoms that obstruct the efficient absorption of 
outside capital. These symptoms appear in the form of (a) nonexistent or 
unconfirmed titles to land and unsettled rural life, (b) government con­
tracts and control over land that minimize the role of private capital and 
(c) a weak resource base to the borrower of outside capital even if defects 
(a) and (b) are removed. 
Conversely, given tenure conditions, the credit system is inefficient. 
This is sustained by the traditional practice fostered by religious doctrine 
and custom. In the Islamic World "interest to stimulate saving and to 
facilitate the appropriate allocation of capital is still deemed contrary 
to religion and/or ecclesiastical sanction" (27, p. 36). 
The taxation structure being closely linked with the land tenure systems 
also influences capital formation in agriculture. A relatively higher 
preference is placed by the policy-maker on the collection of direct taxes 
as a source of revenue. Besides giving rise to innumerable problems of 
administration, the desire for higher revenue through taxation is not com-' 
mensurate with the effects of taxes on agricultural production and improved 
resource use. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that high administrative costs 
plus relatively low direct tax returns coupled with decreasing returns® to 
the individual farmer as a consequence of the tax levy may well slmf do^ra 
the rate of increase in output and capital formation in agriculture. 
Q 
It is assumed here that in the long-run producers of agricultural 
commodities will be in a position to accelerate capital formation in agri­
culture by reinvesting a large portion of their net returns on farm 
improvements. 
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III. Following the diagnostic hypotheses, the remedial hypothesis is 
introduced to serve as a basis for suggesting possible alternative modifi­
cations in the land tenure structures consistent with the goals pursued. 
In the search for tenure forms that are suited for adoption, the criteria 
of incentives, technical and managerial innovations and capital are viewed 
as essential ingredients for success. In this sense the remedial hypothesis 
may be called the "success" hypothesis. Specifically it is hypothesized, 
that land tenure structures, domestic and derived from other experiences, 
are characterized by success elements, which if identified and extended, 
could contribute to increased production. 
In summary, the hypotheses formulated above are; 
I. The "problematic" hypothesis 
II. The "structural traps" hypothesis: 
1. The incentive trap 
2. The technical trap 
3. The capital trap, and 
III. The "success" hypothesis 
In the interest of brevity, these terms will be used throughout this 
report in referring to the specific hypotheses. 
Suggested Theoretical Tools and Elaboration of a Model 
In the light of the hypotheses formulated in the previous section, we 
shall suggest a particular model to suit the conditions and serve the 
purpose of analyzing the structure of Sudanese agriculture. We suggest a 
theoretical framework on the lines worked out by Van de Wetering (21), but 
applied to a different context. 
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Tinbergen and others are increasingly applying the "complete system 
method" in their econometric work. The method, in short, is to prepare a 
complete system of equations explaining the interrelations of both of the 
"endogenous" and the "exogenous" variables (28). The endogenous variables 
in an economic system are the variables within the system (such as total 
production, per capita income of the agricultural labor force, factors 
demand, etc.) and the exogenous variables are those which are external to 
the system (for example, social factors, input prices, base-acreage of land 
in production, weather, etc.). In the case of an economy which is predomi­
nantly agricultural, this approach is still more important, since the 
exogenous variables, particularly land tenure structures, social and 
climatic conditions, are instrumental in determining the different effects 
on the different units of the system. It is necessary that due importance 
should be attached to both the endogenous and exogenous variables in order 
finally to select the proper variables in the system that are to be observed 
and measured. 
In view of the above reasoning, the following model is regarded as a 
suitable devise for depicting the role that agriculture can play in con­
tributing to economic development through modifications in land tenure 
structures. 
We first define the production function for agriculture in the follow­
ing Cobb-Douglas form: 
elasticities. is labor inputs (variable), is capital inputs (vari 
able), and is base-acreage (fixed). 
(1)  
where is index of technological progress, and are production 
Define the gross value of agricultural production as: 
(2) Y = . Qa 
where is agricultural output, Pq is price of agricultural output and Y 
^a 
is gross value of output. 
Define the distribution of output: 
(3) Y . YP + YG 
where is domestic private demand, Yq is government demand for agri­
cultural output. 
Define private demand for agricultural output: 
D  ^ „ „''i (4) ïp • "o'iVyi 
a 
where is total population in non-agriculture; non-agricultural per 
capita income; price elasticity; and b2 is income elasticity. 
Assuming profit maximization in production, the following marginal 
efficiency conditions can be derived; 
(5) fJa . \ 
where are labor inputs, and is the agricultural wage rate. 
(«) 
SK, Pq 
a 
= % 
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where denotes capital inputs, and Pg is the price of capital inputs. 
These marginal efficiency conditions are the economic indicators that 
serve as a measure of the deviation between the norm and the present 
situation. 
The agricultural per capita income is defined as: 
... 
a 
where is agricultural per capita income and is agricultural population. 
The total agricultural output is distributed according to the princi­
ple of "value-added". If this is to be the case then the total gross value 
of production will be completely exhausted by labor expenditures, capital 
expenditures, and rent payments. The variable factors of production, labor, 
and capital will be employed in such a manner that their marginal value 
productivities are equated to their prices. The payment to land is the 
residual which will remain after both capital and labor have been rewarded. 
The wage bill of the agricultural labor force can be defined as: 
(8) W = . «a = "'l • % 
T O'l Y 
where W is the wage bill in agriculture, anàO^-^ is the eleasticity of pro­
duction with respect to labor. 
Capital expenditure in agriculture can also be defined in the same 
manner as follows: 
( 9 )  C  :  P . .  K .  :  Ks N = ' 1 • "a 
/.A 
where C is capital expenditure andis the elasticity of production with 
respect to capital. 
Rent payments are defined as follows: 
(10) R . . Qa _ . N, - P;.^ . K, 
= (1 - ^ 1 - • Qa 
where R refers to rent payment. Using Equation 1 and the marginal ef­
ficiency conditions, the supply function for output and the demand functions 
for labor and capital can be derived. 
The supply function for agricultural output: 
7\ o/^ ^ D 
(11) Qa = • FUa 
where 7\ = 1 . 
1 - o^ i - fTj 
The supply function is then some function of the index of technology, 
the quantity of land available for cultivation, the price of labor, capital 
and agricultural output. 
The demand function for labor is: 
Tig, XT, >(4-1) 
(12) «a . A; . «1 - ' - La ' ^Ka ' ' Tq, . 
Likewise, the demand function for capital is: 
A TICV, >(l-(?i) (^°i-l) 
(13) : A; .d; I .g 1 - La ' PN, • Pk, • 
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Land as a fixed input enters each of these functions as a shifter, 
whereas capital, labor, and agricultural output are represented by their 
respective prices. Since land enters as a shifter then, an increase in 
land acreage through diversification or the introduction of more irrigation 
projects will increase the supply of agricultural commodities and will en­
tail an increase in the demand for labor and capital. The index of tech­
nology can take account of land improvements in the form of conservation 
measures, fertilizers, and insecticides and other improvements. 
The above system of equations can be used to generate estimates for the 
endogenous variables in terms of the exogenous variables to meet the cri­
teria for improved efficiency and use of resources in agriculture as .formu­
lated in the previous section of this chapter. Following is a classifi­
cation of the variables recognized as endogenous and exogenous in the model: 
Endogenous variables 
Qa: Total agricultural output 
Yp: Domestic private demand 
Yg: Government demand 
Y : Gross value of the agricultural outputs 
W : Labor expenditure 
Ya: Per capita income of the agricultural labor force 
C : Capital expenditure 
R : Rent payments 
Na: Labor inputs used in production 
Ka: Capital inputs used in production 
Exogenous variables 
Vj[: Population in the nonagricultural sector 
Vg; Population in the agricultural sector 
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y^: Per capita income in nonagriculture 
L^: Base-acreage of land in production 
Ajt Index of technological progress 
Pq : Price of the agricultural output 
^a 
Pn^: Agricultural wage rate 
P^ : Price of capital inputs in agriculture 
There is thus a total of ten endogenous variables and a set of nine 
exogenous variables. The number of parameters that have to be knot-m for 
numerical specification of the model are restricted to the production 
function (1) and the domestic private demand (4). This conforms with the 
means-end continuum (Figure 1), where the production possibility set and the 
consumer preference patterns are viewed as intermediaries in attaining the 
goals pursued. For analytical purposes, it is necessary to solve for the 
endogenous variables in terms of the exogenous variables. Since most of 
the equations enter in nonlinear form, Taylor expansion of the first order 
offers a convenient means for the linearization of such eauations. To 
demonstrate the procedure, we start by the Cobb-Douglas form: 
"Il Qa = Al K,! . 
We then write the first-order Taylor expansion as; 
where the subscript o indicates that the expansion is approximate only in 
o 
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the neighborhood of the point of evaluation. The above expression can be 
written as: 
In other words, the proportionate change in agricultural production is 
a linear function of the proportionate changes in labor and capital. More 
generally we solve for the endogenous variables such that a proportionate 
(or percentage) change in any endogenous variable is expressible as a linear 
function of proportionate changes in exogenous variables. Small roman 
R - R 
letters will indicate such percentage changes, for instance, r s . 
R 
Applying this procedure and solving for the endogenous variables we obtain 
Table 2. The coefficients appearing in this table are various linear combi­
nations or products of the parameters appearing in the production function 
and demand function for agricultural output, that is, b^, and 
b2. A numerical example is therefore readily constructed, provided one 
specify the parameters of the production function and demand for agricultural 
output. The estimation of the parameters of the farm production function and 
the demand function for agricultural output can be performed only when the 
relevant data are made available. For this study we are just content with 
demonstrating the relevance of the model in accounting for the interaction 
between changes in land tenure structures and other economic forces, oper­
ating independently from the institutional structures in agriculture. 
Table 2 demonstrates points of interest to the policy-maker. Under de­
creasing returns to scale <1), modifications in land tenure 
structures accompanied by advances in technology (A^) would enhance the pro­
ductivity goal. With only slight changes in the resource mix through the 
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Table 2. Structural dependence between endogenous and exogenous variables in percentage changes^ 
?! Va 
^i •^1 
Equation Endogenous 
variable 
Symbol 
Total population 
excluding agri­
cultural labor 
force 
Agricultural 
labor force 
Per capita 
income 
excluding 
agriculture 
Index of 
technologj 
progress 
1. Total production Qa -- - -
2. Demand for labor - -
3. Demand for capital 
^a 
-  - -  - -  -
h. Domestic private 
demand 
1 -  - bg -  -
5. Government demand - 1 -  —  
-^2 
6. Rent payments r = 
-- -  —  -  -
7. Per capita income 
in agriculture 
^a 
--
- 1 - - A 
^Source; (21, p. 589). 
b;. 1 
1 -cfl 
^ , Qa - , etc. 
in percentage changes 
yi ^ % 
ir capita 
icome Index of Total land Agricultural Price of capital Price for agri-
;cludinti technological in wage rate items used in cultural output 
;ri culture progress production production 
y 
M 
A (.^1-1) 
7\ 
- b. 
A 
7^^ 1 -
1%%! 'At -7\<^ 
l-f-A( - t»! 
-hi 
A 
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implementation of effective dissemination techniques and reorganization of 
farm holdings output will be increased in multiplicative fashion since 
A > 1. The per capita income of the agricultural labor force increases by 
?\ percent. The distribution of factor earnings between rents and wages 
remains constant with a Cobb-Douglas function and hence the wage bill and 
rent payments in agriculture increase in equal proportion. 
Suppose that with increasing incentives and expansion in the industri­
al sector, the wage level (P^^) in agriculture rises. The per capita 
income of the people employed in agriculture changes by - 1) -f- 1 
percent. The demand for labor in agriculture declines by 7\.(^ - 1) 
percent. The demand for capital declines by Rent payments and total 
production are equally affected. Thus, policy instruments that associate 
changes in tenure structures with capital substitutability in small doses, 
and with an effective labor release-absorption mechanism offer an appropri­
ate package of means to break through the so-called structural traps. 
Until now discussion of the model has been carried out in terms of 
sectors. Modifications in land tenure structures however, may involve a 
change in the ownership base, resource availability, or change in the 
parameters of the production function. The productive efficiency of a 
tenure system evaluated by production-function analysis at the farm level 
can be conceived of as a convenient means of relating the individual pro­
ducer to the aggregate industry function. In this sense, one similar pro­
duction function could be fitted wherein various farms from within every 
tenure class by locality could be sampled. The estimation of such production 
functions depends on the selection of agricultural input-output information 
that could be made possible through having cross-sectional data for the 
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selected tenure systems. One of the benefits of such analysis would be to 
test the aforesaid hypotheses thus arriving at some judgement about the 
efficiency of the prevalent factor proportions in production and hence to 
suggest changes in these proportions in the optimal direction. 
Every tenure class can then be represented by an aggregate production 
function which reflects "a composition of farm activities as well as output-
input relationships" (29, p. 552). The composite production of every tenure 
class can be described by a Cobb-Douglas function of the form: 
= F® (N, K, L) 
where E refers to any particular tenure class, X the composite output of 
that tenure class, N, K, and L, are three broadly defined inputs of labor, 
capital, and land. It is assumed that this production function is homoge­
neous of the first degree with the following conditions: 
4f"- I f"-  I f '"  
W"-
llx! . 0. > 0, 0 
i.e. we assume diminishing marginal returns to factors of production. 
Subsequent to this we can develop as many functional relationships as 
there are tenure classes. What distinguishes one tenure system from the 
other is that it is described by some input-output variables different from 
some other variables. Within the same tenure structure, various farms 
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would be particularized by the same variable, but in different proportions. 
This is indicated by the classification of variables related to four tenure 
classes in the Sudan in Table 3. The classification given, however, is not 
a comprehensive description of the totality of the structure of the farming 
system in the localities mentioned. There are other forms of tenure within 
these various localities which are not taken into consideration in this 
study. Inasmuch as the ones taken are regarded to be representative of the 
particular farming areas, the classification given satisfies the require­
ments of this study without loss of generality. 
The structure of a particular tenure system as displayed by the vari­
ables that characterize it, is of significance in evaluating its "virtues" 
(efficiency capabilities and potentials) by using the criteria related to 
incentives, capital, and knowledge. Important implications can be drawn 
from this regarding the ends-in-view sought. If the assessment is to be 
made in light of the objectives of a composite firm,^ in this case a tenure 
class, then the criteria for assessment must be the efficiency with which 
the functions are carried out and the extent to which the input capabili­
ties is realized. 
Inasmuch as the theory of the firm is regarded as the basis of the 
analysis, the following production efficiency criteria must hold if each 
tenure class is to produce consequences that are compatible with the ob­
jective of improved efficiency and use of resources: 
1. Resources must be allocated within each farm in such a manner that 
the marginal value productivities (MVP) of the resource services are 
^The term "composite firm" is used synonymously with the term 
"property establishment" defined in the previous section. 
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Table 3* The agrarian structure of four tenure classes in the Sudan 
Locality-
Variables South Northern Province 
1. Type of tenure 
2. Organizational*structure 
a. Entrepreneurship 
function 
b. Management function 
c. Labor function 
Communal 
"traditional" 
managerial skill 
Communal labor 
Family labor 
male labor 
female labor 
child labor 
Individual ownership 
(Family farm) 
Head of the family 
Head of family 
Family labor 
3. Type of farming 
4. Size and operation 
Intensive cropping 
and grazing 
Dry farming 
Nonme chanical 
Diversified 
production 
Subsistence 
-A basic coirmion unit in 
terms of village 
family-heads 
-Carrying capacity of 
range as a measure 
of size 
-Land operated by 
household 
Intensive farming 
Irrigation 
i. flood irrigation 
ii. basin irrigation 
iii. pump irrigation®' 
iv. water-wheels^ and buckets 
Nonme chanical 
Diversified production 
Subsistence, internal market 
and export 
Small holdings 
Fragmented holdings (1-4 acres) 
Dry 
Owner-operated 
^A unique situation that exists in the Northern Province is the one where individual ownership of ; 
is superimposed on individual ownership of land. In this case, land belongs to small owners or is divl 
pump-owner, cultivator, and sometimes landowners. This case will also be dealt with in this study. 
^he water-wheel is not always a family farm. Frequently the land is owned by a different person : 
tenant provides the labor (30, p. 287). 
hem Province Gedaref District Gezira Scheme 
al ownership 
farm) 
the family 
Annual leasehold Triple partnership or vertical 
family 
ihor 
Licensee or hired manager, 
usually with technical 
experience 
Hired labor 
Skilled labor 
Migratory labor 
Sudan Gesira Board and Tenant 
Controlled labor (industrial) 
Contractual labor 
Tenant's family and hired labor 
^tensive farming 
Dry 
Mechanical 
Î farming 
)n 
-ood irrigation 
IS in irrigation 
inç irrigation®' 
iter-wheels^ and buckets Specialized 
deal 
.ed production 
ice, internal market 
ort 
Internal market mostly 
dings 
d holdings (1-4 acres) 
Rent-operated 
(fixed rent) 
Intensive farming 
Gravity-fed irrigation 
Mechanical and nonmechanical 
Specialized 
Primarily export 
Subsistence and internal market 
Share operation 
rated 
where individual ownership of pump and irrigation works in the private pump shcemes 
ongs to small owners or is divided between tenants and the crops are shared between 
e dealt with in this study. 
is owned by a different person from the one who owns the water-wheel, while the 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Variables Locality South Northern Province 
5. Land characteristics 
6. Capital in use: 
a. Machinery and 
equipment 
h. Seeds,, fertilizers and 
insecticides 
c. Crops and produce on 
hand 
d. Livestock categories 
a. Clay soils 
In the flood region: 
-"Toich" land 
-Intermediate land 
-High land 
"b. Lateritic soils 
a. Primitive hand tools 
h. Negligible 
c. Negligible 
d. Livestock; beehives 
and fisheries 
Alluvial soils 
'Gezira' (or island) soil 
'Sagia* (or qurer) soil 
'Kara' soil 
a. Punç and canal layour and 
animal drawn implements 
b. Limited seed supply 
c. Negligible 
d. Draft animals, sheep and 
goats, poultry and orchards 
7. Products and 
activities 
8. Credit facilities by 
source 
a. Private sector 
b. Public sector 
9. Taxation structure 
10. Market structure 
a. Location 
b. Communications 
c. Transportation and 
distribution 
Grain crops 
cassava 
telebun 
Vegetable crops 
Fruit crops 
Cattle, hides and skin 
Fisheries 
Bee wax 
Hut tax 
Poll tax 
Remote and isolated 
Grain crops 
wheat, maize 
vegetable crops 
Fruit crops 
citrus fruits 
dates and mango 
Pulses 
Fodder crops 
a. Moneylender, relatives 
Conçany organizations 
b. Agricultural bank 
Date tsix 
Ushur (tilth) 
Near to export market 
but not well-linked 
with internal markets 
lorthem Province Gedaref District Sezira Scheme 
L1 soils Clay soils Clay soils 
•a' (or island) soil 
i' (or qurer) soil 
soil 
I and canal layour and a. 
lal drawn implements 
ted seed supply b. 
igible c. 
t animals, sheep and d. 
s, poultry and orchards 
Tractor, planting equip­
ment, spare-parts and 
hand tools 
Sorghum and seasme seeds 
Grain storage 
Negligible 
a. Works equipment and materials 
for irrigation ginning., and 
agricultural operations plus 
small band implements and 
animal drawn 
b. Cotton seeds, other seeds 
and materials 
c. Cotton stocks 
d. Poultry bams milk sheds 
and draft animals 
rops 
, maize 
able crops 
rops 
s fruits 
and mango 
Grain crops 
sorghum (dura) 
Oil crops 
sesame 
groundnuts 
Fiber crops 
Cotton 
Grain crops (dura) 
Fodder crops (lubia) 
crops 
ylender, relatives 
any organizations 
cultural bank b. 
Commercial banks 
Machinery contracting 
companies 
Agricultural bank b. 
Moneylender and relatives 
Machinery contracting and 
cooperative marketing boards 
Agricultural bank 
s 
bilth) 
export market 
3t well-linked 
Internal markets 
High transportation costs Most favored in terms of three 
attributes of a market structure 
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equal to the price of the resource service. A unit of labor or capi­
tal should not be used for cotton if it can produce greater value pro­
duct in wheat. The above condition can be stated briefly in the 
following form: 
MVPj^ = - MVP^ = MVPl « Pl 
Resource prices P^, Pj^, and are opportunity costs -- a more mean­
ingful expression than actual prices. This condition insures that 
every factor is rewarded according to its contribution. It also 
implies that there is no limitational input and it defines the optimum 
factor-product combination given all other factors and products. 
2. The resources must be substituted in such a manner that the ratio 
of the marginal physical product of each pair of resources is erual to 
their respective price ratio. Formally this condition is defined as 
follows : 
MPPjg MPPj^ MPP^ 
This condition defines the least-cost combination of productive 
services for a given level of production. 
3. The services of a resource must be allocated between compatitive 
products such that equal marginal value productivities are achieved, 
i.e. 
= ^N,X2 = ^^N,X3 ^N,X^ 
where N is labor allocated to the production of various crops, Xj, X2, 
X3 'Xjj on the farm. This condition implies maximum production 
given the stock of resources. 
The above conditions can be extended to also satisfy the optimality 
criteria between farms in a particular tenure system, between regions con­
taining a variety of tenure systems, between agriculture and nonagriculture 
and overtime. Also, the consumer can be tied in to the analysis as a 
furnisher of a factor of production through the leisure-effort function. 
The usefulness of the model so far described can be stated briefly in 
the following two points; 
1. Given the optimum conditions within the realm of which a tenure 
system must operate, deviations from these conditions generated by the 
model would be reflected in deficiencies in either incentives, or the 
technical state of production or capital or a combination of these. 
The model, if estimated, will enable us to measure these deficiencies 
in terms of the costs and the marginal returns of the above categories. 
This sort of benefit-cost analysis will in turn increase our knowledge 
of the causes of inefficiency and will give a guide as to their cure. 
2. The empirical verification of the model can serve as a basis from 
which a partial solution to the agricultural problem of the nation can 
be recommended in terms of the emergence of a "best form" of tenure. 
For this purpose, an efficiency index of tenure based on actual and 
"optimum" resource expenditures such as the one developed by Miller 
(31, p. 53), could be constructed under Sudanese conditions. 
A defect of the model is the static long-run nature of the analysis. 
It is long-run since all factors are assumed to be variable. However, to 
introduce time into the analysis. Hicks treats physically the same resource 
services used at different dates (production intervals) as "different" 
services and the same products turned out at different dates as "different" 
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products. Also, discounted prices can be substituted for static prices for 
dealing with intertemporal allocation of repources (32, p. 197). 
Another weakness is the conflict between the macro-concepts developed 
in the first part of the model and the micro-concepts evident in the 
objective function of a firm. A detailed analysis of the variables under 
scrutiny presents a clearer picture of the socio-economic structure of the 
economy, but the danger involved is that it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to break dovm the different units of each variable into homoge­
neous units. %en dealing with the system as a whole in terms of broad 
aggregates one loses sight of the "farmer" but gains from viewing the 
economic system in its totality. However, the choice between the two is an 
optimum decision-making process in itself. It depends on the availability 
of resources and time. However, the whole analytical framework developed 
thus far could be regarded as a frame of reference suited to point out, 
through demonstration where data are inadequate, to tenure deficiencies. 
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CHAPTER THREE: EXISTING TENURE STRUCTURES 
The Sudanese Environment within which Tenure Structures Function 
Before discussing the tenure structures within the context of the ana­
lytical framework developed in the previous chapter, it appears necessary 
to appraise the Sudanese economy within which the existing tenure structures 
operate. The physical characteristics and the geographical aspects of the 
economy are an inseparable part in a consideration of agricultural develop­
ment through land tenure structures. Consenuently, it is of importance to 
give due respect to these aspects of the Sudanese economy in the following 
brief form. 
The Sudan consists for the most part of a plain rising gradually in 
elevation from north to south and westward and eastward from the Nile River 
Valley. Its total area is nearly one million souare miles. 
In the east, this plain is separated from the Red Sea by an escarpment 
of hills rising one thousand meters. In the west-central region, the Nuba 
Mountains rise out of the plain. Further to the west there is the Jebel 
Marra Range which attains an elevation of over three thousand meters. The 
only other impor .ant mountain range is the Imatongs of the Uganda border. 
The country is entirely situated within the tropical zone. The 
climate shows wide variation. It never rains in the extreme north, whereas, 
rain is plentiful in the extreme south so that rainfall generally increases 
from north to south. This distribution of rainfall is reflected in the 
types of vegetation which pass from thorny, almost leafless drought-re­
sistant types of vegetation in the north to evergreen and deciduous forests 
in the south. The largest part of the country consists of savannah lands 
or arid and semi-arid desert. The temperature shows considerable daily 
variation in the northern desert areas. Farther south this variation is 
lessened by higher rainfall and humidity, and temperatures are generally 
uniform throughout the area. 
The total population of the Sudan in 1955-56 numbered 10.3 millions 
(see Table 4a and b). It is rapidly increasing at an annual rate of around 
2.8 percent. The population estimate gives the density of approximately 12 
persons to the square mile. The distribution of the population over the 
country is very uneven. For instance, one-fifth of the total population 
lives in Blue Nile Province in the Central Region. Below the line Geneina-
E1 Obeid-Kosti-Sennar-Kassala, rainfall is sufficient for grain cultivation. 
The population there is distributed rather evenly from east to west. This 
area comprises the provinces of Darfur, Kordofan, Bahr El Ghazal, Upper 
Nile, and Equatoria, with the total population of 5.9 million and also part 
of the Blue Nile and Kassala Provinces (Figure 2). Abova this line, how­
ever, rains are insufficient and therefore the people are concentrated near 
the River Nile. This area comprises northern and western provinces with a 
population of 1.4 million and part of the Blue Nile and Kassala Provinces. 
However, it is reasonably assumed that the country can accommodate in­
creased population with economic benefit. Indeed, the number of annual 
immigrants in search of employment points to this. Population distribution 
counts as much as numbers. It is not an altogether healthy sign that the 
population of the larger towns seems to be increasing in number at a greater 
pace than the population as a whole. This statement is made with utmost 
reserve because it is felt that an agricultural country cannot afford to 
have a large number of unproductive mouths to feed and it cannot be doubted 
that, in the absence of a corresponding development of industry, the "drift 
to towns" is a real limitation to development. 
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Figure 2, Main agricultural regions o£ the Sudan (33, p. 32a). 
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Table 4.a. The Sudan - Total and working population (in '000 persons)* 
1956 Census 1961 Census 
Pi-ovince Total population Economic. Total Economic. 
active population active 
in 7o of 
Urban Rural Total Total pop. 
Bahr El Ghazal 17 974 991 561 55.8 1,157 646 
Blue Nile 144 1,926 2,070 820 39.2 2,398 936 
Darfur 54 1,275 1,329 762 56.9 1,539 875 
Equatoria 22 881 903 529 57.2 1,050 607 
Kassala 149 792 941 389 40.9 1,097 446 
Khartoum 255 250 505 184 36.4 584 212 
Northern 88 785 873 250 28.6 1,014 290 
Upper Nile 10 879 889 433 48.1 1,038 490 
Kordofan 115 1,647 1,762 931 52.6 2,052 1,070 
Sudan 854 9,409 10,263 4,859 11,929 5,572 
^Source: (34, p. 3). 
Table 4.b. The Sudan - Occupational distribution of the labor force 
(in '000 persons)^ 
Males Females Total In % of labor force 
Pastoral activities 
a. farming, hunting. 
fishing, forestry 2,207 1,048 3,255 --
b. animal husbandry 837 63 900 
a -f- b 3,044 1,111 4,155 85.76 
Manufacturing 63 178 241 4.97 
Construction 31 -- 31 0.64 
Commerce 92 8 100 2.06 
Transport 31 -- 31 0.64 
Services 177 46 223 4.61 
Unclassified 54 10 64 1.32 
^Source: (34, p. 4). 
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The resources of the country are primarily agriculture, land, and 
water. There is a plentiful supply of good land for cultivation and graz­
ing. Generally, land availability causes no great problem in Sudan. This 
is evident from the assessment of the Sudan's land potential made by the 
Soil Conservation Department (Table 5). From the nearly two-hundred 
millions feddans (one feddan equals 1.038 acres or 0.42 hectares) of po­
tentially useful land, about eighty million feddans are more suited to live­
stock raising than to crop growing. This leaves 120 million feddans po­
tentially cultivable. It is estimated that only some six million feddans, 
or five percent at the most, are now under cultivation in any one year. 
This certainly leaves much room for improvement, though perhaps not as much 
as might be supposed. It is not within the scope of this study to make an 
estimate of how much land could be brought into cultivation. It is enough 
to shov? that a sufficiency of land is not a problem. 
However, effective use of agricultural land potential is limited by 
the availability of water. As mentioned above, there are certain areas 
where rainfall is inadequate for agricultural production and human settle­
ments are concentrated near the rivers. Expansion of agriculture in such 
areas depends largely on whether more water can be made available for irri­
gation. The building of Roseires and Khashm El Girba Dams will provide an 
abundant water supply for irrigation, and will in this way remove one of 
the most important bottlenecks in the economic development of Sudan. South 
of the line Geneina-Kassala, rains are generally sufficient to sustain 
agriculture. However, even here rainfall is rather uneven and, moreover, 
there are long periods of drought between rainy seasons. For this reason, 
the government has been pushing a program for the development of ponds or 
"haffirs" with protected rain-catchments and of underground water resources. 
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Table 5. The Sudan's land potential® 
Area 
Sq. Miles Feddans Percentage 
Northern desserts 145,500 89,686,200 15.00 
Marginal lands 366,175 255,710,270 37.75 
Ironstone country 145,500 89,686,200 15.00 
Total of land "impossible 
or difficult to develop 
,11 
657,175 405,082.670 67.76 
Swamp 12,125 7,473,850 1.25 
Southern rainland 9,700 5,979,080 1.00 
Rain flood plain 48,500 29,895,400 5.00 
Central rainlands 121,250 74,738,500 12.50 
Western cattle country 121,250 74,738,500 12.50 
Total of land of 
potential development 
321,825 192,825,330 32.25 
Grand total 970,000 597,908,000 100.00 
a 
Source: (35, p. 270). 
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The construction of "haffirs" is concentrated mainly in the clay-belt, while 
the development of underground water through well-drilling focuses on the 
sandy areas. 
The economic structure of the Sudan is, to a large extent, typical of 
a country passing through the early stages of economic dvelopment. In con­
trast to the economies of the industrially advanced countries, a substantial 
sector of the Sudanese economy is outside the exchange economy. A large 
part of the national product is still produced in a "traditional" way with­
out the help of modern techniques and investment goods. Consequently, the 
resources belonging to agriculture are being utilized at very low levels of 
productivity. This is one of the conspicuous characteristics of the agri­
cultural sector which is inseparable from the low level of per capita 
productivity that establishes the basis for the problems being investigated 
in this study. 
At the national levels, data for the value of the gross domestic 
product (hereafter referred to as GDP), together with the size of the popu­
lation for the periods 1955/56 - 1960/61 indicate a very low aggregate per 
capita income (Table 6). It can be observed from the table that a large 
part of the national product is still produced in the "subsistence sector" 
of the economy. 
The GDP originating in agriculture is 62 percent of the total GDP and 
the bulk of the population is engaged in agriculture. Thus, it is a truism 
to describe agriculture as the basic activity in Sudan, not only with 
reference to employment of resources but also with reference to total 
income. The description of agriculture as the basic activity contributing 
between three-fifths and two-thirds of the GDP implies that ameliorations 
in the agricultural sector are crucial to overall economic development. 
Table 6. The total value of production together with the size of the population for the 
period 1955/56 - 1960/61& 
Item 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 
I. G D P  
( c^s) (000,000) 
(a) Traditional part 
of economy 160.7 164.9 170.5 174.8 ' 181.6 187.2 
(b) Modern part 
of economy 123.5 149.7 140. 9 146.9 166. 2 170.0 
284.2 314. 6 311.4 321.7 347. 8 357.2 
II. Population 
(OOO's) 10,263 10,657 10,958 11,267 11,585 11,928 
III. GDP per capita 
27.42 29.52 28.42 28. 55 30.02 29.95 
^Source; (36, p. 16). 
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The existing conditions under which the resources are used in "sub­
sistence agriculture" imply the lack of fulfillment of an optimum situation 
within agriculture. The consequences thus far realized are incompatible 
with the ends in view mentioned previously. In the economy, it would 
appear, as we shall see later, that the available land and labor, apart from 
the scarce resource capital, are unused or underused. The abundance of 
land and labor relative to capital limits the range over which labor and/or 
land can be substituted for capital to obtain a greater output or even the 
same total output. Not only is the real income per person low as a conse­
quence of this disproportion in the use of resources, but also most of what 
is produced is being consumed, thus leaving almost nothing of what is 
scarce to be devoted to increasing the productive capacity of the economy. 
The "modern sector" of the economy, conceived as that part which is 
yielding a product by means of modern techniques and with the help of 
modern types of investment goods, has grown at an annual rate of 6.5 percent 
during the period 1955-56 — 1960-61. This is much higher than the three 
percent rate of aggregate growth of the "traditional sector". The total 
GDP has been increasing by 4.7 percent annually. Of course, this increase 
has been partly offset by the population growth which is 2.8 percent per 
annum. Thus, the per capita GDP has increased by about 2 percent each year 
and now it amounts to approximately 30 Sudanese pounds (1 Sudanese pound 
equals $2.87). In view of the rapid population increase, this rate of per 
capita growth cannot be considered as being satisfactory even though, in 
some regions of the country, the figure for per capita income might be 
higher than thirty Sudanese pounds. The situation is worsened more by the 
likelihood that the traditional sector has been absorbing a considerable 
portion of the natural increase in population. 
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In comparison with the per capita aggregate rate of increase, for the 
economy as a whole (1.7 percent), the annual rate of increase in the per 
capita productivity of the "traditional sector" is estimated to be: per 
capita growth of "traditional income" equals "traditional sector" grovjth^/ 
traditional population increase = 3/2.8 s 1.07 percent. By the same token, 
the per capita growth of the modern sector is: 
Per capita growth of the modern sector 
s Modern Sector growth 
Modern Sector population 
= = 2.32 percent 
2 . 8  
The above numerical illustration reveals the likelihood that the out­
come of differential changes in population growth will be a heavy burden 
and a drag on "traditional agriculture". It follows from this that if the 
major increase in population is going to occur in the "traditional sector", 
the difference in productivity between the "traditional sector" and the 
"modern sector" is going to be deepened in the future, even if the tra­
ditional output is to be expanded to meet the increasing requirements of a 
groTfing population. Thus, at least for food supplies to be maintained, a 
transfer of labor must occur from areas where heavy population pressure on 
the land exists to areas located in the "modern sector" of the economy. 
Productivity in the "traditional sector" will have to be expanded by at 
least more than 2.8 per cent if this is going to be the annual rate of 
population growth in the future. 
^Here we are assuming that the natural population increase in both the 
"traditional sector" and the "modern sector" is the same. 
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Even though the "modern sector" is small in size, relative to the 
"traditional sector", the average per capita income of the former (s 75.16 
Sudanese pounds), approaches almost three times the aggregate average (= 
27.69 Sudanese pounds). Such a high ratio of average per capita income in 
the modern sector to the aggregate average complies with the norm that a 
shift from traditional agriculture towards agricultural commercialization 
will enhance agricultural development and will consequently stimulate 
overall economic dvelopment. 
While the above per capita figures indicate that rising income levels 
can only be realized through the transformation of traditional structures, 
they do not give a clear indication of the related and sometimes conflict­
ing issues of inequalities in income distribution and political unrest. In 
his attempt to measure output and expenditure patterns in the various 
economic regions of Sudan,2 McLoughlin has compiled data that shows distri­
bution of income by occupational group and by region. These statistics 
reveal that income distribution in the Sudan is highly uneven (see Tables 
7, 8, and 9). As seen in Table 7, the average income of a farm owner^ is 
2 The Sudan has 9 clearly identified economic regions. Six of these are 
entirely rural, either camel or cattle nomads and animal owners, some form 
of riverain, rainland, or shifting cultivation farmers; or typically, combi­
nations of several of these patterns of activity. But 3 are not. These are 
the towns of urban complex (Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman); the 
Gezira Gravity Flow Irrigation Scheme, and finally the Gash-îokar flood 
irrigated deltas. 
Riverain cultivation refers to the fringe of cultivation along the Nile 
north of Khartoum which is extremely narrow and sometimes non-existent. 
Nonetheless, it is an important supplier of food and a source of income to 
the inhabitants of the area. 
Rainland cultivation, on the other hand, depends entirely on the rain 
and is concentrated mostly in the central rainland region which extends in a 
belt across the center of the Sudan lying between the 400 mms. and 750 mms. 
isohyets. 
^Farm owner as used here refers either to a non-operator or a licensee 
of a private cotton estate. Annual leaseholders in the Mechanized Crop Pro­
duction Schemes can safely be included in this category also. 
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899 Sudanese pounds, whereas, that of a farmer^ is only 57 Sudanese pounds. 
Also, white-collar workers seem to rank high in the income ladder. Con­
sidering Table 8, McLoughlin argues that the highest income decile of the 
labor force earns 34.45 percent of the national income in contrast to the 
lowest income decile with 4.22 percent (37, p. 533), Average annual incomes 
^ /• 
per worker are s 260 and s 32, respectively, which are 344 percent and 
42 percent of the mean Sudan worker income. An explanation for this strik­
ing income dispersion can be accounted for partly by the political influence 
of the white-collar class. 
Table 9 indicates significant inter-regional contrasts. The Desert-
Nile irrigation economy, using primarily inefficient traditional techniques, 
and tools gives a mean worker income slightly above the national average, 
but has an income (dispersion) distribution which is practically identical 
to the nation's. The capitalized flood irrigation region has an income 
half as great again as the national average. The Gezira Scheme worker's 
income is triple that of the national average. The Three-towns Region has 
the highest worker income which is almost 5 times that of the national 
average. The other 5 regions which are predominantly rainland farming and 
cattle nomadic economies indicate a less-than-national average income. 
McLoughlin infers from his data that the regions with the highest 
income, the regions where government concentrates investment (Three Towns, 
Gezira, and Gash-Tokar) have the most evenly distributed incomes. Con­
versely, the agricultural and nomadic regions making up the other six, tend 
to have more skewed distribution as well as lower levels (37, p. 533). 
'^By farmer, we mean farm operator in most cases. A farm laborer could 
also be acquiring the same average annual income provided that he occupies 
himself with the cultivation of a grain crop during the rainy season. 
Table 7. Sudan: Number employed, average income and total income, by occupational group® 
Occupational group 
Number 
employed 
Average 
income (--c's) Rank 
National income 
0. Professional-non-technical 2,647 1,050 1 2,778,273 ' 
1. Professional-technical 1,101 1,371 • 0 1,505,010 
2. Managerial-commerce and.industry 1,510 937 2 1,415,380 
3. Farm owners and farm managers 235 899 3 211,365 
4. Semi-professional-non-technical 39,365 321 7 12,605,162 
5. Semi-professional-technical 10,087 572 4 5,766,150 
6. Shop, workshop owners, supervisors 
in commerce and industry 66,461 331 6 21,971,180 
7. Senior clerical and kindred 3,660 397 5 1,451,765 
8. Craftsmen, mechanics 105,981 249 9 26,340,352 
9. Skilled personal services 68,428 107 D 7,295,954 
A. Farmers, hunters, fishermen 2,366,387 57 J 135,055,702 
B. Animal owners 161,348 89 F 14,306,985 
C. Junior clerical and kindred 20,066 231 A 4,610,743 
D. Machinery operatives 31,803 205 B 6,522,742 
E. Semi-skilled and unskilled 
personal services 42,467 68 H 2,904,975 
F. Laborers except farm laborers 77,130 96 E 7,423,228 
H. Farm laborers and forestry workers 48,694 115 C 5,583,431 
J. Shepherds 706,672 32 K 22,463,893 
K. Protective services 16,014 250 8 4,003,500 
Total 3,769,956 75 284,215,790 
^Source: (37, p. 531). 
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Table 8. Sudan: Selected labor force decile information^ 
Decile Decile average 
Decile Number in Income in % of average as percent of 
decile decile ^s income Income X"s mean 
10 376,996 97,907,297 34.45 259.70 344.48 
9 376,995 32,043,555 11.27 84.90 112.74 
8 376,996 21,517,272 7.57 57.06 75.69 
7 376,995 21,517,215 7.57 57.08 75.51 
C) 376,996 21,517,272 7.57 57.06 75.69 
5 376,996 21,517,272 7.57 57.06 75.^9 
4 376,995 21,517,272 7.57 57,08 75.71 
3 376,996 21,517,272 7.57 57.06 75.69 
2 376,995 13,177,168 4.64 34.95 46.36 
1 376,996 11,984,145 4.22 31.79 42.17 
3 ,769,956 284,215,790 100.00 75.39(Mean) 100.00 
^Source: (37, p 1. 533). 
Table 9. Sudan; Regional income dispersion compared to Sudan average 
dispersion, labor force deciles, Regions and Sudan^ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regional 
Mean Income Income Column 3 Dispersion as 
Region worker 7» in 7„ in minus 7o of Sudan 
income decile decile column 4 dispersion 
(a"s) 10 1 (%) (30.23 points) 
1, Three Toifns 315.30 25.54 2.82 22.72 75.25 
2. Gezira 232.41 14.66 4.60 9.97 33.00 
3. Gash-Tokar 111.09 28.05 5.49 22.56 74.50 
4. Desert -Nile 84.07 34,82 4.44 30.38 100.50 
5. Semi-desert 57.88 41.85 3.46 38.39 127.00 
6. Qoz Sands 67.40 27.25 6.53 20.72 68.50 
7. Central Clay 
Plains 73.95 31.36 7.30 24.06 79.50 
8. Flood Plains 30.35 32.61 5.60 27.01 89.55 
9. Ironstone Forest 35.10 48.01 5.70 42.31 140.00 
10. Sudan 75.39 34.45 4.22 30.23 100.00 
^Source: (37, p. 533). 
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Even though the concentration of developmental efforts at particular 
centers could be justified on economic grounds, such a hypothesis could 
easily be invalidated on political grounds. The differences in the per 
capita incomes and in the levels of living that have come to exist inter-
regionally as a consequence of the way in which the economy has developed, 
particularly between the South and the North, calls for an effective re­
formulation of policies that might permit the simultaneous achievement of 
the objectives of equality, a minimum political stability threshold, a 
positive increase in per capita productivity and consenuently economic 
diversification. 
The destructive dispute that has come to exist between the south and 
the north might find its explanation partly in the politician's reluctance 
to attach "fair" weights to the developmental objectives. Undoubtedly, 
there are other factors in the history and geography of both regions which 
have contributed to the development of the present social insecurity and 
political uncertainty besetting the nation. These factors- apart—far less 
emphasis is placed in current discussion on land institutions as the key 
answer to the vital national quest for unity and progressive development. 
The problems facing the Sudanese farmer in the North are no less severe 
than they are in the South. Both have inherited a deplorable state of 
affairs with limited freedom in carrying out their socio-economic pursuits. 
Both live in static social structures that leave little room in the 
way of living and working. With a few relatively minor exceptions, commu­
nal land tenure structures determine, to a large extent, production re­
lationships within traditional agriculture. They exhibit a diversity of 
primitive enterprises that are organized on a tribal basis. McLoughlin 
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describes the form of this diversity in the following brief passage: 
As elsewhere...social groups of the Republic of the Sudan 
have adapted to their varying physical environments. Camel 
nomads occupy semi-desert regions immediately adjoining the 
deserts; rainland farmers and cattle nomads are found in 
the heavier rainfall zones to the semi-desert's south; and 
shifting (forest) agriculture and cattle-owning but sedentary 
populations are located where rainfall is more reliable and 
heavier (38, p. 357). 
The "pastoral activities" and the primitive form of peasant agri­
culture are the, predominant occupations for earning a living. Food gather­
ing and hunting are not uncommon especially in the South, Almost every 
tribe in existence emphasizes its own special cultural and socio-economic 
adaptations to a particular environment. 
The gap between the small elite minority on top and the great deprived 
masses at the bottom is great. The levels of-living among the vast majori­
ty of the people who are mostly peasant folk are extremely low. Their diet 
is defective. The income acquired by them is low and uncertain. The inci­
dence of diseases among them is high. Illiteracy is prevalent, and output 
per man is comparatively one of the lowest. With such tottering economic 
foundations "supplementary" reforms such as the expansion of irrigation, 
the erection of dams, etc., will not by themselves secure an adequate so­
lution to the overwhelming problems facing the nation. More than equally 
important and urgent is the need for "basic reforms", within this frame­
work the creation of a system of "land possession" capable of channelling 
the community's resources into avenues of effective allocation is conceived 
as a genuine formula for improving the standard of living of the rural-
people and achieving their welfare. 
Thus, inasmuch as agriculture is the greatest actual and potential 
resource of the Sudan, in which is engaged the great majority of the people. 
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and inasmuch as most of the tillers of the soil are landless tenants, share­
croppers, or laborers suffering from a destructive system of land tenure, we 
cannot but come to the conclusion that in modifications in land tenure 
structures lie the key to an effective solution of the problem. This will 
be the direct and major concern of this dissertation. 
Existing Tenure Structures in the Sudan 
Formally all unregistered land in the Sudan is deemed to belong to the 
Government. In practice, the Government exercises its ownership as trustee 
for the people who have traditionally exercised rights over land. 
In the riverain and Gezira areas, the right to individual ownership has 
been claimed and registered. However, in the Gezira Scheme privately-owned 
land has been leased by the government, which has placed it under the ad­
ministration of the Sudan Gezira Board to be cultivated by tenants. 
l-There land is cultivated at irregular intervals, or is superabundant, 
it is commonly recognized both by the people and the government as held 
communally. It is administered by authorities of the tribe, village, or 
other communal unit, the only right of the individual being his right as a 
member of such a unit to cultivate, cut wood, etc. in accordance with custom 
or as the authorities of^the communal unit direct. In the Southern Sudan 
the re ^ xs been no land registration for individual ovmership. In the Nuba 
Mountains region^ the development of rain-grown cotton seems to be forcing 
the pace in the direction of individual ownership. 
Individual family farm ovmership has not been promoted in the develop- — 
ment schemes of the Sudan. Tenancy is the basis of agricultural production 
^The Nuba Mountains region is one of the four principal subregions 
within Western Sudan whose boundaries are being determined by physical 
phenomena but reinforced by differences in the origins, languages, and 
customs of their inhabitants (39, pp. 148 and 173). 
on a major part of the irrigated land including the Gezira, and in some^ of 
the areas developed for mechanized dry-farming. In case of pump irrigation 
schemes, such as the White Nile Livelihood Schemes, the government grants 
leases for pump irrigation areas against a nominal rent plus taxes paid by 
the licensees. The duration of the lease may exceed ten years. The licen­
see, in turn, has sub-tenants usually on annual contracts. In government 
pump irrigation schemes, the term for renting land is also one year. 
There are several problems inherent in the prevailing land tenure 
pattern in Sudan. The concern of this section is to identify these problems 
as they exist within each of the following tenure classes; tribal tenure in 
the south, individual freehold in the Northern Province, annual lease in the 
Gedaref District, and vertical cooperation in the Gezira Scheme, keeping in 
mind the problematic hypothesis as presented earlier, Hypothesis I. 
This section of the chapter is divided into two broad sub-sections. 
The first sub-section reports the problems existing in four classes of the 
domestic tenure systems. The second sub-section describes the variety of 
international tenure structures; specifically the family-farm, tenanted, 
and o^'mer-operated in the United States of America, The Kolkhoz in Russia, 
the Kibbutz settlement in Israel, the Ejido in Mexico, and the proportional 
profit farm in Puerto Rico. 
Tribal tenure in the South 
In the introductory remarks earlier in this chapter, it was indicated 
that the Sudan is divided into nine district economic regions. Ttro of 
^In other mechanized dry-farming areas specifically around Gedaref and 
Singa the government has been letting land in lots of 1000 feddans on 
annual contracts. 
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these nine regions lie in Southern Sudan: (a) the Southern Clay Plains and 
(b) the Ironstone Plateau and Southern Hill Masses (see Figure 3). 
Selected regional economic data may be consulted at Table 10 whose 
statistics show economic region population, labor force, income, and income 
distribution profiles. 
The two economic regions in Southern Sudan comprise about one-quarter 
of the country's area and population. The economy of over 90 percent of the 
inhabitants of the South is based on self-sufficiency at bare subsistence 
level (40, p. 2). Although in most cases it is purely agricultural in 
character, it varies considerably from locality to locality in the degree of 
its dependence on the different sources of livelihood. 
No tribe in Southern Sudan can be regarded as exclusively pastoralists 
and only a few are exclusively cultivators. Some of the Nilotic and Nilo-
Hamitic tribes can be considered as leading a predominantly pastoral life, 
although, as can be seen from Table 11, the economic reliance of these 
peoples on livestock products is usually much less than what can be assumed. 
At the other extreme are the Zande and other small tribes living in 
afforested and tse-tse infested parts of the Equatorial Region. These 
people possess hardly any livestock and have to rely entirely on crop pro­
duction. Fishing by the majority of tribes, hunting, and food gathering are 
by no means uncommon occupations. 
Communal land tenure structures determine to a large extent production 
relationships in Southern Sudan. The term "communal tenure" by which the 
relationship between man and his land in a tribal system has often been 
described, is partially justified in that an individual's rights to land 
are derived from his membership of a community and from his position in the 
political organization. Rights to allocate land to others are similarly 
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Figure 3. Thé Southern Flood Plains and the Ironstone Forest (39, p. 325). 
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Table 10. Sudan: Selected regional data, 1956®' 
Item Three 
Towns Gezira 
Gosh-
Tokar 
Desert-
Nile 
Semi 
Desert 
Q 
Sa 
1. $ of total land area - - - 19.9 27.7 1 
2. ^ of total population 2.3 7.1 2.2 4.5 12.5 2 
3. $ of total Westerners^ 2 7 2 5 13 2 
k. ^ of total labor force 2.3 5.9 2.2 3.3 12.1 2 
5. Labor force member mean 
annual income ( s) 315 232 111 84 58 6 
6. $ of total income earned by 
highest paid decile of 
labor force 
25.5 14.7 28.1 34.8 41.9 2 
7. $ of labor force who earn 
highest income decile 2.4 6.0 2.6 2.3 1.6 
8. $ of national output 9.6 18.1 3.3 3.7 9.3 2 
9. io of output which is farm 
products 0.1 64.0 40.3 23.6 16.6 4 
10. Government spending as $ of 
total spending 19.8 56.0 34.4 3.6 3.2 
11. $ of government spending 3.3 76.7 8.2 0.1 1.2 
12. $ of income which is cash 
(not real) 80 70 60 38 25 3 
13. Regional $ of Sudan total 
cash income 17.2 28.6 4.5 3.2 5.3 2 
^Source: (37, p. 538). 
^Westerners, normally enroute from West Africa to Mecca on Pilgrimage, have formed an important s 
They are 15^ of the population; but double that percentage of the wage labor force. 
Desert-
Nile 
Semi 
Desert 
Qoz 
Sands 
Central 
Clay 
Plains 
Flood 
Plains 
Ironstone 
Forestry 
Sudan 
19.9 27.7 10.0 15.9 14.8 11.8 100 
h . 3  12.5 23.9 21.8 15.9 9.7 100 
5 13 24 22 16 10 100 
3.3 12.1 27-5 21.6 16.6 9.3 100 
84 58 67 74 30 35 75 
34.8 41.9 27.3 31.4 32.6 48.0 34.5 
2.3 1.6 1.9 2.0 0.8 1.0 1.7 
3.7 9.3 23.9 21.2 6.6 4.3 100.0 
23.6 16.6 44.1 44.1 28.5 31.4 37.1 
3.6 3.2 2.5 2.6 6.2 6.9 15.6 
0.1 1.2 2.3 2.0 2.7 2.1 100.0 
38 25 39 39 6 7 44 
3.2 5.3 21.0 18.6 1.0 0.7 100 
have formed an important source of labor supply to cash cropping communities in the Sudan, 
or force. 
Table 11. Estimated contribution of animal products to the nutrition of 
the Nilotic inhabitants of the Jonglei Area (a part of the 
Flood Region)^ 
1. Average number of livestock 
per head of human population: 
cattle 1.25 
milch COT7S 0. 75 
sheep and goats 0.80 
2. Average estimated production per year: 
milk: available for 
human consumption 
per cow 100.00 gallons 
Meat per head of 
human population 28.00 kgs. 
3. Contribution to diet in terms of calories: 
a. Per year: Milk 75 gal. (? 2500 187,500 
Meat 28 kgs. @ 1000 28,000 
Total 215,500 
b. Per day: Total 590 
^Source: (40, p. 3). 
based on the allocator's political position. Individual right to any given 
piece of arable land is normally established either through his own legiti­
mate use of it with the knowledge and approval of the chief and the com­
munity, or by inheritance. In pastoral communities, grazing land is not 
allocated to individuals; only arable land and homestead sites are so 
distributed. 
Legally almost all land in Southern Sudan is unsettled and unregistered 
I9  
due to the fact that land is abundant and labor is scarce. Individual 
ownership as such is lacking and the tribe has the exclusive right in its 
area. Among the Neur and Dinka tribes for instance, each tribe is an eco­
nomic unit with its own pasture and water, and each has well-defined areas 
over which it has grazing and cultivating rights. Boundaries exist between 
the areas of each tribe. Rights extend to grass and cultivation only. 
Fishing rights go with land and a stream is divided into sections. Thus, 
there is no individual ownership of land and the individual is regarded 
primarily as a member of his "clan" which owns the land. 
Among the Zande and Nyangwara who are predominantly tillers of the 
soil each member of the tribe has the right of using the land piece which 
he clears and cultivates for a long time. Any areas outside this small 
piece are under the privilege of the tribal chief who can allot them to 
members of his own tribe or in some cases to strangers. This helps to 
strengthen the chief's political power, and, in addition to the blood or 
kinship association, it aids in cementing the tribal structure. However, 
in a relatively less developed tribe like the Nuer, there is a "clan-owner" 
other than the chief, called "Diel" who acts as the father of the land and 
looks after its allotment. This has a religious, as well as a socio­
political and economic background (41, p. 196). Moreover, it serves the 
purpose of the accepted subsistence level towards which land use and tenure 
are oriented. 
The shilluk on the other hand, a settled people living along the banks 
of the White Nile in hundred settlements, are described by Bolton to have 
an original grantor of land who carries the title "dyil". Bolton argues 
that : 
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Even when dispossessed of the chieftainship a "dyil" 
lineage remain the owner of the soil. Within a settle­
ment each lineage has its hamlet. The dyil's associ­
ation with the land is ritual, and the enjoyment of the 
land by the individual member of a hamlet is not restricted 
in the interests of the "dyil" (41, p. 196). 
From the above description one may postulate that there is a general 
common pattern of land tenure in Southern Sudan related through the ages to 
a system of subsistence agriculture, which is still the prevalent form of 
economy.^ There seems to be a close connection between communal tenure and 
the tribal social and political organization. Within the social structure 
of every tribe there are traditions, customs, and beliefs that impede the 
economic system. Taboos and magic have a predominant place in the tribal 
culture. Cash, as yet, has little attraction to most of the tribes and 
barter is the normal means of exchange. Most of the inhabitants suffer 
severely from chronic diseases that sapped their energy; "all being sub­
servient to a feudal hierarchy of autocratic chiefs and their every activi­
ty ordered by superstition, fear of magic, and witchcraft, oracles or 
tribal custom" (15, p. 2). 
Within the above context, the communal tenure system does not seem to 
contribute to the well-being of the people. Besides discouraging the 
application of technology and advances in human knowledge, the existing 
system of tenure tends to keep crop-production separate from pastoral 
activities in an area where the rational integration of these two activi­
ties will presumably yield conseruences advantageous to the farmer. The 
social institutions of which the tenure system is a part prohibit the ef­
fective utilization of factors of production for the sake of development. 
^There are exceptions to this general rule which will be mentioned as 
"success elements" in the 'diagnostic phase' of this study. 
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To dictate initiative and drive as well as organization which are funda­
mental for the achievement of economic prosperity, it is crucial that the 
social institutions he geared to this end without upsetting the people. At 
present, this is not the case, however. That this is not the case can be 
easily recognized if we enumerate the problems of communal tenure in terms 
of incentive inefficiencies, technological and managerial limitations, and 
capital inadequacies. 
On the whole, most of the tribes do not react in an expected way to 
the stimulus of incentives. They pay more attention to the present and the 
immediate gain that they can attain rather than to the more distant future. 
Once the goal that they are striving for is achieved, they lack the desire 
to continue work. "Sale of produce is seldom necessary, except for paying 
tributes in cash, for ceremonial expenses, or for buying limited quantities 
of consumer goods. As the need for money income is limited and probably 
invariable, elasticity of supply of goods or labor from many a subsistence 
unit is negative" (42, p. 173). 
Tenure uncertainty and lack of incentives are also aggravated by the 
lack of capital goods which curtail the productivity of labor. The 
natives' marginal evaluation of work exceeds the renumératiôn which they 
might get out of it. That is to say, that the natives' needs in the south 
are mostly fixed and their demand schedule is inelastic. Their limited 
wants and needs can be met with relatively small amounts of effort. A 
study that has been made by De Schlippe and Batwell among the Nyangî-jara 
tribesmen indicated that the amount of leisure was steady during the first 
half of the agricultural season with an average of 38 percent of the total 
possible effort (43, p. 338). 
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If we compare this with the relative participation in other occu­
pations such as agricultural field work for crop-production, domestic work, 
craftsmanship, hunting, fishing and food gathering, and absence from home, 
the conclusion arrived at is that a relatively higher percentage of the 
effort is expended on unproductive pursuits. Not only is the efficiency in 
labor use curtailed by the imbalance in the seasonal distribution of occu­
pational occurrences, but it is also reduced because of the deficient 
allocation of labor between the sexes. Table 12 is cited as a definite 
evidence of custom justifying weeding, harvesting, processing of agri­
cultural produce and domestic work as women's work among the Nyangvzara 
people. 
The scarcity of labor relative to land in the south has led to a 
situation where large areas subject to communal tenure are not fully 
exploited. This is inextricably related to the customary operation of 
communal tenure where non-members of the community are not alloifed to 
operate the land of the community, or where strangers may be alloted land 
by the chief but prevented from cultivating economic crops which are 
thought to establish a continuing right in the land; the outcome is re­
duced agricultural production. Not only do such practices hamper the full 
utilization of the land resource, but they also help sustain the immobility 
of the labor resource within the agricultural sector. This is a case in 
point where a conflict is created between social and local interests on the 
one hand, and economic or national interests on the other (44, p. 41). 
The allegation that labor inducements and contributions are out of 
balance finds its explanation also in the unsettled way of life as a conse­
quence of communal grazing and shifting cultivation among the Nilo-Hamitic 
83 
Table 12. Relative participation of men and women in agricultural 
operations in percent among the Nyang^^ara people^ 
Field tj^pes^ Operation Men Women 
A Broadcasting hoeing 87 13 
Weeding 0 100 
Harvesting 0 100 
B Broadcasting hoeing 100 0 
Weeding 0 100 
Harvesting 0 100 
C Opening hoeing 87 13 
Sowing groundnuts 52 48 
Harvesting groundnuts 30 70 
D Opening hoeing 21 79 
Sov?ing maize and pumpkin 17 83 
Average of all operations 27 73 
^Source: (43, p. 339). 
^Field types are differentiated into A, B, C, Cg, D, E, and F accord­
ing to crop associations, soil types, acreage, seasonal labor reruirements, 
variation in weather and nutritional levels. 
tribes. In the case of cattle-o^raing tribes, much time is spent in search 
of grazing and water. This places a limit on the availability of labor 
required for crop production. Continuous shifting of homesteads and the 
amount of time spent by many cultivators in travelling between their 
homesteads and "out-cultivation" on the higher patches of land which are 
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often a considerable distance^ from the homestead reduce the effectiveness 
of labor and limit its supply even more. 
Given incentives, the technology of communal tenure intimately con­
nected with the practice of shifting cultivation presents serious problems 
in the face of agricultural development. De Schlippe and Batwell view 
shifting cultivation as a continuum of three superimposed orders within a 
system of agriculture beginning with field types (defined previously) find 
ending with the shifting of homesteads which is a functional consequence of 
pseudo-rotations (43, pp. 341-342). Figure 4 shows a typical family hold­
ing with various field types numbered A, B, C, Cg, D, E, and F. On the 
whole, such a family holding can be considered as the basic production unit 
under a communal land tenure system. Such a production unit performs an 
economically necessary function of providing for the needs of a family — 
consequently a high risk aversion is to be expected in view of change. 
This is particularly the case if the influence of exogenous factors such as 
the unreliability of rainfall (shocks of weather) is taken into consider­
ation. In viewing the range of crops grown under such a system of agri­
culture within the context of increased production for the market, one is 
led to believe that the communal production units present serious difficul­
ties in bridging the gap between subsistence and increased production. The 
introduction of cash crops complimentary with the ones produced in other 
economic regions requires a pattern of land use which is different from the 
one offered by communal land tenure. Shifting of homesteads as well as 
Q 
In the Flood Region it has been found that a cultivator has to walk 
an average distance of about five miles from the homestead to the area of 
cultivation (40, p. 14). In terms of time, to cover such a distance 
requires about 1.15 hours. 
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Field Type A 
Association of 
sorghum and a 
variety of 
legumes. 
Established on 
first-year land, 
that is, ramba 
or land restored 
to fertility 
Field Type B 
- Cereals and legumes plus oil crop on old land 
(Yopu) 
- Second and subsequent shifts 
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Field Type F 
Tobacco because of its 
highest prestige value 
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Type D 
Maize, 
deccan 
hemp. 
okra, 
pumpkin 
Sweet sorghum 
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destruction and allm; 
manuring 
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Field Type C 
Groundnuts, 
usually 
grw'm in 
third shift 
land type, 
humid, wet 
soils 
RAMBA: 
Restored fertile 
soil 
Field Type E 
Sweet potatoes on old land 
Field Type Cg 
Groundnuts, earthnuts, 
expensive labor at harvest 
Figure 4: A typical land holding with field types under Nyangt^ara 
system of agriculture (average area 16,855 square meters).® 
^Generally, the labor functions required for all field types are per­
formed in the terms of seed broadcasting, hand clearing, felling of trees, 
weeding, poor soil planting, crop protection from birds, and harvesting. 
Fields type A, B, and C are generally the most important field types in 
terms of labor requirements, acreage, and nutritional value. 
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fields, undermines the fertility of the soil and leads to the uneconomic 
dispersion of family holdings. The existence of Yopu (degraded soil) and 
Rada (over-cultivated soil) as shown hypothetically in Figure 4 is a clear 
indication of the wasteful and exploitative utilization of land. 
Communal tenure presents problems of management, too. None of the 
studies reviewed on native agriculture point out anything basically Tnrong 
with peasant's management nor do they propose any drastic changes. However, 
if improved production and resource use requires certain modifications in 
communal tenure, it is positive that the traditional managerial skills be 
oriented towards closing the gap between "semi-nomadic" cultivation and 
a settled type of agriculture. 
Given incentives and technology, communal tenure raises innumerable 
problems for capital creation. The restriction of land ownership to the 
tribe hinders the security of title to the land which is essential for 
raising capital funds. Further, insecurity of tenure associated with the 
semi-nomadic way of life and coupled with the lack of internal markets and 
the inadequacy of market attributes make the inflow of capital from private 
sources (whether within or without the Sudan), virtually impossible. Capi­
tal is urgently needed for the improvement of southern trade. In relating 
the problems of capital to that of trade in the south, Basiniski points out 
to the unreliability of the transport svstem thus increasing the capital 
requirements even further by increasing storage and transportation losses 
(40, p. 17). 
It is also interesting to note that crop production under the tribal 
system particularly in the Flood Region inhabited predominently by cattle 
owners does not constitute a reliable source of income that can displace the 
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high "insurance value" placed on cattle. If this were the case then the 
inhabitants may afford, through free will, to release their cattle hoard­
ings into the market.^ A consequence of such a development will be an in­
crease in the margin to save and an acceleration of capital accumulation. 
The above remarks are in brief elements of serious dissatisfactions 
inherent in and associated with the present system of tribal tenure in 
Southern Sudan. Aspirations compatible with development dictate the re­
moval of these dissatisfactions. l-Jhy do these dissatisfactions persist and 
how could they be removed will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
Individual freehold in the Northern Province 
A large part of the Northern Province falls within the economic region 
recognized as the Desert-Nile (Figure 2). The bulk of the inhabitants of 
this region depend on agriculture for their bare necessities, supplemented 
by petty trade and remittances from outside relatives for the purchase of 
such goods and services as they can afford (Table 13). In contrast to the 
economic regions of Southern Sudan, a characteristic feature of this most 
northerly economic region of the nation is the high man-land ratio. Good 
agricultural production depends entirely on the Nile as a source of irri­
gation. Total output is restricted even more by the grossly inefficient 
methods of irrigation. McLoughlin, in presenting the output profile of 
this region (see Table 13), mentions a number of factors that impede the 
development of economic activities in Northern Sudan including the re­
stricted condition of the soils; the fluctuating availability and quantity 
^If the tenure system is so modified as to serve as a basis for the 
provision of a reliable budget that will enable the cattle-owning tribes to 
satisfy their preferences, then much enthusiasm for trading in livestock 
may be the consequence. 
88 
Table 13. The Desert-Nile total output, distribution, 
percentage of Sudan by output category® 
and 
Output category 
(c^ s) 
Total output 
Distribution 
by category (%) 
% of Sudan 
Total output 
1. Farm products 2,359,253 23.55 2.23 
2. Livestock 567,368 5.42 1.75 
3. Forestry products 1,506,544 14.40 5.32 
4. Fishing and Marine 
products 105,685 1.09 1.63 
5. Transport and 
distribution 2,301,430 23.00 6.12 
6. Minerals 16,110 0.15 7.11 
7. Manufacturing 219,426 2.09 7.93 
8. Public utilities 68,911 0.65 6.57 
9. Craft industries 713,423 6.82 7.30 
10. Building and 
construction 820,577 7.84 5.05 
11. Banks 38,047 0.36 2.82 
12. Non-government 
education bodies -- - -
13. Domestic services 27,908 0.26 00
 
o
 
14. Misc. services 638,908 6.10 4.21 
15. Government 358,053 3.42 2.09 
16. Ownership of 
buildings 418,949 3.99 5.09 
Total 10,456,973 100.00 3.68 
^Source: (33, p. 219). 
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of water, the marked differences in climate between summer and winter (33, 
p. 219). All these factors and others can be viewed as manifestations of 
economic problems emanating from the tenure arrangements in the Northern 
Province. 
Historically Mohammedanism had taken firm root in Northern Sudan. As 
a result of this and through contact with Egypt, a land policy based on the 
Koranic laws was firmly established in the north; a policy which is still 
the dominant feature of the country. In these laws land is recognized as 
the property of the individual. According to Bolton, "....the bias of the 
native mind...." towards individual ownership "derives from a right con­
ferred by first clearing of land, followed by continuity of possession and 
regularity of cultivation. The validity of a claim to individual ownership 
depends also on whether custom requires that land should be inherited ac­
cording to Mohammedan Law, and recognizes sale and purchase of the land 
itself" (41, p. 23). 
The historical development of land tenure legislation in Northern 
Sudan indicates that the colonial administration starting in 1899 had 
recommended that freehold can be granted where land is held under continu­
ous possession for five years. Leake, in his review of the land tenure 
situation in Northern Sudan at the time mentions other guiding principles 
that were adopted in deciding the validity of titles including the follow­
ing (45, p. 127): 
1. Possession since the reestablishment of the civil 
government creates a prima facie title in default of a 
superior one, 
2. Where a superior claim is maintained against a pos­
sessor, the possessor is to be given grants elsewhere. 
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To check exploitation, it was further laid down that all cultivable 
land, whether cultivated or not, would be liable to taxation. 
However, the principles outlined above were not sufficient for the 
creation of a secure tenure system that would have stopped speculation in 
land and prevented the concentration of land into fewer hands. Conse­
quently, further steps were taken starting with the appointment of land 
commissions whose purpose was to produce adequate cadasteral information, 
the reliability of which could lead to the settlement of land disputes and 
conflicts. A series of land ordinances committed to further legislative 
action and to confer adequate powers on the administration were passed 
between the years 1903 - 1920. The enactments stipulated by the government 
in 1905, for instance, stipulated, first, that "all waste, forest, and un­
occupied land shall be deemed to be the property of the government until 
the contrary is proved" and secondly, that "in the case of land which under 
the customary methods of cultivation is cultivable at irregular intervals, 
the fact that a person has cultivated it for whatever period, shall not by 
itself give him the absolute ownership of the land" (46, p. 15). 
The above two enactments with many others reinforced in 1925 by a 
comprehensive consolidating Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance (46, 
pp. 1-150),'paved the way for a dichotomy of land tenure that characterizes 
the agrarian structure of present day Northern Sudan. A compromise between 
the Colonial administration's preference for the leasehold system and the 
natives' bias towards the individual freehold has been the outcome. 
^^The deficiency of cadasteral surveys hampers land settlement and 
registration even today. There are still large tracts of land in Southern 
Sudan and in some parts of the Central Rainlands where progress is partly 
limited by the need for adequate survey and surveying staff. 
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Within the above historical framework of land tenure development, the 
Northern Province has had its share of individual owners where claims in 
the land have been established. Where uncultivated, and hence the property 
of the government, the land was divided into blocks of ten feddans and 
leased. According to the figures given in the National Income Accounts in 
1956, there are 732 private pump schemes^^ in the Northern Province; 320 
of these are with a "perennial" license and 412 with a "flood"^^ license. 
The gross area in feddans is stated to be 152,138. This figure excludes 
the areas operated with less-developed means of irrigation and under 
private property such as 'sagias' (Persian water-wheel), 'mataras' (Persian 
water-wheel where the source of water is a well), and 'shadoufs' (a hand-
operated water-lifting device suited for watering plots of vegetables). As 
of 1956, the number of 'sagias' in operation is estimated to be 5,405; 
that of 'mataras' is 197; and the number of 'shadoufs' is 72 (48, p. 108). 
Irrigation schemes under government control command an area of 128,000 
feddans. However, there is a wide gap between this figure and the one 
given by Thornton when he describes the government schemes as being nine 
"ranging in size from 2000 to 6000 acres" (30, p. 288). 
According to Thornton, there are at present more than 1000 private 
schemes in the Northern Province. No further classification is given, 
however (30, p. 288). 
12 Irrigation by pumps in the Northern Province and elsewhere in Sudan 
is controlled by two classes of licenses; 1, 'perennial' licenses, on 
which water may be drawn all the year round, and, 2, 'flood' licenses, 
limited to the period from July 15 to March 31. Government schemes, how­
ever, are not severely limited by the 'flood' license. The licenses, 
besides determining the gross scheme area, also state the number and size 
of pumps. Partial amendments have been made in the laws governing licens­
ing to allow more freedom of operation. A comprehensive treatment of the 
licensing and operation of all pump schemes now controlled under the Nile 
Pumps Control Ordinance, 1939 is given in Tothill on the section on Pumps 
(47, p. 615). 
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Figure 5 depicts the major developments in the agrarian structures of 
the Northern Province. Various sources have been consulted for the conden­
sation of the information. The figure shows that individual ownership and 
tenancies on publicly-owned land are the two tenure forms that have charac­
terized land settlement in the early stages of development. Accompanying 
the process of the modernization of agriculture in the Northern Province, 
which as yet is incomplete, various forms of organization have evolved. 
The tenure alternatives that have emanated from the leasehold system have 
in common public investment in land. Where tenancies exist on public land, 
the government acts as the true landlord. Where tenancies have come to 
exist on originally privately ovmed 'old basin'and 'sagia' land the 
management is still in the hands of the original land-owners. These two , 
forms of tenure differ principally in (a) the way the production program is 
organized, (b) the way the final proceeds are distributed, and (c) the 
status the tenants have and the role that they play in the decision-making 
process.(See Figure 5) 
Those tenure arrangements that have transpired from the individual 
freehold system and with which we are directly concerned, have as their 
common denominator private investment in land and irrigation works. Small 
private holdings associated with various forms of irrigation were and still 
are predominant in the Northern Province. The prehistoric model of "owner 
cultivatorship" in Northern Sudan is the 'sagia"wherein the operating 
11 During and immediately after the first World War seven irrigation 
schemes were established in the Northern Province by the government. All 
of these schemes were sited on old basins (depressions watered from the 
Nile by a connecting canal) and large sagia areas which were privately 
owned (50, p. 749). 
^^Over certain areas of seluka and basin lands peasants have merely 
rights of cultivation rather than freehold tenure. 
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farm family performs the major part of the actual labor of cultivating the 
land" (49, p. 5). Along the narrow belt bordering the Nile where culti­
vation is conducted on the receding flood or on irrigation by 'sagia', 
'matara', or 'shadouf, the early introduction of pumping stations by the 
government led to the widespread installment of pumps and irrigation works 
by private sources. From the pumping station, the water is led into a 
canal system and conducted onto the fields by flwz. The area commanded is 
limited by the extent of the area under control or by the capacity of the 
pumps. Barbour in praising the privately financed pump schemes write the 
following; 
By taking advantage of the higher lift and output of a me-
canical pump, these schemes have been able to bring under 
cultivation land too high or too far from the river to be 
irrigated by water-wheel. Sometimes existing 'sagia* land 
is incorporated in pump schemes; sometimes channels are 
dug to enable 'sagia' land to be irrigated from the pumps in 
return for a suitable water-rate; and sometimes nearby 
water-wheels are undistributed and continue to operate as 
before. The most efficient schemes have undoubtedly been 
those where private individuals have acquired enough land to 
be able to set up schemes completely within their ovm control. 
These schemes are not popular with the local population, who 
are usually associated as employees only, but some of the 
longer established private schemes are cuite profitable 
(39, p. 144). 
However, the type of private schemes that Barbour refers to as 'most 
efficient'; 'quite profitable', 'unpopular' with distinct management and 
hired labor force are quite rare in the Northern Province just because of 
the land-hunger if nothing else.^^ This is only one type of non-government 
scheme in the Northern Province. (See Figure 5) The three other types are: 
Purves has meant exactly this when he said that the inhabitants of 
the Northern Province are known for their communal and patriotic spirit, 
but are cantankerous and quarrelsome over small matters, particularly over 
land, however valueless. The scarcity of cultivable land has produced a 
veritable land-hunger, which is often most unneighborly (51, p. 171). 
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1. Tenancies on privately ovmed lands in private pump schemes. Under 
this, we have two main subdivisions: (a) Private estates with tenant 
cultivators where the land includes both private and government land, 
i.e., unregistered land. In the Zeidab Scheme, for instance, a large 
proportion of the land is owned by a prosperous family and a smaller 
proportion of the land is ovmed by the natives and further areas were 
leased from the government. 
According to Tracey (52, p. 761), the terms of tenancy in the 
Zeidab Scheme stipulate that the estate takes one half of the value of 
the crop as water-rate and rent. The tenant pays all expenses of 
cultivation including the cost of the plowing. Additionally, the 
tenant obtains free water for his grain areas. The estate provides 
water at a nominal rate to native land owners adjacent to the 
scheme.(b) The other subdivision, which Thornton (30, p. 288) 
regards as a form of organization by itself is the individual (or 
small group) ownership of the pump and irrigation works. The land in 
this case is divided between small owners or tenants; the crops being 
shared between pump owner, tenant, cultivator, and sometimes land­
owners. In this form of organization, the individual pump otmer 
dominates; being a merchant (moneylender) or a local notable. In 
criticizing the private pump schemes in the Northern Province, some 
have come to the conclusion that: 
l^This information was true prior to 1941. Many changes have taken 
place since then. In 1954, the government has made amendments regarding 
the laws governing the operation of the private pump schemes. These amend­
ments, the extent of which is unknown to the author, were made with the 
dual purpose of achieving stability of income in private schemes and to 
enable the tenants to meet the costs of their obligations. 
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first....the burden of paying half the crop to the pump-
owner (and in the case of tenants, a part also to the 
land-ovmer) has kept living standards much the same as 
they had been in the preceding sagias, and second, the 
schemes are poorly managed (30, p. 288). 
There exist some indications which show that the tenant culti­
vators and sometimes small group landowners are often seeking a way 
to break away from this form of organization and set up their own 
smaller pumps. Land rights and control over water use in such an 
instance are more closely identified with what can be called a modern 
form of "owner-cultivatorship". Retired government officials o^-ming 
small pumps irrigating fruit orchards, which are not an integral part 
of private schemes practicing general cropping, also fall within this 
category. 
2. A few schemes are in the hands of business-like farmers, real 
lovers of the land, who have enough commercial insight to enable them 
to manage their farms relatively efficiently. This is the form of 
organization that belongs to what Thornton may call the "company 
type". Where the initial development has been made by a group of 
local people, perhaps assisted by absentee relatives, the relationship 
between cultivator and shareholders is a family one. In these schemes 
the absentees are heavily influenced by family loyalties and the 
company may have a committee of management dratra from the local people 
rather than a board of directors and employed manager. The pump and 
irrigation works plus the land in this case are the ownership of an 
extended family whose members are cultivators and shareholders. On 
the other hand, there is the new type of company, where the culti­
vators, led by an individual scheme o^-mer, have joined in buying small 
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numbers of shares with the strictly commercial purpose of increasing 
their portions of the proceeds of the pump schemes. Thornton (30, p. 
289) is of the view that this form of organization has considerable 
possibilities where there is opportunity for expanding commercial 
agriculture. It allows the building up of the power of the small 
cultivators. At the same time, it reduces the domination of individual 
pump owners and moneylenders. It is a form, moreover, which may have 
advantages in new developing areas and in those schemes where an 
organization intermediate between a higher authority and a substratum 
of many cultivators is required. 
3. The third form of organization is the pump cooperatives. The pump 
cooperatives in the Northern Province have been developed as an al­
ternative form of organization to replace under-sized holdings and to 
expand production over and above the subsistence minimum. The pump is 
usually bought by a subscription between the local villagers them­
selves,^^ sometimes engaged in profitable employment elsewhere. 
Absentee native subscriptions are not uncommon. Irrigation licenses, 
eitner "perennial" or "flood" are granted by the government. The 
working rules of the cooperative stipulate that the cultivator keeps 
half the produce from his acreage, while the other half is used for 
the improvement of the cooperative scheme, for works of social better­
ment in the locality, and for the payment of a dividend of not more 
than 12 percent to the shareholders (39, pp, 144-145). The cooper­
ative societies are usually administered by committees elected from 
1 7 There are also cases of cooperative societies being established by 
the government. In such cases, the government provides the capital 
expenditures necessary for canalization and the pumping plant. 
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the shareholders and cultivators. Even though they have indicated good 
prospects for capital creation (50, p. 757), the pump cooperatives do 
not seem to have been a success. Thornton (30, p. 289) writes that 
despite the commonly held view that "the characteristics of irrigated 
farming" tend "to favor cooperation", yet, only 9 percent of the 
schemes in the Northern Province are cooperatively organized, and even 
in these, cooperation is restricted to expenditure on pump and canal 
layout. There is little cooperative marketing, for instance, and 
credit facilities to individual members'""are not well-developed. The 
lumpiness of the initial investment associated with a long-term ges­
tation period, the limited managerial experience, the unneighborly 
spirit that clouds the land situation, and the unbalanced rewards to 
the participants in terms of their land and efforts contributions are 
all factors that have slowed down the development of cooperation in 
the Northern Province. 
The above completes the description of Figure 5. The figure has thus 
far provided a useful framework for presenting the problems that the 
various tenure arrangements in the Northern Province offer, thereby dis­
couraging the attainment of the goals of agricultural development. Where 
security and opportunity on the land is limited because of the injustice^^ 
done to the tenant and the land shortage respectively, the laws of inherit­
ance aggravate the situation even more; being one of the most serious 
handicaps to agricultural efficiency and prosperity throughout the 
1R Injustice as used here means the receipt of a reward by a participant 
lower than his contribution to the production process and insufficient to 
support him and his family at or above the subsistence norm. This Is also 
the case because other participants claim returns higher than their own 
contributions. 
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province. Inoptimal utilization of individually owned land hçis largely 
been the outcome of undersized and/or noncontiguous holdings.In many 
parts of "Sagia" and "Seluka" lands, holdings and even ownership of indi­
vidual date palms have become subdivided in accordance with normal laws of 
inheritance, operating through Sharia law, until in places, a stage has 
been reached in which the owners have so small an acreage of land that they 
cannot support a family upon it. This has adversely affected the improve­
ment of agricultural productivity and resulted in the poverty and under­
nourishment of the rural population in the areas concerned. Not only does 
the land go out of cultivation, as this is the outcome in many an instance, 
but also it becomes incapable of supporting an expanding population. 
Furthermore, there are limited outlets outside the particular farming area. 
The land area being fixed, the outcome by necessity is a further reduction 
in the size of holdings. The end product is an area much too small to be 
profitable even under the most favorable market conditions. 
The problem is potentially a serious one because of the different 
practices that are resultant of the river behavioral pattern and some 
traditional aspects have also contributed to parcelled and scattered uneco­
nomic tracts of land. For the most part the sloping bank and the adjoining 
piece in the river-bed belong to one owner who is usually the owner of the 
high land above (Sagia). But in some districts, the "Seluka" owners and 
"Sagia" owners are distinct. In some cases, as Bolton points out, "the 
high land had been sold without the sloping bank (gerf) pertaining to it, 
^^We can also refer to undersized holdings and noncontiguous holdings 
as the result of land fractionation and land fragmentation, respectively. 
Both the former and the latter might equally well be referred to as heredi­
tary subdivision of agricultural land which finally leads to the parcel-
lation of lands into small units that are spatially separated. 
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but native opinion is inimical to the severance of 'Sagia' and 'Seluka' 
land since custom divides the river into rectangular blocks divided in the 
middle of the river by an imaginary boundary called a 'mirin' which lies in 
the direction of the ilm of the river. The other boundary of the block is 
at right angles to the river and is called a 'fasil' (41, p. 191). The 
situation in some other districts is complicated even more by the fact that 
land ownership is vested into one person, 'Sid el Asl', while the right to 
cultivate without rent belongs to another, 'Sid el Miswak'. The only bene­
fit received by the former is a share in date palms. 
Tothill has described the evils of minute subdivision of land on his 
comment on the problem of land fractionation in the Northern Province in 
1948:20 
In general the householders and their families were a rather 
poor lot of people physically, appeared to be undernourished, 
and were obviously very poor. Their dwellings were spacious 
and generally in good order and clearly a relic of better 
times prior to minute subdivision of the land. The daily 
habits in regard to food show that tea, coffee, sugar, arid 
milk were used very sparingly, that the meat intake was 
entirely inadequate, and that there was a marked shortage 
of vegetables and fruit. In the matter of household effects, 
one was saddened to go into a house where one was treated 
with the greatest courtesy and made to drink probably the 
whole week's supply of tea or coffee or both in one mag­
nificent half-hour, to have solemnly to write down the entire 
contents of the house...., 5 beds, 1 ocassional table, 2 
aluminum pots, 1 tea pot, 2 glass cups, 2 wooden basins, 1 
gourd, 1 china and 3 metal basins, 2 wooden boxes, 1 donkey 
saddle, and 1 smoky little lamp without a chimney as the 
entire list of household property of an elderly man, a wife, 
and six children all under 9. Poverty was also indicated by 
the almost entire absence of camels, bulls, cows, calves, and 
heifers. The milk supply from goats and sheep was much too 
small for a healthy community and could not be greater because 
^^The picture for the freehold owner has not undergone much change 
since that time. Hox^ever, the government pump schemes seem to present a 
relatively better picture of a tenant's life. 
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land çould not be spared for the grm-ring of additional forage. 
...the big fact that emerges is that notwithstanding the date 
palms that slightly ease the economics of the community, 
the three feddans or less of land available for each house­
hold is not nearly sufficient to enable any sort of emergence 
to take place. Poverty is again reflected in the financial 
relations with the 'suk' (market), particularly in the 
perennial indebtedness (53, p. 220). 
With such a situation as the one described above, individual freehold in 
the Northern Province does not seem to offer the best opportunities for a 
higher per capita productivity through improved technical knowledge and a 
sustained increase in the propensity to save and consequently to invest. 
In terms of incentives, individual ownership in land may secure hard-work­
ing people; owner-cultivatorship being one of the most highly prized and 
jealously guarded customs of the native population; but in terms of 
capital and knowledge, the offer is meager. The attention will be focused 
on these considerations in the chapters to follow. 
Annual leasehold in the Gedaref District 
The development of this system of tenure has been a consequence of the 
introduction of mechanized farming in the central rain belt of the Sudan in 
the early 1940's. The country, at the time, was faced with the danger of 
grain shortages; declines in dura (sorghum) production were evident. The 
paramount objective under such conditions was to meet the requirements of 
a hungry population. The rainlands was the natural choice for such a 
development, the reason being a high land to labor ratio due to the 
abundance of land. Consequently, the famine danger coupled with the 
scarcity of labor have compelled the substitution of machinery for labor in 
the Gedaref District. 
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Development has first proceeded by the expropriation of 333,000 
feddans lying to the west of Gedaref toim and north of the Sennar-Kassala-
Port Sudan Railway^l (54, p. 2). The schemes established in this area were 
and still are managed by the government, and the land is worked by me­
chanical methods assisted with a labor force recruited from the toxms. The 
use of daily hired labor was not uncommon. By 1947 the system of partici­
pating cultivators was introduced; whereby the land was to be plov/ed and 
sown by the scheme; weeded and harvested by the cultivators. The intro­
duction of the participating cultivators on a share-cropping^^ basis was 
viewed at the time to be instrumental in providing the labor necessary with 
the least cost, and in securing a permanent source of income to the culti­
vator. Where land was allotted to the share-croppers, many of whom were 
also merchants or nominees, by the Nazirs (tribal chiefs), few of the 
allotments have survived. On the other hand, where land allotments were 
made by the inspector of agriculture, all the cultivators are still par­
ticipating in the scheme. 
In 1952 a working party was set up to investigate the technical and 
economic aspects of proposed schemes for bringing a larger area under 
91 Figure 6 overleaf gives a brief historical review of the intro­
duction of mechanization in the rainlands, an area where the indigenous 
system of tenure is still predominantly nebulous. 
22 In return for carrying out the operations that have not yet been 
mechanized, the cultivator used to receive 50% of the produce tax free. At 
first this was found to be more than the scheme could afford and it was 
reduced to a taxable 45% of the produce. In 1951-1952 the grain market was 
flourishing and the share of the cultivator was restored to a taxable 50%. 
No information regarding recent developments is available; but it seems 
that fluctuations in the cultivator's share have largely been influenced by 
the situation of the grain market and the costs of production. 
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Figure 5. Organizational forms under unirrigated agriculture 
in the rainlands where the M.C.P.S. have been 
developed but not completely integrated. 
mechanization and to recommend measures for improving the efficiency of the 
existing schemes. In reviewing the historical development of the partially 
mechanized schemes at the time, the working party came to the conclusion 
that mechanized tenant farming schemes have failed to justify the heavy 
? O 
capital expenditures lumped into them ^ (55, p. 2), In 1953 an end was put 
to the system of the participating cultivator, yielding place to the annual 
leasehold system. Under this system, a Land Allotment Board is responsible 
for the allocation of expropriated farm land. Theoretically priority in 
land allotments is to be given to cooperative societies and then to indi­
viduals in the locality who are able to purchase mechanical ecuipment and 
finally, to Sudanese from the other areas. No land is allotted to aliens 
or expatriates. The land is rented at one piastre per feddan, or LS 10 per 
1000 feddans which is only a nominal rent.24 This is a t^^pical example 
indicating the lack of an effective land market since the rental fees 
charged do not vary with the productivity of the land. The land allotment 
authority has completely disregarded the relationship that must exist 
between the prevailing land price and its productivity in value terms. 
23 Those who sponsored the development economically were only wise 
after the event. In recent years the financial results from mechanization 
have steadily improved. The knowledge and experience gained has been 
exploited and skillfully developed since 1953 onwards. The mechanized area 
under private farming as of 1961 amounts to more than one million feddans 
extending south of the railway line. Competition is still feverish for 
more. 
^'^Though the rent for land is extremely low, the taxation on these 
farm schemes is 10 percent of the gross return, and this is collected at 
the auction market through which all crops are channeled. This system has 
been the subject of a lot of criticism recently due to the drop in profits 
owing to the decline in the price of sorghum. The criticism is mainly 
directed at the fact that the tax is not based on a percentage of the net 
returns as it should be but on gross returns (56, p. 2), 
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Rent must provide for the value of land and investment in reclamation and 
improvement capitalized over a given number of years. This, of course, 
depends on the particular farming system and the necessary investment in 
the course of time to maintain or conserve soil fertility. This is es­
sential if land fertility as a national asset has to be restored for the 
coming generations. At present there is a strong competition for getting 
allotment in the areas of mechanized farming. If the expansion in these 
areas is to achieve the objectives of agricultural development sought then 
rents will have to be increased. The development so far set in motion 
presents a problem of the lack of a feed-back mechanism that can allot-: the 
plowing back of increases in rent to finance new developments by opening 
new areas for mechanized farming. In determining the low land rents in the 
mechanized areas, the land authority has not given attention to societal 
preferences as regards the "best" form of organization suited to the 
achievement of the developmental goals. The implication here is that the 
concession of a lower rent by the land authorities may in fact be a form of 
hidden support for the appropriate settlement of the local farmers given 
their preferences as to the form of organization that must prevail. An 
obstacle that annual leasehold system has created in the way of realizing 
improved productivity is the passing of such concessions to people who are 
not real farmers. Prejudices and bribery have greatly influenced the 
allotment of holdings. As a consequence, an unreasonably higher proportion 
of holdings has been allotted to local and "outside" notables and merchants 
who are in some cases the relatives of government ministers. Most of such 
people have been attracted to mechanized dry-farming not because of a genu­
ine interest in farming but because of a desire to maximize the rate of 
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return on investment in the shortest possible period. If development is to 
proceed on this line by allotting land to such people to whom agriculture 
is not the only mode of living, and if prices of agricultural products drop 
with subsequent low returns on capital invested, they may find no difficul­
ty in giving up farming for a number of years with the expectation that 
conditions may change. In the annual leasehold system of the central clay 
plains there is no heavy capital investment such as canals, buildings, 
drains, and so on tied to the land. With adverse market conditions, this 
form of inflexibility renders contraction in agricultural production im­
possible. The main item of investment, the tractors can be sold, hired, or 
stored for later use when economic conditions improve. On the other hand, 
with increasing returns to capital under favorable economic conditions, 
expansion in the area under mechanized production would be as rapid as 
contraction when the economic conditions are adverse. It might as well be 
expected that such type of expansion in the area under production would ex­
hibit the condition of a backward sloping supply curve. Such perverse be­
havior, hypothetical as it may seem, endows the system of tenure under con­
sideration with a form of instability that is not conducive to the reali­
zation of the goals which it has been devised to achieve. 
Another major problem that the annual leasehold system presents as the 
term indicates is the lack of security of tenure. The allottment of land 
on a year-to-year lease renewable at the end of each season does not give 
the lessee a chance of constructing permanent buildings for the scheme 
manager (if a hired manager exists), labor, and sheds for the tractor and 
machinery. Shortage of housing and water supply coupled with the dissatis­
faction that the hired laborers have developed as a result of the 
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relatively low standard of living will not encourage settlement on the 
farms. The absence of the manager and laborer alike from the farm, es­
pecially at harvest time, inhibits the attainment of optimal resource allo­
cation by unnecessarily adding to the costs of production. 
The lack of security of tenure is in fact an_incentive for the lessee 
to mine the soil with the aim of obtaining the maximum possible returns 
hoping that they can move to other areas. Both insecurity in tenure with 
the lack of legal provision to ensure a better management of land and the 
fixation of rents below the economic level point out to inefficiencies that 
make mechanized farming; incapable of contributing cheaply to agricultural 
development. It is a noticeable feature that some farms are not cultivated, 
and for most of them one would hypothesize that the optimum economic size 
has not been attained. Such cases would not obtain had the land market 
been allowed to operate, since a rise in land rent can be considered as a 
means to ensure the cultivation of the maximum area. 
Of no lesser importance is the question the system raises as to the 
settlement of the local inhabitants, part of whom are hired on a temporary 
basis by the lessees, particularly during the harvest season. The princi­
ples under which land tenure of the nomad and the rainland cultivators is 
determined in the Central Clay Plains have undergone little alterations 
since the introduction of mechanization in the area. Most of the village 
settlements in the area are of a temporary nature because the natural con­
ditions are such that they make it necessary for the farmer to move in 
search of a permanent food supply to meet the basic necessities of life. 
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Cultivation in "Bildat"^^ and "Harig"^^ areas is neither secure nor re­
munerative. It has been indicated by McLoughlin that the insecurity of 
normal cash and real income for the Sudanese farmer is one of the main 
factors which moves him into wage markets (33, p. 30^). Many of the nomads 
moving through this Central Clay Plains and the rainland farmers earn part 
of their income from pursuit of part-time employment in the Gezira Scheme, 
Gash and Tokar Deltas and rainland cash cropping. The sporadic movement of 
the nomads and semi-nomads in the wage labor market has favorably led to an 
increase in per capita consumption standards as a consequence of the "... 
increasing incidence of the use of money, ...as a medium of exchange" (33, 
p. 212). If the obiectives of development are to increase agricultural 
production and improve resource use, then the rise in per capita con­
sumption standards is a consequence that is incompatible with the reali­
zation of these goals insofar as it limits the creation of opportunities 
necessary for accelerating productive investment in the land. Labor, being 
scarce as it is, does not find adequate employment throughout the year. 
Increasing production which can be regarded as one of the niceties of 
agricultural development is not consistent with the nomadic and semi-
nomadic way of life, particularly when there is no legal basis to 
safeguard the cultivation rights of the village communities" (55, p. 18). 
And to argue as McCall has argued that "....the lands to be used for 
development ... lie principally in areas in which cultivation rights are 
25 
Bildat cultivation (singular Bilad) refers to patches of dura 
(sorghum) cultivation usually on cleared land surrounding a village settle­
ment. 
26Harig cultivation is a system of preparing the land for farming by 
burning the grass upon it. 
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rare or absent" and accordingly "...the size of the development..." is such 
as not "...to upset the traditional access of nomads to grazing" (55, p. 
43) is to defeat the purpose of such a development. If mechanized farming 
is to expand under the annual leasehold system, additional lands must come 
into use. _ This will mean the extinction^? of customary rights in the land, 
where ownership of the land by the nomadic tribe or the village community 
has not undergone a process of settlement through judicial channels. The 
villager and the nomad alike will lose their major source of bare sub­
sistence from "Bildat" cultivation and grazing respectively. If we add to 
this the fact that the increase in labor-saving capital has been inadequate 
as it has reduced labor requirements without channeling it into other 
markets where its marginal productivity is higher, then the situation of 
the uprooted tiller of the soil becomes really deplorable.^ 8 The problem 
of settlement, then, forms an integral part of further planning for the 
expansion of mechanized farming. For if the system of annual leasehold 
forms the readiest means of increasing grain production for the market, in 
its present form it also raises the risk of building up a body of landless 
workers held to an insecure system of farming by lack of alternative means 
of finding a livelihood. 
The tenure problem that the annual leasehold system presents, as far 
as such a problem exists, lies in the method of adjustment, as between the 
government and the communities that consider themselves as holders of land 
27 It is assumed here that land for expansion of mechanized farming 
will be expropriated to the state. 
o o 
Even at present, the peasants are described by Barbour as being 
poor, as attested by the generally shabby clothes and by the bareness of 
their homes (39, p. 185). 
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rights, of the incremental value of the land. The settlement of nomadic and 
semi-nomadic communities, necessitating in some instances the reclamation 
of virgin lands, will involve not only considerable capital expenditures 
but risks that the private sector may neither be willing nor able to bear. 
Such risks, a result of hazardous natural conditions, can only be reduced 
through investment in social overhead capital that will add to the value of 
properties of the local inhabitants. It is only after the reduction of 
such risks conditioned by the abolition of the nomadic way of life that an 
emerging system of tenure can perform adequately the role required in ad­
vancing capital formation. 
In light of the problematic hypothesis serious doubts are raised so 
far as to the efficacy of the annual leasehold system in contributing fully 
to the goals of agricultural development. The whole issue of land allotments 
has not touched upon the indigenous cultivator, thus resulting in a weak 
incentive situation for labor associated with rewards not in line with 
contributions. The lessee of land, on the other hand, has no incentive to 
invest in land improvements or structures for reasons mentioned earlier. As 
a consequence, the system does not advance capital creation. Managerial 
costs are high. The size and the layout of farms needs to be reviewed in 
terms of mechanical efficiency requirements. The continuation of Iot-T un­
economic land rents could not be justified. Accordingly, to ensure more 
secure and stable incomes to the farmer, and to reduce the possibility of 
the contraction of agricultural production should adverse market conditions 
prevail in the future, basic modifications in the annual leasehold structure 
are necessary. Such modifications should relate the institutional and tech­
nical factors and focus more consciously on those reform measures which will 
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contribute to the realization of the goals sought. 
The Gezira Scheme 
The Gezira (island) Scheme is identified by the area irrigated from 
the Sennar Dam which spans the Blue Nile 250 miles south of the urban Three 
Towns (Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omduman). The land utilized in the 
economic region is in the form of an inverted "V" created by the junction 
of the White and Blue Niles. The total irrigated area of the Scheme as of 
1963 is 1.9 million feddans, one half of which is irrigated and under in­
tensive cultivation in any one year (57, p. 3). The other half is so uti­
lized the following year. Prior to the dam's construction in the 1920's, 
the region's inhabitants had socio-economic activities similar to those of 
the nomads, semi-nomads, and rainland agriculturalists who at present in­
habit the neighbouring semi-desert and the Central Clay Plains region. 
Of the cultivated land, which is half of the total irrigable area 
annually, half is devoted to cotton production and half to food crops, dura 
(a cereal crop) and lubia (a leguminous crop) in particular, sufficient for 
the provision of food requirements. 
McLoughlin reports that as of 1961 over 700,000 persons live on the 
Scheme, with 200,000 more on the average entering seasonally to harvest 
crops (58, p. 181). The system of cultivation is through tenants, though 
the major agricultural operations, such as plowing and spraying, are under­
taken centrally. The actual detailed cultivation, the planting, inter-
culture, irrigation, and picking of the crop, is performed by the tenants 
under the supervisory technical staff of the Sudan Gezira Board. The 
cotton produce is handed over to, processed (ginned) and marketed by, the 
Sudan Gezira Board. The net proceeds of the cotton enterprise are divided 
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among the three partners (Sudan Government, Sudan Gezira Board, and 
tenants) on a profit share basis.^9 
The institutional structure of the Gezira Scheme is a triple partner­
ship; the Sudan Government, the Sudan Gezira Board, and the tenants. The 
present Gezira Board, a public utility, replaced in 1950 the two private 
corporations who had developed and managed the Scheme to that time. The 
Government also became entirely Sudanese with 1956 political independence. 
The tenantry, however, while maintaining practically the original legal 
status over the years, have become politically powerful as a class and 
through their representative union have recently secured a seat on the 
Board (30, p. 290). 
Originally individual land ownership was recognized in the Gezira. 
Long before the actual start of the scheme, individual rights in land have 
been registered and legislation was passed to the effect that everybody who 
possessed land within the Scheme was obliged to rent it on a forty-years 
lease to the Government at a price of ten piastres^® per feddan, the 
highest price for a lease under normal conditions before the irrigation. 
The rights of the owner are still further restricted since he is not allow­
ed to sell his property without Government approval. However, approval is 
given only if land is sold to: 
^^The proportion of sharing as of 1964 is 44 percent to the tenants, 
40 percent to the Government, and 10 percent to the Sudan Gezira Board, 
The other 5 percent constitutes the funds that are allotted to the Tenant's 
Reserve, to Social Development, and to local Government Councils. The 
Boards' share is utilized to cover managerial costs, and expenditures on 
research and a business profit tax. The remainder, if any, is shared 
between the other parties. 
OQ 
One piastre equals approximately three cents. At the present ex­
change rate, the Sudanese pound (- 100 piastres) is equivalent to $2.87. 
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1. Tenants or sheikhs^l of the vendor, who own less than 720 feddans. 
2. Bonafide residents in the area and potential cultivators who may 
thereby increase their holdings up to 40 feddans (59, p. 772). 
In case the otmer cannot meet the above specified conditions, then he 
can sell the land to the Government at a fixed rate of 80 piastres per 
feddan^Z (60, p. 35). 
The above indicates that private ownership of land is restricted. 
Further, the proprietor is allowed to pass on his land only in plots of 10 
feddans since the whole irrigated area of the scheme is so subdivided. The 
fields are so regulated to prevent excessive subdivision of land, and to 
meet the requirements of the applied rotation which was laid dovm to ensure 
the best possible cotton growing conditions. However useful these measures 
are, the land-OT-mer has lost most of his rights. As a Sudanese Government 
report indicates: 
The use, but not the oicnership, of the land has been 
nationalized, that is, no individual can keep his land 
out of the Scheme or hold the country to ransom on the 
terms of entry. The Government has assumed entire 
control of and responsibility for the land, paying the 
owners as compensation a rent equivalent to the highest 
market rate before the Scheme started and giving them, 
in addition, original priority option to tenancies 
(61, p. 32). 
The allocation of tenancies^S is regulated by the Gezira Land 
oi 
Sheikh is usually the head of the village. 
32 The fixed rate has been changed to one Sudanese pound per feddan 
since 1947. 
33 Originally tenancies consisted of four ten-feddan plots. In order 
to avoid absentee landlordism and to provide the opportunity of greater in­
come for a larger number of farmers, tenancies in recent extensions of the 
Scheme consist of 15 feddans, each, while the size of those in the original 
Gezira area has been reduced by 44 percent (62, p. 2). 
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Ordinance of 1927, which amended earlier legislation of 1921 and 1923. 
Those who owned 40 feddans or more, called "right holders" come first as 
tenants; and then their "nominees", that is, people nominated by owners 
who possess 80 feddans or more. Finally, land allotments are made to 
"preferential tenants" or people who own 20-40 feddans. Mackinnon reports 
that the allocation of tenancies to right holders and nominees is obliga­
tory unless they have a bad cultivation record.IJhen this is the case, 
the right holders and nominees are persuaded to nominate someone else 
(59, p. 771). Preferential tenants are given priority over landless men in 
the allocation of tenancies. After tenancies have been allocated to the 
above three classes of cultivators, the claims of others are considered. 
Allotments are then made to those considered suitable, after consultation 
with the village council concerned. 
From the foregoing description, it is apparent that the Gezira peasant 
is not a tenant according to the most general usage of the term. He is 
rather a share-cropper exercising less of the functions of management than 
does a tenant. Precisely, he usually works his own land, rented by the 
Government. Thus the original owner of the land receives a land rent from 
the Government, and in addition, he has the right to cultivate the holding 
that is allotted to him, or to nominate a person to take his place as a 
cultivator. 
This right to work on a certain holding has a widely varying value, as 
the cotton yield and especially world cotton prices vary greatly. The 
additional income from rent is of importance in lean years when the 
^^Tenants' evictions are very rare and they seldom occur. Mackinnon 
reports just over one percent evictions at the end of 1938-1939 season (59, 
p. 772). 
115 
tenantry's share is relatively low due to declining cotton prices. How­
ever, rental income forms a declining proportion of the average tenant's 
cash payment when the cotton market is flourishing. The fixed rent finds 
its justification in the fact that the additional value of the land has 
been made possible only by the Government investment in irrigation. The 
traditional basis of agricultural profit-sharing in the Nile Valley has 
been that he who provides the land and brings water to it by "Sagia" or 
"Shadouf" receives half of the profits, while the cultivator of the land 
receives the other half. In this connection Versluys reports that: 
....In the Gezira area the 1 andor-mer outside the 
scheme received 1/10 of the yield, the OT-mer of the 
water-wheels 1/10, the man who procures the cattle to 
drive the wheels 2/10, while 4/30 is given for the 
procurement of seed and implements and finally, 2/30 
for cattle fodder; the remaining 4/10 go to the 
worker. The 40 percent paid out to tenants in the 
Gezira irrigated area thus conforms to a local 
custom (60, p. 30). 
But, whereas the 'customary' tenant contributes to production by applying 
his effort only, the Gezira tenant pays a part of the production costs^^ in 
addition to his labor. Comparing what the tenant gets with the results 
obtained under the customary division of the yield, Versluys comes to the 
conclusion that the division of the proceeds would not be exceptionally 
favorable for the Gezira tenant. But the tenant derives other income from 
those crops which are retained wholly by him. The value of these crops 
cannot easily be compared with the proceeds accruing from cotton, because 
they are food and fodder crops that are consumed by man and his animals, 
35 The tenants usually pay for cotton seed, other seeds, and materials 
and livestock and small hand tools. In the past they used to pay for 
plowing, too. 
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although part of them may be sold.^^ According to the estimates that 
Versluys has reported from various sources, the average net return of a 
tenant for the 1949 crop was LE.235 if the tenant does not work himself. 
The net return was LE.269 if the tenant and his family do the work (50, p. 
42). At present, even though the management believes in the favorable 
possibilities open to the tenants, the latter are rather pessimistic about 
their financial position. 
One of the striking deficiencies of the scheme that results in a rela­
tively lower level of income to the tenant is that he does not share in the 
ordinary agricultural work but leaves everything to hired labor. As 
McLoughlin very rightly states; 
....Present-day ramifications of the earlier nomadic and 
Moslem value system are governing to an increasing extent 
the economic behavior of tenants and most of the resident 
and seasonal labor forces. As incomes have risen and 
consumption expanded, it has become possible financially 
to support those social activities, those aspects of 
ostentation and conspicuous consumption, which the 
community considers intrinsic to self-esteem and social 
advancement The most important single ingredient 
in this pattern is relief from manual agricultural labor 
for the person and his family. This withdrawal of 
effort by both the tenant as his profits rise, and the 
worker as his total wage income goes up, has resulted in 
the economic fact that twice as many people (at far more 
than twice the cost) are needed to produce the same bale 
of cotton or ton of grain as were required twenty years 
ago. The rising level of income....is simultaneously 
the vehicle through which a diminishing rate of increase 
in total and per capita income is being effected. Costs 
of production, and therefore selling costs, are artifi­
cially swollen (58, p. 183). 
Realistic as it is, the above explanation ignores a major argument 
against share tenancy arrangements, of which the Gezira Scheme is a rather 
It should also be noted that the tenant may have business interests 
other than his tenancy. He may be engaged in an economic activity outside 
the Scheme. 
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special case. Under a share of the proceeds arrangement, the incentive for 
a party to contribute efficiently to the production process will depend 
upon the manner in which the costs and returns are divided. Accordingly, 
one would expect the tenant to be averse to hard work and improved husband­
ry because he only gets a proportion of the results of his efforts. 
Thornton, in touching upon this point, argues that: 
....In the case of Gezira cotton, however, the year-
to-year variations are so wide and so little under the 
control of either partner that this criticism is out­
weighed by the substantial advantage of risk-sharing. 
If the tenant had to pay rent for the resources 
provided by the senior partner (Government) there would 
be even greater fluctuation in his income. It is de­
sirable to bridge fluctuations even now by a Reserve 
Fund (63, p. 4). 
This argument, however, loses its plausibility when the structure of 
the Scheme is assessed on a long-run basis. With the present plans for the 
diversification of the Scheme, the advantages of share-tenancy^? may out­
weigh the disadvantages. It is unlikely that all the commodities produced 
will have the same uncertainty as cotton. Moreover, diversification itself 
may tend to reduce income variability in which case the insecurity in 
tenant's income can no longer be attributed to factors beyond the control 
of the policy-makers. Under such a situation aversion to work, and conse­
quently inefficient use of the available resource-labor -- will find its 
explanation partly in the reduced incentive characterizing the share-
cropping partnership. 
^^Share-tenancy is viewed from the over-all efficiency standpoint, 
whereby arrangements between the Government and the tenantry should be such 
that it will facilitate movement towards perfect association of costs and 
returns over time. 
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The organizational form of the Scheme presents also technical problems 
and capital limitations that hinder the achievement of the goals pursued in 
this study. 
In assessing the efficiency of the tenant's holdings, Thornton 
observes : 
....tenant's enterprise is stiffled by the present curbs^^ 
to production flexibility and the inflexibility of 
holding size. At present tenancies are let on an 
annual tenancy with no principle of automatic inherit­
ance, and the number of tenancies that can be legally 
held by one tenant is strictly limited. Those who 
would argue for greater flexibility cite the S.G.B.'s 
Village Farm Experiment at Wad-el-Naim where extension, 
backed with adequate resources, has led to much enter­
prise by some of the tenants. The non-farming activi­
ties which some of the tenants elsewhere have developed 
carry similar implications. Against these arguments 
may be set the disciplinary pressures which the manage­
ment find it necessary to apply to maintain minimum 
standards of cotton husbandry.(30, p. 292). 
The Gezira is then a static system that cannot be extended without 
extending the irrigation area. The rigid subdivision of the tenancies into 
sizes which are to fit a rigid rotation makes the Scheme extremely inflexi­
ble. This is incompatible with the goal of diversification and entails a 
conservatism that favors the persistence of a mono-culture. The justifi­
cation for this attitude, however, lies in the technical limitations with 
which the Scheme is endowed, namely, the reservation that the central 
planning agency has to take into account regarding the effective use of 
water and the relative profitability of crop substitutes other than cotton. 
In addition, the insecurity of tenure and the uncertainty facing the 
Curbs to production include limitations due to cropping, watering, 
and other cultivai methods, besides the concentration of the cultivating 
area in the hands of many tenants. 
119 
individual tenant regarding the payment of his share^^ reduce the efficien­
cy of production by tending to withdraw the tenant and his family from 
manual work. The individual tenancy agreement in use at the Gezira Scheme, 
for instance, stipulates certain stringent conditions: 
....If the Tenant neglects or is careless in the 
cultivation of his crops, the Syndicate^O shall 
have the right without the consent of the Tenant 
to take such steps as the Syndicate may consider 
proper for the safeguarding of the crops, and any 
expense incurred thereby shall be a debt from the 
Tenant to the Syndicate and may, without his consent, 
be deducted by the Syndicate from his share of the 
proceeds of the crops. Further, if the Tenant 
neglects or is careless in the cultivation of his 
crops or neglects to carry out the reasonable orders 
of the Syndicate's officials in any of the aforesaid 
matters or fails to comply with any of the other 
provisions of the Government or the Syndicate, the 
Syndicate shall have the right to terminate the 
tenancy forthwith without any compensation to the 
Tenant (except as hereinafter provided) and to hand 
over the land and cultivation subject to the debts 
to the Syndicate secured thereon but free from any 
claim by the old tenant (except as hereinafter 
provided),,.. (64, p. 342), 
Such a stipulation as the above involves a good many obligations and not 
all that degree of security. Reluctance to work is not so much explained 
by "....a set of values that still emphasize status more than wealth,,.." 
as Thornton and others claim, as it is explained by the numerous 
39 The system of accounts followed in the Gezira Scheme is such that 
the proceeds to the tenant are not paid on crop delivery but lag behind. 
In addition, the accounts disregard the expenses that the tenant might 
incur through hiring labor or through his own work and which might not be 
covered by the loans that he receives from the Scheme's Management (64, 
pp. 87-89). 
The term Syndicate is at present replaced by the Sudan Gezira 
Board. 
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sources^l of uncertainty that tend to reduce the tenant's evaluation of the 
cotton crop. The Gezira tenants tend to prefer low-risk production and 
greater diversification because expected yield returns from the cotton 
enterprise tend to have a relatively higher degree of discount for un­
certainty when compared to short-term crops such as dura. This argument 
is well-illustrated by the inclination of the Gezira tenant to shift his 
resources toward uses in other income earning activities. In many an 
instance as Thornton explains, the tenant may be the center of an economic 
unit which uses resources on the fringe of the Scheme, he may provide 
tertiary services in an undifferentiated rural society, or may occasionally 
have non-rural interests as far away as Khartoum (63, p. 2). 
The concentration in few hands of either cultivating area or land 
ownership with the subseouent development of absentee landlordism has 
lowered the standard of cultivation. Gaitskell does not describe the 
situation accurately when he expresses the opinion 
....By granting to land-owners only such tenancies as 
they themselves, in the opinion of the Government, 
were competent to cultivate, and by reserving to 
Government the right to let all other tenancies to 
such persons as it thought fit, the distribution of 
tenancies was made in such a way that very few persons 
had more than one unit. In this manner, the wealth 
from the new enterprise was spread among a very 
large part of the resident population (64, p. 86). 
Gaitskell's argument is at variance with the comments that observers 
of the Scheme make regarding absentee landlordism, the situation of hired 
labor in the Scheme, and the reluctance of the tenants to work. In the 
^^Wunderlich indicates that the size of the discount by a tenant would 
depend upon a number of factors -- the individual's own propensity to bear 
risk, his capital position, variability of prices and production, expec­
tations concerning tenure period and alternative employments, and level of 
living (65, p. 141). 
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Managil extension, for instance, land speculation, which was unchecked by 
the Government prior to the development, has provided an opportunity for 
the local notables and merchants with capital to buy native lands, with the 
result that more than one tenancy has been allotted to one particular 
family.42 Thus, the nicety that the Government has set out to achieve 
that is, the creation of an independent peasantry of a 'good' class of 
native land-owners, has been complicated with the conversion of some of the 
originally independent peasantry into hired laborers. To illustrate the 
argument even more. West reports: 
....It has been observed that at least one-third of 
the units in the Gezira are nmv split between father 
and son, .... (66, p. 57). 
The above arrangement, though believed to alleviate the problem of 
hired labor in the Scheme, is one of the reasons that has led to the cre­
ation of the problem in the first place. The father-son arrangement, 
besides giving rise to absentee landlordism, has enabled a wealthy family 
with a small working capacity and a distaste for work to receive a rela­
tively larger number of tenancies; while another family composed of a 
larger number of worlonen would have been assigned a single tenancy, or no 
tenancy at all. As a consequence of this, the Scheme is faced with a host 
of problems: a large proportion of "gentlemen managers", to use Gaitskell 
terminology, who regard agricultural labor as socially degrading and who as 
a consequence employ labor to the limit of their incomes and a hired labor 
class guarding with envy a tenant who works less but receives more. 
^^While the typical tenant as McLoughlin claims, has approximately 40 
feddans, these have been parcelled out (privately) into plots of 20, 10, 
and 5 feddans. In some cases, however, combination has effected much 
larger tenancies managed by often absentee tenants (38, p. 377). 
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Between the two extremes is the hard-working tenant who is often forgotten 
in the search for ramifications of unorthodox economic behavior. 
Apart from the tenants, there is thus a group of people resident in 
the Scheme or entering it during the picking season from elsevThere. The 
labor supply that is normally available within the Scheme is sufficient to 
secure year-round employment in agriculture, with the Gezira Board, the 
Irrigation Department, other official agencies, and in town and village 
commerce. Seasonal immigrants, however, form the bulk of labor supply at 
the picking season and the pulling-out period following it when the demand 
for labor from outside the Gezira is particularly high. Table 14 indicates 
the traditional sources of labor from outside the Gezira. The total column 
in the table indicates an increasing number of seasonal immigrants in the 
period 1943-44 - 1961-62. This increase can be used as a very rough indi­
cation for a declining propensity to work on the part of the tenant and an 
active propensity to hire labor up to the limit of his income. McLoughlin, 
in commenting upon the nature of seasonal employment in the Gezira Scheme, 
writes: 
....Half (of the seasonal immigrants) are nomads from 
adjoining semi-desert and drier (more northern) Central 
Clay Plains regions. The remainder are of two kinds --
Sudanese farmers (Sudanic and Arab) from Ooz Sands and 
Central Clay Plains districts; and Westerners. This 
former group is growing in number as soil erosion, 
over-crowding and declining productivity force them 
into acquiring income other than from their farms. 
Like the nomad, they come to the Scheme primarily for 
food. Participation at all and length of stay in wage 
markets are dependent upon the success of their otm 
rainland crops, the level of Gezira money wages (and 
real income in the form of grain), and the strength of 
the desire to return home. They may not arrive at all 
if rains are satisfactory, no locusts appear, and no 
bugs and diseases consume their food supply. Thus, 
between the nomad and the reluctant farmer, over half 
the picking wage-labor force (on which the entire 
Table 14. Picking labor census as prepared by the Sudan Gezira Board, Numbers of workers by 
Nationality groupa 
Season 
Blue Nile 
Arabs 
White Nile 
Arabs 
French 
Equatonals 
Fellata 
Hansa 
Western 
Sudanese Others Total 
1943-1944 41,361 26,757 16,109 14,088 9,702 850 108,867 
1944-1945 72,504 31,206 18,599 11,708 10,449 770 145,236 
1945-1946 63,963 34,281 15,857 12,669 9,832 1,443 138,045 
1946-1947 65,388 35,654 15,466 12,918 8,503 670 138,599 
1947-1948 85,540 49,413 19,112 12,910 11,726 1,247 179,948 
1948-1949 96,002 43,043 19,913 18,251 10,806 623 188,638 
1949-1950 103,615 47,560 21,282 18,408 14,172 949 205,986 
1950-1951 89,500 50,813 23,850 19,284 19,474 773 203,694 
1951-1952 55,466 42,614 24,901 11,069 23,626 157,676 
1952-1953 72,409 54,152 29,651 17,483 32,513 - 203,406 
1953-1954 61,960 44,201 29,653 15,091 31,672 - 183,418 
1954-1955 77,469 53,390 26,962 16,260 29,711 - 205,753 
1955-1956 89,233 54,338 24,774 20,049 23,774 212,168 
1956-1957 112,574 55,355 32,959 19,272 31,787 - 251,947 
1957-1958 52,732 42,549 20,264 12,137 21,702 - 149,384 
1958-1959 118,143 65,673 ,26,939 18,002 41,058 40Z^ 270,219 
1959-1960 82,894 75,466 19,433 13,286 31,410 50 226,592 
1960-1961 91,629 85,063 17,827 11,446 43,991 40 240,996 
1961-1962 70,014 79,014 28,907 74,028 18,492 • 391,275 
^Source: (67, p. 32), 
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Scheme depends, not to mention national development 
via government income and investment) is a fluctuating 
variable, and unpredictable in terms of both appearance 
and duration of stay (38, p. 379). 
The flow of laborers into the Gezira Scheme from the subsistence farm­
ing areas besides being an outcome of low real agricultural income, also 
retards the acquisition of skills for the expansion of the industrial 
sector. A system of migratory labor encouraged as a "savior" of a risky 
monoculture is incompatible with the positive increase in per capita real 
productivity sought for the nation as a whole. This brings to the surface 
one of the inherent inflexibilities of the Gezira Scheme that has tra­
ditionally been and still is oriented to primary production for export. 
The view is usually held that the reluctance of the average tenant to work 
is a major factor that contributes to the decline in cotton output during 
peak seasons when migratory labor is scarce. Such an argument can suggest 
that a large amount of underemployment is displayed by the Gezira Scheme. 
To assume that the splitting of the number of units (hawashas) between 
father and son will reduce the problem of migratory labor through reducing 
the economic attractiveness of wage labor would be unrealistic. Even if 
the area under irrigation is extended, the migratory labor system would be 
expected to continue as long as the rainland agriculturlist and the cattle 
43 
nomad could raise their family incomes by migrating. 
The above reasoning indicates that, given the excess labor capacity 
If we accept the theoretical construct of Rainis and Fei in their 
identification of the growth process that a developing economy experiences 
by phases, as valid, and if it is reasonable to assume that the Sudanese 
economy has approached a stage of transformation that lies in between the 
stagnation phase and the take-off phase, then it follows that a proportion 
of the population could be moved out of the farming sector without depress­
ing the output. 
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in the Gezira Scheme, the service of hired labor could be replaced in some 
operations by the use of other underemployed tenants. The factors of pro­
duction can be so reorganized that additional labor inputs from those 
resident in the Scheme may produce the same output as before, though the 
"conservative" attitude toxjards work by some tenants often hinders the 
expansion of production. 
While the system of hired labor is probably a necessary phase in the 
development of Sudanese agriculture, with time it seems evident that the 
gains from the system will have to be exhausted, and that further progress 
depends on a different, more coordinated kind of development that is to be 
coupled with change in attitude towards work that some regard as unpleasant. 
The persistence of the movement of the hired laborer between commercialized 
agriculture and subsistence farming offers the evidence that the nomad or 
semi-nomad is unable to become either a more productive farmer or a more 
productive industrial worker, but becomes stuck in a plateau of relative 
inefficiency in each kind of employment. 
If the Scheme is to contribute the maximum possible to national funds 
for reinvestment and development it must produce its output at a lower 
cost. This cannot be the case, however, where the tenants are dissatisfied 
with the apportioning of the shares of the net proceeds of the cotton crop 
and with the list of items included in joint account costs. Further, 
adverse market conditions for the cotton crop with severe fluctuations in 
cotton prices coupled with fluctuations in average yield per feddan as 
shown in Table 15 dictates a shift of emphasis from the aforesaid crop. 
Such a change in attitude will have to be preceded by modification in the 
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Table 15. Yield and price of Gezira cotton during the period 1926 - 1950^ 
Crop year 
Yield in Kantars 
per feddan 
Price in pence 
per pound 
1925 - 1926 4.8 18.0 
1927 4.7 18.0 
1928 3 . 3  19.7 
1929 3.6 18.4 
1930 2.3 7.9 
1931 1.4 6.4 
1932 4.1 8.5 
1933 1.9 8.1 
1934 2.3 8 . 6  
1935 4.5 8.2 
1936 3.7 7.9 
1937 4.5 8.6 
1938 4.6 5.9 
1939 4.5 6 . 2  
1940 3.8 9.6 
1941 4.0 8.9 
1942 4.8 9 . 1  
1943 3.1 9 . 3  
1944 4.9 10.6 
1945 3.4 10.3 
1946 4.0 19.2 
1947 3.4 38.5 
1948 4.3 38.5 
1949 4.6 41.3 
^Source: (64, p. 267). 
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organizational structure of the Scheme if all the parties involved and the 
nation are to benefit. 
Most of the services in the Scheme are provided by the Central Govern­
ment through cooperation with the Sudan Gezira Board; being the Govern­
ment's agent. The determination of the use of factors of production: 
land, capital, water, and even labor is to a large extent the responsibili­
ty of the Sudan Gezira Board. The tenant has no discretion in managing the 
cotton enterprise, and he is not given as much attention and advice regard­
ing his subsistence crops. Management decisions, consisting primarily of 
cotton cultural practices are performed predominantly by the staff of the 
Sudan Gezira Board; who in most cases lack the technical experience. If 
it can be assumed that management is still a limiting factor in the Gezira 
Scheme, then improved efficiency and resource use can be expected as a 
result of some basic changes in the traditional management of the Scheme. 
For management to be economically efficient, the condition which have to be 
satisfied would be that the increase in output will be greater in value 
terms than the manager's salary. The fact that management expenses have 
more than doubled since the introduction of the Managil Extension as 
Thornton reports (63, p. 5) indicates that the cost of providing the mana­
gerial services to the tenant is a heavy burden on his net capital forming 
capacity. Since the Government has assumed responsibility of management 
for the Scheme, uncertainty of tenure and the limited role that the tenant 
exercise in the decision-making process produces a reluctance on his part 
to invest in land, for he has no assurance that the benefits from such an 
investment will not be cut off. 
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Increases In cotton production in the Gezira Scheme have mainly been 
the outcome of acreage expansion, the incidence of heavy rain prior to 
planting combined with light rain the preceding year and response to ferti­
lizer application (64, pp. 174 and 311). There is no evidence that Sudan 
Gezira Board management has resulted in an increase in total product 
greater than expenditures incurred on centralized management. With in­
creasing costs of production being incurred on irrigation, labor recruit­
ment and other social services, and with fluctuating productivity per 
feddan, additional income that could be channeled into productive invest­
ment is limited. Under such conditions the quantity of capital that the 
Gezira Scheme can create from the standpoint of economy would be meagre. 
In summing up this problematic section on the Gezira Scheme it could 
be said that a relatively high degree of efficiency in cotton production 
has been obtained. The whole sequence of operations, from seed-bed 
preparation to marketing, is organized by the controlling authority. The 
partnership system designed to suit Gezira conditions has reduced the 
tenant almost to the status of a paid laborer. The Scheme represents not 
only the largest Government investment but also its most difficult fi­
nancial problems. Inasmuch as the agrarian structure on which the Scheme 
is built harbours inefficiencies that impede the achievement of the already 
stated objectives it is desirable to look for the modifications necessary 
for the removal of such obstacles. 
Selected Tenure Structures from Other Nations 
At one time or another modifications in land tenure structures have 
occupied a place of great importance in countries the world over in their 
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efforts to promote the objectives of equity, improved productivity^^ and 
resource use and increased production. In this section, the intention is 
to review the historical role that particular agrarian reforms have per­
formed in attaining the objectives referred to above, indicating where 
pertinent the problems realized or that, as of now, have yet to be over­
come. Such a review is of relevance in increasing the awareness of those 
who are still groping for a sound institutional foundation that will enable 
the realization of the goals they seek. 
Family - farm; tenanted and owner-operated 
Most of the land rights in the United States are in the hands of indi­
viduals under tenure arrangements of various kinds. Colonial patterns of 
land distribution were such that family-sized owner-operated farms were as 
large as the farmer's financial and business ability permitted them to be 
or were 'in the hands of farmers of moderate means who were dependent upon 
family labor'. Thomas Jefferson saw the United States being patterned as a 
nation of small land-holding farmers. He felt that the farmer must till 
his ovm land if he is to have great pride and a sense of economic security. 
"....Agrarianism and private property in farmland were for Jefferson not 
ends in themselves but the means to democracy and individual freedom" (68, 
p. 5). Ruttan offers a concise comment on the liberal - Jeffersonian 
tradition; 
In the United States, political and equity considerations 
have traditionally represented the dominant themes in 
agrarian reform. The confiscation of loyalist estates 
during and following the Revolution was primarily 
^Ruttan is of the opinion that the productivity objective has only 
recently come to be of major importance in complementing the classical 
objectives of political stability and equity (69, p. 115). 
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motivated by equity considerations. Jefferson's 
political philosophy, which regarded the family farm, 
owned and operated by the cultivator, as the only 
sound foundation of social equality and political 
stability, provided the intellectual foundation for 
the major U.S. agrarian reform legislation of the 
nineteenth century and remains an important theme 
in current agricultural policy discussion.45 
Only in recent years has productivity emerged as 
an important theme in U.S. agrarian legislation (69, 
p. 115). 
Historically, frontier land in the U.S. was not 'free', nor was it 
easy to cultivate. Forests had to be cleared in some instances and in 
other cases the prairies had to be broken up and let rot. This took con­
siderable time and demanded that the farmer have some kind of subsistence 
during the cropless period, .Also, immigrants settled the rural areas 
which, naturally, decreased the available land for farming. Population in­
creased, demanding a greater output of produce per acre. As pointed out in 
an official bulletin: 
Besides possessing a relatively large acreage of arable 
land per capita, the United States also is fortunate in 
having advanced agricultural techniques that reduce the 
effective pressure of its population on the land. Thus, 
in this country, there are 16.5 acres of arable land 
per capita of agricultural population, contrasted with 
such comparable figures as 2.2 for the world as a 
whole, 0.94 for the continent of Asia, and 0.7 for China. 
Agrarian reform legislation during the nineteenth century conceived 
in the spirit of Jefferson's agrarian democracy includes: (a) the Pre­
emption Law (1841) which legalized squatting on unsurveyed public domain 
with the right to purchase up to 160 acres at the minimum price after 
surveyal; (b) the Homestead Act (1862) which conveyed free title to 160 
acres of land after residing on and cultivating the tract for five years. 
These laws were reinforced by other legislations designed to insure the 
economic success of the family farm; (a) the Morrill Act (1862) establish­
ing the land grant agricultural colleges; (b) the Hatch Act (1877) provid­
ing federal support for the state agricultural experiment stations; and, 
(c) the Smith-Lever Act (1914) creating a federal - state agricultural 
station (69, p. 115). 
131 
lAen agricultural land is relatively abundant, land 
tenure problems tend to be less pressing than when land 
is relatively scarce. Nonetheless, in the United 
States land has always been sufficiently scarce to make 
competition for farmland keen (68, p. 36). 
The recent evolution of tenure status during the last three-ruarters 
of a century is explained by the four following phenomena: 
1. The evolution of a system of public farm credit institutions; 
2. The changes in transportation and communication available to 
farm people; 
3. The wartime experience of farm people; and 
4. The long period of general prosperity and full employment that 
began in the early forties. 
During the 1930's which followed the depression in the United States, 
the Federal Government had to set up a Land Bank Commission which would 
grant loans with lower interest rates and longer periods of repayment by 
the farmer. The Emergency Farm Mortgage Act allowed the maximum amount of 
a loan to be doubled and the loans were made directly to the farmers who 
did not have a farm-loan association in their locality. 
In 1937 the Farm Security Administration was established to give the 
following types of assistance: 
1. Rehabilitation loans and grants to farm owners, 
tenants, croppers, and farm laborers who could not 
otherwise obtain government-sponsored credit; 
2. tenant-purchase loans to qualified tenants, 
croppers, and farm laborers at low interest rates with 
long re-payment periods and variable annual payments; 
3. experimental work to devise new types of housing 
and new building methods that would improve the 
quality and lower the cost of farm housing; and 
4. temporary camps to provide minimum accommodations 
for displaced and destitute migrant farm families 
(68, p. 56). 
Here is a practical example where public credit agencies have been an 
effective instrument in stabilizing ownership conditions to maintain a 
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productive agriculture. Conversely, security in land ownership have 
favored the expansion of farm credit activity. This is not to be inter­
preted to mean that owner cultivatorship is the only method of making 
capital available to farmers. Apparently, as Hurlburt points out: 
.... there are greater opportunities or incentives for 
investment ... on owner-operated farms — where the 
operator pays the costs and receives the benefits — 
than on tenant operated ones,on which there are 
problems resulting from length of occupancy and 
cost-returns sharing. This does not imply that 
effective arrangements cannot be developed for 
improvements on tenant operated farms (70, p. 10). 
Tenancies on privately-owned land differ from owner cultivatorship 
principally in that the owner of the land does not cultivate, or operate, 
the land but rather retains the continuing ownership rights, and transfers 
temporary rights of possession and use of the land to a tenant (71, p. 4). 
Tenant-operated farms have received high praise by economists specifi­
cally in economies with a highly developed agriculture, where the operators 
need to work with considerable equipment and livestock (49, p. 46). So far 
as U. S. agriculture is concerned tenant operation, besides private owner­
ship of resources, seems to have created "....a structure of interests 
which, in a market economy, tends to promote efficient combination of re­
sources in the short-run" (72, p. 37). In his search for the secrets of 
agricultural success in the U. S., Bray attempts to dispel the widespread 
belief: 
....that American agricultural performance is, to an 
important degree, a result of the system of land tenure 
characterized by the family-owned and operated farm 
(72, p. 25). 
By adding the acreage of rented land held by part owners to that held 
by tenants, and the acreage of land owned by these part owners to that held 
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by full owners and using this criterion to determine the extent of land 
rental in the U. S. (See Table 16) Bray writes: 
....the percentage of all land in farms actually farmed 
by its owner has decreased slightly from about 50 
percent in 1900 to about 55 percent in 1959. The 
percentage of all land rented, on the other hand, rose 
from about 31 to .35 percent. About 10 percent of all 
farm land is in large units operated by hired managers. 
These national totals, however, include subsistence 
and dairy areas where owner-operators are predominant. 
....In the North Central States^^ the importance of 
owner-operators has decreased. The percentage of all 
land in farms actually fanned by the owner decreased 
from about 63 percent in 1900 to about 57 percent in 
1959. Conversely, the percentage of all land in 
farms which was rented, that is, land farmed by some 
type of tenant, increased from 34 to 41.5 percent in 
the same period. The percentage of land farmed by 
owners decreased during the first thirty years of 
this century, while that of tenants increased, the 
two being equal in 1930 with 49 percent each. After 
that date, the trend reversed (a record of 51.5 
percent of the land in the North Central States was 
rented in 1940) and land farmed by owners then rose 
and appears to have stabilized in 1950 at about 56 
percent. The latter figure is true for both the 
North Central States and the entire United States 
(72, pp. 31-33). 
Bray's data do suggest that land tenancy is just as important as ever, 
but that there has been a marked increase in renting of land to augment the 
resource base of presumably efficient operators who already own land. The 
information presented on the average size of farm, by tenure of operator, 
at census intervals from 1900 to 1959 (72, p. 35) portrays a limited growth 
in farm size for owner-operators, a more rapid growth for tenants, and 
remarkable increases achieved by part-owners. If it is accepted that 
The North Central states contribution to the national farm output 
has increased from 44 percent in 1920 to 48 percent in 1957. To Bray the 
importance of these states bulks so large that an explanation of the growth 
of agricultural production and productivity for this area alone would go a 
long way toward explaining the performance of American agriculture. 
Table 16. Land in farms: percentage distribution by tenure of operator^ 
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1954 1959 
United States 
Percent of land held 
by part owners 
Otfned 50.0 50% 50^ 49. 1 48. 1 54.1 55.2 54.9 
Rented 49.5 50b 50^ 50. 9 51. 7 45.9 44.7 45.1 
Full otfners 51.4 52.9 48.3 37. 6 35. 9 36. 1 34. 2 30,8 
Part owners 14.9 15.2 18.4 24. 9 28. 2 36.4 40.7 44.8 
Tenants 23.3 25.8 27.7 31. 0 29. 4 18. 3 16.4 14.5 
Managers 10.4 6.1 5.7 6. 4 6. 5 9.2 8.6 9.8 
Full owners plus land 
owned by part owners 58.9 60.5 57.5 49. 8 49. 5 55.8 56. 7 55.4 
Tenants plus land 
rented by part ovmers 30.7 33.4 
! 
• 36.9 43. 7 44. 0 35.0 3?Tf^ 34. 7 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 10^ 
^Source: (72, p. 32), 
^The actual division between owned and rented land farmed by part oimers is not available, 
so the computation is based on the assumption that the division was half and half. 
Table 16. (Continued) 
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1954 1959 
North Central States^ 
Percent of land held 
by part owners 
Owned 52.6 50% 50% 52.6 49.7 54.7 55.6 55.7 
Rented 47.4 50b 50% 47.4 50.3 45.6 44.4 44.3 
Full owners 53.0 49.3 44.0 35.2 33.0 36,2 34.5 32.4 
Part owners 19.3 20.6 21.4 26. 7 27,9 36.6 39.6 43.8 
Tenants 24.9 28.0 32.2 36.2 37.5 25.4 24.5 22.1 
Managers 2.8 2.1 2.4 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.7 
Full owners plus land 
owned by part owners 63. 2 59.6 54.7 49.2 46.9 56.2 56.5 56.8 
Tenants plus land 
rented by part owners 34.0 38.3 42.9 48.9 51.5 42.0 42.0 41.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
^States constituting each region are: E.N.C., Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan Wisconsin; 
W.N.C., Minnesota, lOTza, North Dakota, S. Dakota, Kansas, Nebraska, Missouri. 
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increases in farm size have allowed the introduction of new technology the 
conclusion is inescapable; 
....far from inducing inefficiency, land rental in the 
U.S., it appears, plays a vital role in facilitating 
rapid change in farm size. These adjustments have 
been associated with the changes in production tech­
niques that alone can explain the great increase in 
labor productivity in American agriculture (72, p. 36), 
American experience has shown a capacity to adjust to large-scale 
operation, thus challenging the "fragmentation hypothesis''^^ generally held 
against owner-occupiership. This is not to suggest that fragmentation 
through inheritance is to be tolerated. The implication here is that land 
ownership alone does not assure increased productivity. It is as well 
important to look at the structure of incentives determining land use and 
production techniques. 
While owner cultivator tenure in the U. S. has adjusted to changes in 
markets and employment opportunities by combining farms into larger units, 
it has also been credited with a wide distribution of capital gains for 
agricultural land. Parsons in his appraisal of the equity aspect of a 
progressive agriculture brings to the forefront some of the achievements of 
the family-farm: 
The benefits of technological progress and external 
economies are divided variously between profits of the 
innovators, higher wages of laborers, cheaper or 
better goods for consumers, with some of the benefits 
of such progress accruing to land and other fixed 
factors. This latter is the capital gains phenomenon... 
The capital gains to land of technological progress 
and external economies are compounded by the increases 
^^Parsons argues that the negative effects of fragmentation on pro­
duction find their explanation in the deeper problem of lack of alternative 
employments off the land. The serious adverse consequences of land in­
debtedness is disputed as being mainly a credit problem and cannot be 
directly attributed to owner cultivatorship as such (49, pp. 49-50). 
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in land values due to the inflation, which has charac­
terized western economies for the past two or three 
centuries. It is clear that the owners of farm land 
have gained wealth and have protected themselves 
against inflation in a way 'in which propertyless 
people in agriculture have not the prospects 
are that the o^mers of farm land in underdeveloped 
areas have the likelihood of gaining from future 
developments of similar kind. The tenure of farm land 
determines, very largely, the way in which the benefit 
of these capital gains will be distributed.... Where 
the farmers m-m the land they cultivate, these capital 
gains serve as the basis for eouity capital, and may 
be turned rather quickly into use.,.. (49, p. 55). 
With higher wages and cheaper capital, technical advance in American 
agriculture has been stimulated with a tenure mix that favors labor-saving 
technology: 
....As mechanization moved into the smaller farm areas 
in the Corn Belt and dairy regions of the north and 
east, emphasis has shifted toward the development of 
substitutes for land and toward output - increasing 
technologies together with labor-saving ones (6, p. 
18) .  
The increased productivity of American agriculture accompanied by a 
reduction of the cost per unit of agricultural products seems to have been 
aided by a structure of incentives that stimulates managerial talents and 
fosters technical skills. Many economists do not welcome the choice of a 
labor saving device in an economy endowed with labor abundance and hampered 
by capital inadequacies. Horring, for instance, suggests: 
....In the case of a surplus of manpower or of under­
employment which cannot profitably be employed in 
nonagricultural occupations, a form of land tenure 
which would stimulate a high yield per unit of area 
should be preferred to a form of land tenure which 
encourages an extensive use of land (73, pp. 322-323). 
Horring's claim, however, does not make the family-farm proposition 
unsuited to adoption, if we accept the argument that "...a country, ...sets 
138 
as its objective the promotion of owner cultivatorship of moderate-sized 
farms^^...." (49, p. 43). As owner-operators, the farmers of the U. S. 
have been able to secure the credit they needed to produce the maximum 
output. Capital formation in agriculture has been enhanced by family-farms 
efforts reinforced by the dynamic influence of credit institutions. 
The owner-operated family-farm is not the only tenure arrangement that 
can create the optimum conditions for capital creation. Leasing arrange­
ments, for instance, that have created security of expectations to the 
tenant by extending his planning horizon have been recognized as an inte­
gral part of American agrarian experience suited to the attainment of the 
full output potential inherent in the ne^7 technology and necessitated by 
welfare considerations. Professor Timmons gives a vivid description of the 
transition that American tenure structures have undergone in the following 
passage: 
....(Popular prejudice against) tenancy and labor 
developed while the nations' lands were being settled 
and made into farms. At that time good land was 
plentiful; ownership was easily acquired. There 
was little need for farmers to rent land from others. 
And farmers remaining as tenants or laborers often 
were less efficient. As older communities became 
settled and land became scarce, rural youth (parti­
cularly tenants and laborers not expecting to 
inherit farms) pushed ahead beyond the ever-present 
frontier where farm ownership could be readily 
acquired. Now the last frontier has vanished. 
Practically all good lands are in private ovmership. 
The result: The relation of tenancy and labor to 
ownership holds a new and different significance. 
We are beginning to realize that conditions beyond 
control of the individual hinder the achievement of 
farm ownership and make difficult the maintenance of 
Wfnership.... Some people by force or by choice now 
^®A moderate-sized farm as used here refers to a unit of production 
that is sufficiently large to make use of modern technology and adequately 
suited to warrant the profitable application of these production techniques. 
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remain tenants and laborers for life. Americans are 
beginning to realize that our tenure system should 
recognize this. It should make a place for these 
tenants and laborers.... (74, pp. 88-89). 
Even though the American tenure form has been of significance in con­
tributing to a successful agriculture, for many farm people modern agri­
culture is no bed of roses. To Professor Schultz: 
....The impressive production statistics of agri­
culture in the United States do not bring prosperity 
to farmers. The very success of modern agriculture, 
as a producing sector, places many farm people under 
severe economic stresses. The growth in productivity 
has required all manner of adjustments. But the 
term "adjustment" fails to convey the hard economic 
facts and the trouble farmers are in. The farm 
population of the United States has been cut in half 
since 1943; back of this harsh fact is the unpre­
cedented mass migration of people who have left agri­
culture in the hope of improving their economic lot. 
Yet there are still all too many people trying to 
earn their living at farming, and as a consecuence 
many of them earn a little (19, pp. 77-78). 
The problems that tenure arrangements in the U. S. present are 
different from those encountered in the less developed countries. Not­
withstanding the difference, the U. S. of today has achieved the highest 
levels of output per man in agriculture on the basis of family farming and 
public control of land use. One of the unique lessons that American 
experience teaches is that the ownership of land is an effective means to 
increase the incentives to produce more and invest more in the land. 
Kolkhoz 
The communist collective tenure (Kolkhoz) was first established in 
Russia in the 1920's and later it was extended to the other countries which 
came under the communists' control such as Eastern European countries, the 
Baltic States and recently China and North Korea. Under this type of 
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tenure, even the private ownership of small holdings of land by peasants is 
condemned as being a breeding ground of capitalism and exploitation. The 
agrarian Marxist, besides questioning the ability of the small farmer to 
cultivate his land efficiently, views him as having the tendency to expand 
and become a landlord exploiting tenants. Hence, in order to suppress the 
rise of capitalism once again and in order to prevent the resulting exploi­
tation and also in order to achieve equality of opportunity, private ovmer-
ship of the important means of production including the land should be 
abolished. 
Collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union was, however, more 
than the abolition of private ownership. It was a device for controlling 
agriculture politically, socially, and economically to assure rapid general 
economic development. It is a system forced by the State upon the peasants 
despite their resistance and the resentment in order to turn them into 
laborers conditioned to joining the proletariat. The creation of an agri­
cultural working force divorced, in fact as in aspiration, from land otmer-
ship, commended itself as a means of altering the individualistic social 
outlook which was associated with the small independent landovmers. It is 
used as a means to attain what is believed to be a necessary minimum of 
political and administrative leverage over agricultural life. 
Economically, the system of collectivization claims that with increas­
ing acreage, efficiency of production as well as overall production can be 
raised. According to Marx-Engels doctrine, only large-scale farming is 
capable of applying the result of modern science and technology and thus 
providing larger amounts of goods and services with least costs. The state 
of private ownership and small-scale farming was said to have reduced 
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national agricultural efficiency. Many authorities in economics, however, 
doubt the existence in practice of genuine economies of such large-scale 
units in agriculture. Bicanic presents one of the numerous protests to 
collectivization when he says: 
Economies of scale in the process of collectivization 
have proved to be to a great extent offset by other 
factors. The great number of managerial decisions 
required for management of large collective units 
showed clearly how different the optimum sizes of 
collectivized units may be. The size for technological 
optimum yield for varied crops was quite different from 
that giving the economic price optimum as determined by 
the market or deliveries to the supply centers. The 
instrumental optimum of capital indivisibility differed 
greatly from the financial optimum based on the maximal 
returns on investment. The optimum use of labor (best 
employment ratio) was in conflict with the optimal 
allocation of crops. While the optimum size of the 
production unit which a manager was able to control 
effectively was quite different from the size required 
by other optimums. There was no market to determine 
what the optimum optimorum was, by imposing risks upon 
those who were not fortunate or able enough to find it 
out at their own expense. This complex problem of 
economy of scale was simplified by assuming that the 
greater the size the better the solution for socialist 
production. Even today the problem of optimalization 
of socialist production units, although the object of 
intense research, has not been satisfactorily solved 
(75, p. 178). 
Thus the rigidity of centralized planning and the lack of personal 
initiative and efficiency in work seem to offset the possibilities of 
economy of scale. The coercion and arbitrary measures with which the 
collectivization system has been enforced, leading to the deterioration of 
individual initiative, tend to be a major force in reducing efficiency of 
resource use in Soviet agriculture. Notwithstanding its capacity to absorb 
risk and facilitate the application of indivisible capital, the collective 
experience lessens the contribution that the agricultural sector could 
make, had the system been based on less regimentation. Professor Schultz 
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in his attempt to explain the negative response of agricultural production 
to collective methods writes: 
TVhat is lacking in agriculture in all Soviet-type 
economies is by now altogether obvious. The lack is 
not science or "technology" or machinery including 
tractors, or irrigation, or fertilizer. ^•Jhat is 
lacking is a system of economic incentives that will 
permit and induce farm people to modernize agriculture. 
State control which entails absentee production 
decisions - no matter how frequently the control 
apparatus is reorganized, how many different 
approaches are tried, and how competent the adminis­
trators - will continue to be inefficient. To 
modernize requires the acceptance and adoption by farmers 
of many new agricultural inputs, and it also requires 
that farmers learn how to use these inputs efficiently. 
Thus, resident decisions by operating farmers, 
responding to meaningful economic incentives, are 
indispensable (19, p. 77). 
Originally it has been assumed that the lack of alternative income 
opportunities for the collective farm members was a satisfactory substitute 
for an incentive system. However, the government soon found itself com­
pelled to make exceptions to this rule and selectively apply incentive 
methods to enhance the obtainment of the general economic objectives of the 
State (76, p. 254). The reorganization of Soviet agricultural policies 
during the post-Stalin era is evidence of the recognition of the inter­
dependence between increased agricultural production and income incentives 
to the collective farmers. Kahan, for instance, points out; 
....that the increase of farm output during the 1950's 
was to some extent the result of material incentives 
provided both to the farms and to the farmers 
through....price and income increases. Therefore the 
second stage of Soviet agricultural development is 
marked by the realization that the welfare of the 
nonagricultural labor force is important and that 
increased farmers' incomes aided economic grov/th 
(76, p. 226). 
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However, other critics of the collective system while ascribing the 
revision of Soviet agricultural policies under Khrushchev to the stagnation 
in Russian agriculture, credit the increase in production to extension of 
cultivation to virgin lands (76, pp. 38-39). Basically, it is frequently 
argued that the collective system involves some decisive disadvantages such 
as restriction of economic freedom, lack of personal interest and private 
initiative, etc. The policies towards collectives adopted since 1958 such 
as the relaxations in compulsory deliveries, liberal share or reward to the 
members of the collectives, and the added importance of the homesteads and 
the volume of production and pattern of activities on them seem to have 
endowed the system with a preventive rather than a curative measure (see 
76, pp. 2n6-2^7 and 77, p. 39). 
Given incentives, one of the very practical problems that collectivi­
zation face is that of management. To Binns: 
....the vast size....the average area(s) given for the 
Soviet farms is so high as to suggest that some of 
these farms must be enormous Up to a point a 
large enterprise in agriculture, as in industry, has 
a technical and economic advantage over a small one, 
but there are few parts of the world in which 
reasonably homogeneous areas of agricultural land 
on this scale occur and it has to be admitted that 
the number of practical farmers capable of handling 
farming enterprises of this size is very small, that 
few administrators capable of supervising such 
enterprises are practical farmers, and that few 
persons in either class are likely to have adequate 
local knowledge of the area to be developed (78, p. 30). 
Managerial incompetence in the collective farms, a conseruence of the 
main plank in Soviet strategy to centralize power has replaced "....supply 
....(by) state procurement, and demand....(by) administrative requirement; 
and incentive by economic interest was replaced by force, or fear of force, 
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of the administrative machinery" (75, p. 183). Managers who are techni­
cally competent, but politically not trusted are replaced by those who are 
politically trusted but with no training and experience in agricultural 
management. Such a high concentration of decision-making in the hands of 
the few '-'politically trusted" "....lead first to separation, then to iso­
lation and finally to sterilization of the decision-making process." The 
underlying postulate justifying this political attitude in Soviet agri­
culture is the negation of the law of variable proportions. Other things 
being equal, the operation of the law of diminishing returns in universal 
and cannot be denied. 
Given incentives and management, capital investment has been a maior 
instrument in the Kolkhoz development. Kahan tells us that: 
Soviet attitudes towards supply of capital in agriculture 
have a distinctive character. Decisions for an all-out 
commitment to provide capital for a particular task in 
agriculture are very reluctantly made..,. This hesi­
tation to supply capital on a broad front is true for 
machinery as well as for fertilizer. Postponement and 
the use of stopgap measures enables such capital funds 
to be used elsewhere in the economy. But there is no 
doubt that the lack of complementary actions in the 
agricultural investment field greatly diminishes the 
total effect of new investment. While the collective 
farms were previously ignored (during the period of 
MTS^^) with regard to their choice of machinery, at 
least they now have the freedom of choice within the 
available supply of machinery. Whether the new 
arrangement will assure the required continuity in 
investment is still an open question. Soviet market­
ing has a poor system for communicating the preferences 
of consumers. And the impact of the farm demand upon 
the volume and mix of farm machinery production is 
not likely to become very effective within the 
^^Prior to 1957 farm machinery was owned and managed by a State insti­
tution - the Machine - Tractor Station (MTS). High payments were made by 
each Kolkhoz for the services rendered by the MTS. Since 1957 the MTS 
centers were dissolved and the collective farms have become the owners of 
the farm machinery. 
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existing farm supply organization. It could therefore, 
be concluded that the contribution of agriculture to 
economic growth by increasing output and decreasing 
unit costs depends to a large extent upon a sizeable 
increase in capital per worker and per unit of land 
and the raising of complementary effects of various 
capital expenditures to higher levels (76, pp. 269-270), 
I'Thereas the substitution of capital for labor has enabled the mechani­
zation of agriculture and the recruitment of rural labor for industry, no 
substantial increases in agricultural labor productivity were achieved. 
The replacement of manpower and animal capital by mechanical power has been 
a costly venture. The effective instrument for capital formation was 
forced saving through declines in consumption levels imposed by government 
authorities. Thus the collective worker seems to also suffer from declines 
in real income that are unnecessarily an outcome of inefficient adminis­
trative allocation of capital goods. 
Despite its equalitarian drive, the Kolkhoz does not seem to have 
satisfactorily contributed to the productivity objective. Ruttan empha­
sizes this when he writes: 
....The failure of the productivity oriented Marxian 
agrarian policies to achieve their productivity 
objectives appears to stem from both a lack of confi­
dence in the peasant proprietors' capacity to react 
rationally when provided with adequate technical 
information and market incentives, and strong reliance 
on ideological rather than pragmatic considerations in 
the organization of economic activity (69, p. 118). 
Kibbutz 
The community of collective settlements (Kibbutz) and the cooperatives 
of individual family-type farms (Moshav Ovdim) in Israel is one of the 
unique tenure structures prevalent in the world of today. These settlements 
are characterized by two main features: (a) national ownership of the 
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land,50 and (b) the objection to the use of hired labor. The doctorine of 
"self-labor" manifests itself through a ban on wage-labor. As a conse­
quence, Sadan writes, the farm land market in Israel has been virtually 
abolished, and the farm labor market has been partially crippled (29, p. 
547). 
The typical Israeli cooperative family-farm, that is the moshav 
(plural moshavim) consists of about a hundred conventional households on 
independent family farms. The moshav farmer is an independent entrepreneur 
as far as the internal management of his farm is concerned. To Kreinin, 
the family within a moshav is an economic and social unit, living in its 
oxm home and working its m-m fields. It provides all the necessary labor, 
and hiring of labor is prohibited except under unusual circumstances. Each 
family is expected to help other villagers and can expect help when needed, 
making self labor and mutual aid basic principles of the Moshav (79, pp. 
535-536). The multi-purpose cooperative organization concentrates on the 
provision of supplementary services such as marketing of the farm products, 
carrying in raw materials and groceries, and operating the local credit 
facilities. 
The Kibbutz^l (plural Kibbutzim) on the other hand, is described by 
^^The land is leased on a long-term basis, with the lease automati­
cally extended by the farmers and their heirs. But the lease contains 
guarantees against the sale or fragmentation of the farm unit. 
^^As of 1963, members of the Kibbutzim constitute approximately 4 
percent of the total Jewish population of Israel. The Kibbutzim provide 22 
percent of the wage-earners engaged in agriculture. The agricultural 
produce of the Kibbutzim amounts to some 28 percent of the total agri­
cultural produce of the country. Industrial production in the Kibbutzim 
accounts for 5-6 per cent of the total industrial product of the country. 
The Kibbutzim contributes 12 per cent of the gross national product (81, 
p. 33). 
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Sadan in its conventional form, as: 
....a large consumption unit. In the more "orthodox" 
Kibbutzim the bill of goods is decided upon collectively 
in very great detail. In the more "liberal" Kibbutzim 
a certain part of the funds is made available in money 
or local tokens to the various families. The decision 
of how much should be spent on consumer goods and 
services, and how much, if anything, saved, is....a 
collective one (80, p. 4). 
In the Kibbutz, there is virtually no private property, no personal 
compensation for work done, and no individual allocation of bounties. The 
communal institutions have replaced the traditional household in supplying 
various consumer goods and services. The Kibbutz is a firm with its 
membership as the residual income recipient. Each Kibbutz with the ex­
ception of the recently established ones, is independent in making its own 
decisions either as a consumer or as producer. According to Sadan the 
operational principles of Kibbutz-movement include (80, pp. 6-7); 
1. Equality in the distribution of the Kibbutz consumer services. 
Distribution "to each according to his needs" is practiced within 
limits of widely defined categories. Typically, most of the con­
sumption resources are allocated in kind. 
2. Common property cannot be divided. A single member holds neither 
a share nor any other claim against the Kibbutz equity, including his 
"o;fn" savings. This rule has a counterpart; a member of a Kibbutz is 
not responsible, as an individual, for the Kibbutz liabilities. 
52 3. Obligation to do assigned daily work. 
^^Bachman has pointed out that constant efforts are made to increase 
the number of days spent in "productive" labor; that is, in production 
proper as compared to the number of days spent in household work, etc. (82, 
p. 607). 
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4. Prohibition of the use of wage-labor. This particular restriction 
has been justified on historical and ideological grounds. The ban was 
necessary in order to avoid the formation of colonial society in the 
early days of settlement and the development of class disparities in 
the farm sector. The author contends, however, that disparities in 
the farm sector exist and they will continue to persist as long as 
there is a Jewish-Arab conflict. 
Setting the political issue aside, the Israeli experience seems to 
offer solutions to the organization of agricultural production in less 
developed countries. Indeed, as Kreinin mentions, settlement schemes in 
several Afro-Asian countries have been modeled after the Israeli approach. 
Among them are the settlement projects in western and eastern Nigeria, 
Burma and Nepal (79, p. 538). However, this is only a relative evaluation, 
and it should not be interpreted to mean that the Jewish settlements are 
free of deficiencies. In fact the absence of a land market, the ban on 
wage-labor and the prevalence of nominal rents should be weighed heavily 
against the benefits forthcoming from the adoption of the experience. 
Those who favor the application of the Israeli model to less developed 
countries seem to prefer the moshav type of settlement to the Kibbutz type 
of settlement.53 Implicit in this favoritism is the success that the 
moshav has achieved in combining individual initiative and responsibility 
with a cooperative approach to the problems of farm purchasing, marketing 
C O 
A third type of settlement, knovm as moshav shittufi, has been 
described by Spiro as a recent introduction, representing a compromise 
between the Kibbutz and the moshav. It combines the collective work and 
ownership of the Kibbutz with the private living of the moshav. Spiro 
contends that it is not unlikely that this is the form which many Kibbutzim 
will eventually assume (83, p. 5). 
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and credit. While each family retains its individuality, the cooperative 
techniques allow a relatively more efficient farming and community service 
system. The fact that a moshav family works its own plot and retains its 
oxfn income is an incentive for "productive" effort that a Kibbutz does not 
offer. But, on the other hand, there are various conventional motives for 
work prevalent in Kibbutz economic behavior. Among those given by Spiro 
are the motive of personal economic improvement, intrinsic satisfactions 
derived from work, competitive pride, and prestige given significance of 
labor in the Kibbutz hierarchy of values (83, pp. 84-85). 
Consequences realized from an economic efficiency standpoint for both 
Kibbutz and moshav are given by Sadan and Mundlak respectively. Sadan has 
studied a sample of 198 observations in 66 Kibbutzim during the period 
1953 - 55. Mundlak's sample, on the other hand, consisted of 330 obser­
vations in 66 family farms in 5 moshavim during the period 1954 - 58. 
Using a least snuare estimate analysis, the authors have fitted a Cobb-
Douglas production-function to their data; 
b b b b 
X  =  A C ^ ^ L ^ T ^ K ' ^  
Where X represents either the Kibbutz's or moshav's aggregate outputs, 
A is a constant term, C is revolving capital, while K stands for value of 
livestock, buildings, machinery and other forms of fixed capital. L and T 
stand for the service of labor and land respectively, b^, b]^, etc. are the 
estimated coefficients (elasticities) of production of C, L, etc. The 
elasticities of production are viewed as the shares of the gross product 
which go to the various factors of production (29, p. 555). If values of 
marginal product are assumed to equal factor market prices, the total 
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product will be just exhausted. The comparison of the distribution of the 
net product in the inoshav with the corresponding distribution in the 
Kibbutz given by Sadan is quoted in Table 17. 
Table 17. The distribution of the "net product"® 
Type of The share of The share of The share of 
settlement labor land capital 
Moshav 0.47 0,14 0.39 
Kibbutz 0.48 0.15 0.37 
^Source; (29, p. 555). 
Since, the ratio of the marginal value products of labor to land 
MVPL bi X 
MVP ip bj. L 
holds for both moshav and Kibbutz, and if the Kibbutz's land/labor ratio 
is not equal to the corresponding moshav's ratio then, deduces Sadan, 
either 
(1) MVP^ ^ MVP^^ , 
or (2) MVP®° 4 MVP^^ , or both, 
since the ratio of the labor to land shares in the Kibbutz is almost identi­
cal to the moshav's (Table 17). 
151 
Figures given by Sadan for the land/labor ratio in both moshav and 
Kibbutz, expressed in dunams^"^ per man-year do indicate that the assertion 
is valid^^ (29, p. 556). By calculating the value of marginal product of 
land and labor in the two types of settlements, at the geometric average of 
each sample -- shown in Table 18 - specific conclusions are reached 
Table 18. Values of marginal product of land and labor with respect to 
prices of land and labor, respectively^ 
Type of Labor IL^ Land IL^ 
settlement per man day per donam 
Moshav 4.57 31 
Price (1954) 4.75c rent is nominal 
7.50d 
Kibbutz 9.78 23 
^Source: (29, p. 556), 
^IL. = Israeli pound s $0,33 
^Unskilled labor 
^Skilled labor 
regarding disparities in return to factors of production. From the Table 
it could be observed that the marginal value product of land in the Kibbutz 
is lower than it is in the moshav. But the marginal value product of labor 
in the average Kibbutz, besides being significantly higher than the market 
^^1 dunam = 0.25 acre 
^^The land - labor ratio is higher in the Kibbutzim (37.2 dunams per 
man-year) than in the moshavim (17.2 dunams per man-year). 
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rate of remuneration, is greater than the corresponding value in the 
average family farm in the moshav. Thus whereas land is overemployed 
(MVP™ > Pip) in the moshav, it is underemployed (MVP^^ < P^) in the 
Kibbutz, and whereas labor is overemployed (MVpj^^ > P ) in the Kibbutz, 
it is underemployed (MVP™° P?) in the moshav. Schechter argues that the 
L «L» 
detrimental factor in the Kibbutz has been the labor shortage resulting 
from the orthodox adherence to the self labor principle, which, as 
mentioned, is an important ingredient of the system. The inability of the 
Kibbutzim to control the size of their fixed land allotments has magnified 
this problem (84, p. 482), In the Kibbutzim under study, the attempt to 
minimize the use of hired labor has resulted in a loss amounting to 8 per 
cent of the value of the total farm product. 
For the moshavim, however, the opposite is true. Labor is under­
employed because of the scarcity of non-agricultural employment oppor­
tunities. The fixed nature of the moshavim land parcels has also hindered 
the realization of an optimal allocation of resources. To the extent that 
the principle of self labor is followed, the productivity gap widens. 
Other shortcomings of the Israeli experience that have been frequently 
mentioned as engendering resource inefficiencies are the rent policy and 
the high water costs. Land plots in various regions of the country with 
varying productivity have been charged practically equal rental fees. 
Officially, the rent is 2 per cent of the crop value, ex farm. This has 
been regarded as "just rent" according to the national land authority. 
It has been reported that imputed rent payment represents only 0,4 per 
cent of the total value of the agricultural products of the Kibbutzim. 
Some even paid between IL. 0.25 to 1.5 per dunam in 1951. In particular 
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instances these figures may be even lower due to individual bargaining 
(84, p. 483). The nominal rents do indicate the absence of a land-market 
mechanism where the price of land can secure its allocation in various 
uses. Consequently, inasmuch "....as the nominal rent payment is con­
cerned, it matters little to the farmers whether they are allotted land 100 
miles to the north or south or 10 miles east of Tel-Aviv" (84, p. 483). 
In addition to the above, irrigation facilities are the most limi-
tational factor in Israel's agriculture. Farming in most of the country is 
impossible without irrigation. Hence, 20 - 40 per cent of the ex farm 
value of the agricultural produce represents water cost (84, p. 483), In 
such a situation, if a land market existed, its price would have largely 
been determined by the proximity of the land to sources of cheap irrigation 
water, rather than to population centers. This economic consideration may 
aid in offsetting the "anomalous results of the artificially low and 
uniform rents". 
The above analysis, mostly in the form of quotations, points to some 
structural differences between the Kibbutz and moshav economy which have a 
bearing on projects that are to be patterned after the Israeli experiments. 
Whereas there are curbs to personal freedom which make the Kibbutz less 
attractive to the rugged individualist, experience has shown that it is 
capable of undertaking a wide range of economic enterprises, relative to 
the moshav. 
Tauber notes that: 
....in contrast to the Moshav, (the Kibbutz) engage in 
industrial undertakings and other common ventures, 
such as fishing, transportation, etc. (which) have 
made for a high level of investment in the Kibbutz 
as compared to the Moshav (85, p. 90). 
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On the other hand, the raoshav, a restricted form of cooperation, 
suffers from a less efficient disposition of labor and high initial invest­
ment, but "....it has a special appeal to those who prefer cooperation but 
cherish privacy" (86, p. 158). 
I^atever advantages or disadvantages, the cooperative settlement of 
Israel may have, the future as to the adoption of the experience un­
doubtedly holds both problem and promise. 
The Ejido 
The term Ejido, as used in Mexico refers to the rural village or 
population center with specified village members who have received and con­
tinue to hold land in accordance to the agrarian laws that transpired from 
the Mexican revolution of 1910 (87, pp. 182-186). Duran argues that the 
result of the Mexican reform has been the creation of a dual land tenure 
system based in part on communal ownership and in part on private owner­
ship: 
The political constitution of Mexico orders the 
destruction of the old latifundios and the 
creation of only two land tenure systems, namely, 
the communal lands of the villages, called ejidos, 
and the small private land-holdings whose area can 
be no greater than 100 hectares of irrigated land, 
two hundred hectares of nonirrigated land, or the 
equivalent decreed by law in some other type of land.... 
The ejido is made up of several parts; cultivated 
land, pasture lands, mountains, uncultivated lands, 
etc., and the so-called "fundo legal", or the site 
where the town owning those lands is located.... 
The ejido lands have the peculiar characteristic 
that they do not constitute an absolute, but rather 
a limited property right, since they are subject to 
the legal conditions of being unalienable, 
imprescriptible, and unseizable (88, pp. 310-311). 
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There are two distinct types of ejidal organization: (a) those in 
which individuals are assigned land parcels which they cultivate indi­
vidually^^ and (b) those which are collectively operated where the land is 
owned and worked jointly. 
The Mexican agrarian reform has not placed so much emphasis on indi­
vidual ownership of the land as a stimulus for agricultural work, and 
increased productivity per acre. Rather, the economic basis of the reform 
has been to advocate cooperative organization up to a certain point where 
the peasant holdings offer advantages of joint operation on a relatively 
larger scale. Duran has illustrated this point when he argued that the 
smallness of the ejido plot demands cooperative organization. But to 
affirm that cooperative organization in agriculture would lead, in general, 
to the effective allocation of resources is unacceptable. This tcb so 
because "as the size of the agricultural unit becomes larger the need for 
cooperative association becomes smaller - as seems to be proved in the case 
of non-ejido holdings of Mexico" (88, p. 319). 
The reform of the Mexican agrarian structure has been effective in so 
far as it has resulted in transferring land ownership from large landowners 
to the cultivators. Flores in evaluating the economic consenuences of land 
redistribution in Mexico writes: 
....The one outstanding accomplishment of the agrarian 
reform was the destruction of the latifundio and with 
it the obstacles which acted against economic develop­
ment. Although this was a substantial accomplishment, 
in essence it was a negative one. The problem still 
remained of building up a new agricultural economy 
which would substitute advantageously for the latifundia. 
^^The holders of individual ejidal parcels have permanent tenure 
except that they cannot sell or mortgage the land. 
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....the agrarian reform.... policy suffered from 
serious pitfalls in the form of static assumptions: 
neither population or changes in land use nor 
technical improvements or the possibility of new 
fields of economic activity were anticipated (89, p. 244). 
Thus in their efforts to promote a more equitable income distribution, 
the Mexicans have used the redistribution of landholdings as a structural 
variable. Inasmuch as the ejido and the complementary institutions have 
provided the mechanism for transferring current incomes from landowners to 
agricultural workers and renters, it may be concluded that the Mexican 
reform program has been compatible with the attainment of more equitable 
income distribution. However, serious doubts are raised as to the efficacy 
of such mechanisms if, within a changing economy, they are not designed to 
permit the retention over time of the relative benefits accruing from 
equity preferences (90, p. 1152). 
As to the effect of the Mexican reform on the productivity objective, 
some contemporary critics have pointed out to some defaults inherent in the 
ejido form of organization which restrict efficient resource utilization in 
agriculture. Gittinger for example, writes: 
....there is no doubt that while some ejidos are 
operating with efficiency, most of them are operated 
on a subsistence basis, and the devising of effective 
methods of stimulating efficient agricultural pro­
duction on the ejidos is one of Mexico's most 
serious and urgent problems. For one thing, the 
earlier allotments under the system were too small. 
For another, there is the constant problem of 
introducing techniques which will increase produc­
tivity, and of providing the credit necessary to 
adopt the new techniques (20, p. 313). 
The role of the private sector in creating the capital necessary for 
agricultural development seems to have been seriously handicapped by the 
Mexican agrarian reform. According to Duran: 
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....on the properties not under the ejido system.... 
there are more than 900,000 plots that are less than 
five hectares which, because of their size, are in.... 
inferior situation with respect to the eiido parcel. 
....the agrarian reform, which has created the 
structure of a new system of rural life, has brought 
about a panorama in which....investment of capital 
finds serious difficulties the great number of 
mini-fundios is a condition limiting necessary 
capital investments productive capacity and 
the profits obtained by the farmer do not allow 
either the necessary investment or an aderuate 
amortization of that investment (38, pp. 312 and 314). 
By placing a limit on the size of the holding in the private farming 
sector, the Mexican Government has introduced a rigid ceiling on what could 
be an optimum size of the private production unit. Accordingly, several 
private farmers who may be willing to combine their acreages into single 
operating units to take advantage of scale economies would not be able to 
do so because there is some uncertainty about the security of rights in land 
particularly for farming units of more than 100 hectares. 
To evaluate the Mexican tenure classes as to their contribution to 
production efficiency we are going to draw liberally on a study made by 
Freebairn in the Yaqui Valley, Sonora, Mexico. In describing the characte­
ristics of farming units in three tenure classes (see Table 19) in the 
study area Freebairn comments; 
....Both the private farms and the collective eiidal 
societies had relatively complete capital structures 
as far as machinery and equipment was concerned. 
The individual ejidatorios for the most part depended 
on custom hiring to accomplish their farming oper­
ations. For all three groups, hired labor consti­
tuted the principal source of labor input. Because 
the bank accounting records were not designed for 
internal farm management analysis, it was impossible 
to determine the amount of hired labor used on the 
collective farms. Detailed labor records for a few 
of the societies do permit the making of inferences 
concerning labor use on the collective farms (90, 
pp. 1155-1156). 
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Table 19. Descriptive characteristics of farming units in three tenure 
classes, Yaqui Valley, Sonora, Mexico® 
Concept Private 
farms 
Collective 
ejidal 
farms 
Individual 
ejidal 
parcels 
Land resources: 
Cropland (hectares) 
Capital resources (average 
inventory in U.S. dollars): 
Livestock 
Machinery & equipment 
Farm products 
Subtotal 
Labor resources (man-months): 
Farmer 
Family 
Hired 
Subtotal 
Land use (hectares planted)^  
Cotton 
Wheat 
Corn 
Other crops 
131 
$1,480 
15,888 
1,144 
$23,088 
11 
4 
106 
121 
41 
84 
16 
19 
676 
41,440 
$43,040 
384 
0 
384 
124 
552 
18 
168 
1,072 
$1,368 
6 
3 
13 
22 
5 
9 
3 
1 
Source: (90, p. 1155). 
^Not able to determine. 
I^ncludes double cropping. 
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Given technology and capital, one of the serious problems that the 
Mexican collective development has sustained seems to be its capacity to 
retain labor redundancy on the farm. IThere the land to labor ratio is and 
continues to be low, and where the provision of large scale public invest­
ments and credit has not been sufficient to circumvent agricultural un­
employment and stimulate the mobility of labor, the Mexican model of reform 
does not seem to have satisfactorily contributed to the goal of improved 
productivity. 
In presenting a group of production efficiency indicators for the 
three Mexican tenure classes, Freebairn has demonstrated some of the re­
source inefficiencies the ejidal groups exhibit (90, p. 1156). As shoxm in 
Table 20, labor requirements per hectare planted, for example, are rela­
tively high for the collective ejidal farms. The high labor requirements 
on these farms do indicate their lack of an appropriate managerial organi­
zation. The labor earnings indicator and the amount of product generated 
per 100 dollars of inputs^? show that the ejidal groups compare less 
favorably with the private farms. Negative labor earnings for the two 
ejidal tenure classes do reveal the wasteful use of the labor resource and 
of managerial capabilities and potentials. The residual income measures 
(labor earnings and rate of return on investment) presented also bring out 
the relative superiority of private farms with respect to income potentials 
and consequently their capacity in aiding capital creation, assuming that 
the difference between per capita income and per capita consumption is 
^^The amount of output generated per 100 dollars of input as a measure 
of fanning efficiency combines the effect of numerous management factors 
and internal economic relationships such as production cost control, 
marketing effectiveness, enterprise combinations and internal scale 
economies. 
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Table 20. Comparative production efficiency for farming units in 
three tenure classes. Yaoui Valley, Sonora, Mexico^ 
Economic indicator 
Crop yields (kg/ha) 
Cotton 
Wheat 
Land use intensity 
Ratio of hectareage planted 
to available crop land 
Man days of labor used per 
hectare planted of; 
Cotton 
Wheat 
Returns per 100 dollars of input 
Estimated residual labor 
earnings (U.S. dollars) 
Estimated rate earned on 
investment 
Collective Individual 
Private ejidal ejidal 
farms farms parcels 
1,900 1,630 1,870 
2,560 2,260 2,230 
1 . 2 2  1 . 0 0  1 . 0 0  
68 90^ 65 
7 9^ 10 
$114 ---C $101 
3,400 $ - 295^ $ - 303 
14% 9% 47, 
^Source: (90, p. 1156). 
^Based on data available for part of the societies. 
^Inadequate data prohibit calculation. 
^Net management income per member; members received an undetermined 
prepayment for days worked with these prepayments included in cash costs. 
Supplementary inquiry suggests that these prepayments may have averaged 
130 U.S. dollars per member. 
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being maximized. But the fact that the private sector enjoys much larger 
quantities of all resources than either of the two ejidal groups may indi­
cate that they have relatively better market opportunities (90, p. 1157), 
Freebairn has also fitted two Cobb-Douglas tj^pe production functions 
for the private farms and for the individually operated ejidal parcels. 
The derived equations were: 
(a) for the private farms: 
p _ 170,4 ^ 0.588 j^O. 047 QO.398 Q0.004 Q0.004 
and 
(b) for the individual ejidal parcels: 
P - 33.0 10.139 MO-243 cO.269 cO'354 ^0.072 
c m i 
Where P is the total value of crop and livestock production, L is the 
number of hectares cultivated, M is the labor employed in man-months, is 
the capital input of crop services in U. S. dollars, is the machinery 
and equipment in U. S. dollars, and is the capital input of livestock 
services in U. S. dollars. 
Marginal productivities were computed for the five classes of inputs 
at the mean value when other inputs were also at their mean values using 
each of the above two equations. The results given by Freebairn are quoted 
in Table 21. 
The results of marginal analysis suggest that, the individual ejida-
tarios come closer to the optimum economic level in their resource allo­
cation than does the privately-owned farm. Freebairn in explaining his 
results has the following to say: 
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Table 21. Marginal productivity of classes of inputs 
when other inputs are at their mean values, 
Sonora, Mexico^ 
at their means, 
Yaqui Valley, 
Marginal productivité • in U. S. dollars 
Input 
Private farms 
Individual ejidal 
parcels 
Land (hectare) $145.00 $23.00 
Labor (man-months) 13.40 33.80 
Machinery & equipment 
(dollar expenditure) 0.02 1.41 
Crop services 
(dollar expenditure) 1.57 1.57 
Livestock services 
(dollar expenditure) 0.07 34.08 
^Source: (90, p. 1158). 
The particular internal farm organization disequilibrium^^ 
encountered explains why many ejidatarios tend to rent 
their lands to private farmers. Since the private 
farmers are over-capitalized and have labor available, 
the addition of extra hectares of land is a most 
profitable undertaking. The ejidatarios, on the other 
hand, have to use custom renting for machinery operations 
on their farms. Although renting of ejidal lands is 
illegal and ejidatarios may lose their land use rights 
for engaging in this practice, the field survey indicated 
that 30 percent of the ejidal lands in the zone are 
rented to others (90, p. 1158). 
Thus, the same problem that the Mexican reform has set to achieve, 
that of the prevention of the concentration of the land in a few hands, 
seems to continue to exist. The low per capita income levels of the eiido 
The disequilibria encountered as could be seen from Table 21 are the 
high land productivity and the low labor and machinery and equipment produc­
tivities, for the private farms along with low land productivities for the 
individually operated ejido. 
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do not offer a higher standard of living, consecuently they leave little 
room for capital creation. 
While the Mexican agrarian reform, has in fact released economic and 
social forces that have led to a relatively more productive agriculture^^ 
which in turn contributed to economic development, serious problems still 
persist. 
The Mexican experience reveals that the use of redistribution of land 
as a major reform policy is not necessarily consistent with the promotion 
of per capita productivity. The elimination of the landlords class without 
adequate compensation removes from the economic scene a necessary ingredi­
ent for capital formation, and puts a heavy burden on the public sector. 
The persistence of economically inefficient size units of operation -
minifundia - besides limiting investment opportunities and precluding 
technological improvements affects the efficiency of labor adversely. The 
inflated labor requirements on the jointly operated Mexican farms do indi­
cate that the "ejido" tends to not only tolerate unemployment of labor, but 
to encourage it as well. 
However, it is always easy, and sometimes dangerous, to be wise after 
the event. Whatever success the ejido system may have achieved in Mexico, 
there can be no doubt that one of its positive features, as Flores advise: 
....As other....(less developed) countries enter the 
path of economic expansion, they will be faced with 
problems similar to those encountered in Mexico. At 
this juncture the Mexican experience will undoubtedly 
serve to keep them in the right course and will save 
them from some of the errors which we (the Mexicans) 
did not know how to avoid (89, p. 246). 
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Notwithstanding the difficulties that the agrarian reform has been 
incapable to resolve, Whetten feels that there appears ample evidence that 
total agricultural production has increased since the Mexican Revolution 
(87, p. 566). 
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Proportional profit farm 
The Puerto Rican experience offers another unique land tenure 
structure which has been devised to generate incentive opportunities and 
greater incomes for a depressed landless population prior to the advent of 
the reform. In summarizing the background for Puerto Rico's land tenure 
reform Santos mentions: 
.... latifundia and manager-operated farms are 
characteristic of large-scale sugar cane enterprises. 
The coffee, tobacco, fruit, and general crops 
regions are characterized by a high proportion of 
ownership. Tenants are more or less evenly distri­
buted throughout the different agricultural regions, 
and most farm laborers live scattered in the rural 
areas in poor houses built on sites provided by the 
landlord... The large units..existed at a social 
cost involving masses of hoe-agriculture laborers 
with very little opportunity for improving their 
skills, a great inequality in the distribution of 
income, a strangling absentee ownership, and above 
all a disintegrated and frustrated community 
whithering incentives for group action and for 
self-improvement.... (91, p. 330). 
One of the logical by-products of this situation has been the insti­
tution of the proportional profit farms. The Puerto Rican proportional 
profit farms are authorized under the Land Law of Puerto Rico of April, 
1941. The Land Authority, the public Corporation created by the Puerto 
Rican Land Laif, has been empowered under Title IV of the Law to lease units 
of from 100 to 500 acres of land -- or more where deemed necessary — to 
qualified persons with experience in agricultural management for the 
purpose of establishing proportional profit farms. Stahl states that the 
proportional profit farms have been established: 
....in order to maintain the efficiencies felt to 
be associated with size on the large holdings acquired 
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by the Authority,^0 while providing for a wider distri­
bution of the benefits of those holdings. Benefits — 
net incomes of the farms -- are distributed to workers 
in proportion to the amount of wages and salaries earned 
on the farm during the accounting period. The wages or 
salaries paid during the period are considered to be 
advances against the final disposition of the farm 
income. These wages are to compare with the regular 
wage paid in the area in which the farm was located. 
The lessee or manager is not individually liable for 
payment of any obligations attendant upon the lease, 
but is liable for funds advanced by the authority for 
operational purposes. In effect, the lessee is a 
manager appointed by the Land Authority. According to 
the Land Law, the Authority functions as the fiscal 
agent for the farms and provide such supervision and 
resources as may be set forth in the contract between 
the Authority and the lessee. The terms "lessee" and 
"lease contract" used in the Law do not carry the full 
legal meaning as set forth in Puerto Rican law, but 
refer to "administrator" and "administration contract" 
according to a 1946 amendment (92, pp. 1-2). 
Judging the Puerto Rican proportional profit farm from the standpoint of 
improved efficiency and use of resources, it seems to have offered conse­
quences which are compatible with this goal. The program has helped 
develop in the laborers a sense of responsibility and efficiency since 
besides sharing in the profits that go to labor and management as incentive 
payments, the laborers are rewarded a wage rate that is compatible with 
their marginal value productivity. Further, the title to land rests in the 
hands of all the people. Not only that, but in addition, land has been 
granted to landless farm laborers in rural villages to be established by 
the authority adjacent to the centers of farm production (93, p. 60). 
The provision of such land plots beside enabling every farm laborer to 
build a home, plant some subsistence crops, raise some domestic animals and 
It should be noted that almost all lands subject to expropriation 
under the 500 acre limitation were devoted to the cultivation of sugar. 
The total area of the land leased to proportional profit farms represents 
some 10 per cent of the cane land on the island. 
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rear a family, also provides him with the freedom to exercise his demo­
cratic rights and to sell his labor in the open market without the limi­
tation of dependency which characterized his life as a squatter 
(agregado°^) (91, p. 334). 
The proportional profit farm could also be viewed as an ingenious 
innovation, indispensable in overcoming the resource inefficiencies that 
may accrue as a consequence of the parcelling of land holdings. In the 
case of land where, for natural or economic reasons, the division of land 
is not advisable from the standpoint of economy, the Puerto Rican Land 
Authority has maintained efficiency of production by commanding under one 
management an area that could have been subdivided into a large number of 
small management units. 
The Puerto Rican approach seems to be of great instrumentality in 
favoring the simultaneous achievement of increased productions^ and im­
proved distribution of benefits in agriculture. Not only has the pro­
portional profit farm captured unrest and social injustice due to the 
concentration of land ownership, but it has also created a mechanism 
through which the diffusion of wealth^^ may be effected, thereby 
51 The term agregado as used in Puerto Rico, refers to a landless head 
of a family whose sole income is derived from wage labor in agriculture. 
His residence must have been established in a house and lands belonging to 
another person, or his house erected on the lands of another person. 
°^Santos reports that the proportional profit farm has increased pro­
duction and improved land use. A study of four projects shows that sugar 
cane production on these proportional profit farms increased from 339,000 
tons to 605,000 tons, or 78 per cent. This compares favorably with 19.2 
per cent increase in production for the Nation (91, p. 334). 
53 
Diffusion of wealth means a wide distribution of the incomes of 
rent, royalties, interest, wages, and profits going to the enterpriser-
owner interests. 
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contributing to a substantial increase in the standard of living of the 
greatest possible number of families. In summarizing the record of 
achievement of the proportional profit farm Packard asserts: 
....The operations of the Land Authority as judged by 
its record to date have been surprisingly successful. 
The area in cane has been increased appreciably. The 
yields per acre are above the average. The costs of 
production per ton are relatively low. The non-cane 
land has been put to a higher use than formerly and 
taxes on commercial properties have been increased. 
Labor and management have received substantial profits. 
And the income of the people of Puerto Rico has been 
increased through the receipt of interest on its invest­
ment on farm land. T-That is more, there have been no 
negative social results. The only individuals adversely 
affected are the former stockholders who will be com­
pelled to invest their money in other enterprises 
(93, pp. 85-87). 
However, Packard warns that the nationalization of land through the 
proportional profit farm program is not by itself sufficient in solving the 
income problems of the cane workers. The wage income of the workers, even 
after distribution of profits, is still very low. 
Full mechanization of the sugar cane is not as of yet complete. Many 
authors contend that the introduction of means of production which will in­
crease output per man will make the system more solvent (93, p. 88). 
The Puerto Rican proportional-profit farm merits consideration in 
other areas of the world having a similar socio-economic setting. The rate 
of adoption seems to be governed partly by the ability of a public sector to 
furnish the investment that such a program will require. Of no lesser im­
portance to the success of the Puerto Rican accomplishment will be those 
social reforms necessary for the rise of a new managerial class; the im­
provement of the quality of labor through education and public health 
programs; and the formation of new social and economic institutions along 
with a higher quality of public administration. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DEFECTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE PRESENT TENURE STRUCTURES 
In the previous chapter it has been ascertained that domestic land 
tenure structures present problems that restrict the achievement of develop­
mental goals. In this chapter we strive to evaluate the various tenure 
structures in terms of their defects and contributions using the structural 
traps hypotheses II. 1, 2 and 3. This is done under the following headings 
concerned with incentives, knowledge, and capital. 
Incentive Inefficiencies Caused by Defects in the 
Land Tenure Structures 
The failure of a land tenure system to promote human incentives con­
sistent with improved labor productivity, given knowledge and capital 
results from uncertainty of expectations regarding future control over the 
land resources. A land tenure system may also engenger incentive in­
efficiency by encouraging labor immobility. 
Under uncertainty traps due to defective titles to land and its re­
sources, the farmer's planning horizon becomes less than the optimum 
planning period. As a result, Professor Timmons argues, "....he is moti­
vated to use his labor and capital for short run productive efforts or for 
consumption purposes resulting in reduced productivity" (5, p. 17). 
One of the hypotheses formulated in this study is that the existing 
tenure structures cause incentive inefficiencies which would be reflected 
in uneconomic organization of the labor resource. Hypothesis II. 1. The 
difference between an estimated marginal value product for labor and the 
corresponding resource price could be suggested as evidence of labor dis­
incentive. The estimation of the production function suggested earlier 
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would yield such evidence. Data needed to obtain estimates on factor 
marginal returns would be gross output of farms within a particular tenure 
class in value terms with the corresponding information on land, labor, and 
capital services. No such information is available for the Sudanese tenure 
structures. Consequently, evidence is demonstrated, where possible, by 
using examples which approximate the Sudanese situation. 
One such example, which offers evidence on the incentive trap hypo­
thesis is to be found in a study done by Massell on Turu^ economy. The 
input-output data relating to 29 observations (Turu households) are given 
in Table 22. Output is measured in debes of grain; that is, in physical 
terms. Capital refers to an index of fertilizer, constructed with refer­
ence to the number and type of animals in the household's corral.^ As farm 
labor is performed by the women in the Turu economy,3 labor input is 
measured in terms of adult women in the household. Land input refers to 
the number of acres under cultivation by the household (94, p. 35). 
The production function written as: 
"'i '^ 1 "i X « N ^ K ^ L ^ 
and transformed to logs: 
ln(X) = f ln(N) f ln(K) -j. ln(L) 
^Turu is an aboriginal tribe in the central part of Tanganyika. 
goat counts as one unit, a calf as two, and adult cattle as five 
each (94, p. 35). 
3 This is also true of many communal tribes in Southern Sudan thus 
adding to the plausibility of the example. 
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Table 22. Output and inputs in a sample of Turu farmsteads^ 
Grain production Acres Women Fertilizer index 
'x L N K 
189 4.1 4 187 
95 4.7 3 177 
335 6.4 3 148 
150 5.0 3 130 
57 4. 5 1 130 
195 5.8 5 127 
205 3.5 2 113 
72 5.2 2 98 
90 3.1 3 90 
75 2.6 1 87 
163 8.8 4 85 
53 2.6 1 82 
96 2.7 1 79 
95 4.3 2 71 
55 2.0 3 70 
75 2.6 1 69 
58 6.7 3 69 
36 2.3 1 61 
76 4.2 1 56 
125 4.0 1 54 
45 4.0 1 54 
90 6.1 3 51 
37 2.7 1 50 
35 2.6 1 41 
41 4.1 2 39 
40 1.8 1 35 
51 2.0 2 34 
49 3.0 2 34 
40 3.3 1 17 
Source; (94, p. 36). 
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was fitted, using the least squares method. The estimates of the elasticity 
coefficients are given by: 
ln(X) = 0.673 4- 0.257 ln(N) + 0.523 ln(K) 4- 0.330 ln(L) 
The above equation indicates that labor's elasticity of production is 
approximately one-fourth, that of capital one-half and that of land one-
third. The marginal productivities of the factors, the values of marginal 
produce, factor prices and marginal factor contributions to output are 
presented in Table 23. 
However, whereas it is a sign of "fortune" for Massell that Schneider 
has provided him with factor prices, to the author it is quite upsetting to 
value a woman's life for 400 shillings. There is no community on earth, no 
matter how primitive, that will accept what Massells regards as "interest­
ing" when he notes "....that when a woman dies, part of the bride price is 
likely to be returned - the amount returned, which we (Massell) may term 
the "salvage value", is typically a decreasing function of the woman's use­
ful economic life" (94, p. 39). Such an allegation illustrates a distorted 
view of the African economic man in the search for "interesting" production 
functions. Consequently, the information portrayed in Table 23 should be 
interpreted with the greatest caution.^ 
Should we assume that labor is measured in man-hours, a discrepancy 
between the marginal value product of labor and its price, if such a price 
exists, suggests labor inefficiency. Insofar as there is a failure to meet 
^This is one of the difficulties that one gets into when attempting to 
demonstrate; let alone finding the suitable information which will fit 
into such analysis. 
Table 23. Values of marginal product of labor, capital and land with respect to prices of labor, 
capital and land, respectively in Turu economy^ 
Factors 
Marginal physical products 
SlX) 
N L K 
Debe of grain 
worth in 
shillings 
MVP in 
shillings 
Factor 
prices 
Marginal 
contribution 
to output 
MVP 
Pi 
Labor (woman) 12.37 5 61.85 • 400^ 0.150 
Capital 
(cow = 5 fertilizer units) 0.611 5 38.90 20 1.95 
Land (acre) 7.78 5 15.275 100 0.155 
^Source: (compiled from 94). 
A woman's price is the bride price. To Schneider, the average initial contract for a wife 
consists of four or five head of cattle, about 3 heifers and 1 or 2 steers. This seems to be 
for the services of the woman, who runs the household. Woman's activities include such things 
as the production of grain, processing it, and the provision of firewood, water and so forth. 
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the condition that labor be rewarded in accordance with its contribution, 
Turu economy leads to reduced efficiency in labor. The same reasoning 
applies to labor under communal tenure in southern Sudan. To the extent 
that the marginal value product of labor is lower than the market rate of 
remuneration, the existence of communal tenure enhances practices adverse 
to the optimum use of the labor resource. 
In the mechanized crop production schemes in the Gedaref District, 
where land is allotted on a year to year lease renewable at the end of each 
season; the lack of security of tenure in these farms does not give the 
lessee the incentive to invest in permanent improvements in the land. 
Tenant absenteeism and unwillingness to work on the farm are en­
gendered by incentive inefficiencies confronting the Gezira tenantry. The 
dissatisfaction that the tenants have shown with respect to the apportion­
ment of the net proceeds of the cotton crop could be taken as evidence to 
support the argument that dissociation of contributions from rewards 
reduces the incentives of the tenants to improve their productivity. 
Gaitskell in judging the financial position of the partners prior to the 
nationalization of the Scheme argues that: 
....the tenants profit figures, except in the last 
years, (1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950), were disappointing, 
especially with their five empty years in the 
depression (1930-1934).... (64, p. 264). 
Even though the tenantry's share has increased for the last decade, it 
is often argued that the costs of production have been generally rising (95, 
p. 2). Rising costs of production coupled with violent fluctuations in 
world market prices, over which the policy-maker has no control have led to 
the reduction in the incomes of the tenants. It is possible to minimize 
174 
the adverse effects of the decline in world prices of cotton by achieving 
higher levels of productivity together with substantial reductions in the 
costs production. Given capital and knowledge, the tenants' incentive is 
of prime importance for improving his productivity. 
Technological and Managerial Limitations as Influenced by 
Imperfections in the Land Tenure Structures 
The domestic land tenure structures are characterized by technical 
defects which discourage the development process. 
Individual ownership of land in the Northern Province through the 
prevalence of the Islamic laws of inheritance have contributed considerably 
to the parcellation of land holdings. Where the majority of the inhabit­
ants of the Province depend largely on agriculture for th-ir subsistence 
and where non-agricultural employment and investment opportunities are not 
yet fully developed, land fragmentation is only natural if successive gener­
ations are to scratch a living. Consequently, with increasing population 
pressure on the land, it is not surprising that private ownership of the 
land becomes one of the most highly prized and jealously guarded customs of 
the native population. And eventhough Government pump schemes in the 
Northern Province have been relatively successful, we find that peasant 
proprietors are generally very reluctant to join them. 
The average size of the private holding in the Northern Province does 
not exceed 3 feddans. The average number of fragments is almost five 
representing interests in subdivided "sagia" holdings, and some of the 
fragments are included in some of the pump schemes which have been es­
tablished on a share-cropping basis (See 53, pp. 216-217). The holdings 
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surveyed by Tothill are below the size of a subsistence holding and conse­
quently, are "not sufficient to enable any sort of emergence to take 
place." The existence of land fragmentation leads to reduced efficiency 
and lower total output per feddan due to increases in production costs per 
acre, and precludes the use of many improved technologies which yield eco­
nomies of scale and proportionality. The tracts are scattered out in a 
manner that handicap efficient use of labor and water. The "sagia" and the 
"Shadouf" are the irrigation methods principally employed. A large per­
centage of the people spend their lives in eking out a bare existence by 
these, cumbersome, unpractical, and inefficient methods of irrigation. 
Owing to the scarcity of land sufficiently close to the Nile to be irri­
gated by these means, it is not uncommon for a plot to be cropped twice or 
even three times annually. This naturally tends to exhaust the soil parti­
cularly as plowing is very rare and fertilizers are not used. 
As the motive power of the "sagia" is the bull, and of the "Shadouf" 
is man, the extent of cultivation that can be irrigated by these means is 
limited not only by the land available but also by bull-power. In years of 
low flood, when fodder is scarce, and when fodder consumption competes with 
human consumption, the bulls are so weak that they cannot turn the "sagia". 
Under such a situation very little increase in agricultural output can be 
expected unless major structural changes in the ownership pattern are 
carried out. 
Under the customary system of tenure, land in the tribal areas of 
southern Sudan may be viewed as almost a free good but rationed. Land is a 
free good in the economic sense because it has no price or market value. 
Land which is highly productive commands the same value as poor land. 
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Yet land is rationed because it is not unlimited in supply. The process of 
rationing is the tribal allocative process. So long as land remains a free 
good there will be no cost factor to encourage greater productivity. The 
traditional system of shifting cultivation associated with communal tenure 
and based on human labor, mainly female labor using crude implements, is 
viewed as a self-sustaining system so long as the high land-labor ratio 
allows it to operate unhindered. Not only is such a system wasteful of 
land due to the very high ratio of fallow to arable land, but in the long-
run with a decreasing land-labor ratio it becomes transformed into a highly 
destructive form of semi-nomadic agriculture. A rising population means 
less land available to the household with the need to maintain a minimal 
level of living, and an ever-increasing number of dispersed holdings with 
an ever-diminishing size. The injurious effects of fragmentation need 
emphasis. Besides precluding efficient management and the application of 
technological innovations, it increases the difficulties of soil conser­
vation. Also labor is used unproductively, and the difficulty of es­
tablishing an effective extension service is greatly magnified. 
An additional and important defect in communal tenure is that it dis­
courages the emergence of entrepreneurial and managerial ability among the 
indigenous population. Being one of the scarcest factors in Sudanese agri­
culture, managerial talent is further stifled because the able producer 
cannot acquire land. In support of the view that land is allocated on the 
basis of need and status among the Azanda Guttmann writes: 
As land was plentiful, it was not usual for a father 
to nominate a son who was to take over the home 
after his death. If a son was old enough, he would 
have his own homestead and would not wish to abandon 
that in favor of the one lately occupied by his father. 
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especially as the Azande would expect the ghost of 
the father still to be wandering about. But if the 
son did not have his ovm homestead, or was prepared 
to expand his own homestead, he would take over that 
of his deceased father. The view was expressed that 
where there was more than one son, the eldest would 
take over the homestead. This, however, was repeatedly 
rejected in favor of the son nominated by the chief. 
It was the chief's land and he had the right to 
determine who was to take it over. Thus it was 
claimed that the land would go to the "most worthy 
son", who need not necessarily be the eldest. In 
this connection "most worthy" seemed to indicate the 
son who had gained favor with the chief through 
repeated gifts or special work. Thus where the 
father has died, a son desiring the homestead of his 
father would seek the assistance of his chief. The 
chief would not request a payment in return for such 
help, but it would be "most unusual and unfriendly" 
if no gifts were to be made to him (96, p. 53). 
The "most worthy" son is not necessarily the most competent decision­
maker. There is, however, a wide range in the size of homesteads, and it 
appears that obedience to the chief's orders and "status" does have a 
bearing on this distribution. Thus the non-existence of a market for land 
would encourage the substitution of "personal preferences" for managerial 
ability, and would preclude the creation of progressive farmers who can 
acquire the skill and capacity necessary for the commercialization of 
agriculture. 
Further, communal land tenure in southern Sudan retains a practice 
which impedes the "mobility" of managerial talent by disallowing "strangers" 
to use parts of communal land. This practice is aggravated more by the 
present political situation. Hostility between the South and the North has 
reached a stage whereby the inhabitants of the densely populated regions, 
would not even entertain the idea of moving southwards. Clauson in his 
treatment of a similar kind of experience in some of the Western Pacific 
Islands contends that: 
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.... this is the kind of situation in which a re­
distribution of land between groups may be in the 
public interest and it is sometimes argued by 
representatives of groups which are short of land 
that room ought to be made for them, by government 
action if necessary, on land not yet fully exploited. 
The owners or occupiers of these lands, however, 
argue that even if in the present generation they 
have more land than they need, the natural increase 
of the population will before very long create a 
situation in which their group will require all its 
land, and therefore it would be unjust to deprive 
them of part of their land. It is difficult to 
challenge the justice of this contention. It has 
for many years-been the declared position of the 
governments in these areas that existing rights in 
land will be respected, and it would be impossible 
now to depart from this position without incurring 
justifiable charges of breach of faith (44, p. 41). 
The matter in Sudan is not in fact one in which natural population 
increases in the south may lead to land deprivation; for such is not the 
case in some parts of Southern Sudan. More important is the challenge that 
such a situation (scarcity of land in the northern province and scarcity of 
labor in the south) presents with reference to resolving the conflicts 
between the south and the north necessary for the realization of a pro­
gressive stable economy. From the economic or national interest point of 
view, the question of depriving the southerner from his land is not a major 
issue, for agricultural land is in abundant supply. In fact one could 
argue that a land allotments scheme which will release the pressure on the 
land in the northern province and relieve the man-power situation in 
southern Sudan is a positive step toward achieving national unity and 
development. The conflict between the local and social interests on the 
one hand, and economic or national interests on the other, could be re­
solved by devising a form of tenure which would protect the rights of the 
southerners and yet allow the economic use of the nation's resources. 
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Eventhough the establishment of the mechanized crop production schemes 
in the Gedaref district has stimulated individual initiative and enterprise, 
success has not been achieved in improving the standard of management. The 
leasing system on an annual basis tends to preclude sedentary life on the 
fara. As a result the frequently off-farm manager, has not yet acquired 
the ability of coordinating production on the farm with the different 
alternatives open to the farm. 
Technical and economic considerations suggest that mechanization must 
result in a markedly reduced use of manpower for production. The form of 
tenure could encourage mechanization, especially where the land-labor ratio 
is very high, if it effects both employment and productivity positively. 
Besides economizing labor, there are many instances where mechanization 
increases the output per unit of land by more timely, or more rapid, or 
more efficient cultivation. Where mechanization enables the cultivation of 
previously uncultivated marginal land, it would also increase employment. 
Eventhough it is admitted that the introduction of "dura-factories" in 
the Gedaref district has not been hampered by the scale of operation due to 
land abundance, the main question of how far is it necessary to apply me­
chanical equipment before the optimum size is reached has not been satis­
factorily answered. In addition, the other sectors of the economy have not 
sufficiently expanded to induce the movement of unemployed labor in response 
to market requirements. 
Osman has provided some information about four farms in the mechanized 
crop production schemes for the season 1957 - 1958. The farms have been 
selected not because they are representative of the area, but because that 
information regarding them is available. Consequently, if the results of 
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the economic side of a farm under case study reveals defects, such defects 
could only be attributed to the particular type of farm or area and no 
valid generalizations could be derived. 
The input and output per feddan for the four farms is given in Table 
24. The input includes costs of all items whether purchased or owned. 
Output is the value of the gross output valued at prices prevailing at the 
harvest time. 
Table 24, Input and output for four farms at Singa - Dali M.C.P.S.® 
Size of farm in 
feddans 
Input per 
feddan 
Output per 
feddan 
Net return per 
feddan 
700 (B) 5.900 10.963 5.037 
750 (C) 6.6576 11.233 4.576 
900 (A) 7.092 16.348 9.256 
1400 (D) 6.132 12.589 6.457 
^Source: (computed from data given in 56). 
One could not conclude from the above Table that output as well as 
input decrease with the increase in farm size. Regressing output per 
feddan and net returns per feddan on feddanage alone has resulted in insig­
nificant regression coefficients of 0.0016 and 0.0019 respectively. Farm 
B with 700 feddans has the loifest cost of production per feddan and the 
lowest per feddan output. Farm A with a size of 900 feddans has the highest 
cost of production per feddan. Because farm A has been able to secure 
better prices for the sale of produce and to hire its tractor during the 
dead season in the nearby pump schemes plus the fact that a salarified 
manager who is also a partner is looking after the farm, it has attained 
the highest return per feddan. An interesting feature that the figures 
portray is that as the size of the farm increases by 20 per cent (Size A -
Size C) the returns per feddan increase by about 100 per cent and then they 
decline with the increase in farm size from A to D. However, the fact that 
there is a small number of observations in this case study which are not 
typically representative of the farm situation would not enable us to test 
the proposition that economies of scale derive from large-scale mechani­
zation. It is believed that production function analysis fitted to data 
covering a large sample with more rigorous statistical treatment will 
provide a suitable way of tackling this data deficiency. The value of such 
a method depends largely on the availability of valid information relating 
to labor requirements, capital and land resources, yields and prices. Such 
a method can be applied to tenure situations. It may be necessary to 
select one or more of the typical farms representative of the particular 
tenure situation, in a given locality. On the basis of the data collected 
for such farms it would then be possible to have a knowledge of the produc­
tivities of land, labor, and the various types of capital used in agri­
cultural production. Using such a knowledge estimates of the mean marginal 
productivity of each input category can be obtained by calculating the 
marginal productivities for an enterprise which is representative of the 
tenure situation. In investigating the efficiency with which resources are 
used, land for instance, the calculated mean marginal productivity could be 
compared with either the market price, or the productivity of similar re­
sources employed in other areas. 
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Capital Inadequacy as Effected by Defects in the 
Land Tenure Structures 
Defects in the existing Sudanese land tenure structures also obstruct 
the creation of capital. Raeburn has expressed the feeling that; 
....the supplies of capital available to farm families 
in Africa are so restricted....(because).... in the 
past, the accumulators of capital generally have been 
those of high social position including the older men. 
But their accumulations were largely short-term because 
they had also many obligations to provide "social 
security". And, as in all poor countries, lesser men 
and women also have had to face demands from their 
poorer relatives and friends that in effect have been 
very steeply progressive income tax and capital levies. 
Polygamy has also been an effective means of spreading 
about such productive capital as there was, and turning 
it into consumption goods. Now, when there may be 
somewhat more opportunity to invest in productive 
assets, there is also a greater propensity to consume 
and this is by no means always accompanied by the 
foresight and enterprise that reflects it in a more 
immediate propensity to invest. Thus, such ad­
ditional productive assets as are not being added to 
the small stock are those that arise almost entirely 
from the investment of more manual labor and often 
that of farm families themselves -- more coffee; 
cocoa, or tea bushes, more acres sown to cotton or 
groundnuts, better weeding, and so on. But not, in 
many areas, more draft bulls and implements, carts, 
flood control, water conservation, and irrigation 
requiring outside skills and machinery; not fencing 
and livestock sheds requiring purchased materials. 
The exceptions, closely fostered by governments, prove 
the rule. This is true also in the whole wide field 
of pest control: the highly sophisticated controls of 
cotton pests in the Gezira Scheme of the Sudan, in 
the coffee plots of Kenya; and the cocoa plots of 
Western Nigeria.... (97, p. 235). 
In a similar vein, Professor Schultz has concluded that "while agri­
culture is the oldest production activity of a settled community, sur­
prisingly little is known about the incentives to save and invest where 
farmers are bound by traditional agriculture" (98, p. 111). 
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Capital from its availability point of view is of two forms; 
"derived capital" created within the agricultural sector, and "injected 
capital" arising from outside agriculture. Capital formation within agri­
culture depends upon the difference between per capita income and per 
capita consumption. Professor Timmons concedes that since consumption in 
less-developed countries is already extremely low it is difficult to see 
how consumption could be further decreased and the stability threshold 
maintained, particularly in light of prospective population increases, as 
a source of savings. The same author believes that capital uses within 
agriculture must be concerned with capital formation through increased 
productivity, the prevention of leakages of formed capital, and through 
access to outside capital (5, p. 20). If we accept this argument, then 
only by maximizing per capita productivity would the difference between in­
come and consumption be increased and derived capital gains from agri­
culture be provided for reinvestment and grotvth. 
Regarding capital creation in agriculture, the Sudanese tenure 
structures present defects which tend to hinder the capital formation 
process. These are the high fixed costs of ownership and operation, land 
values beyond the value productivity of land, and the limited opportunity 
to channel savings into productive investment. 
The high fixed costs of ownership including taxes, interest and loan 
renewal costs tend to press heavily upon the small owner of the Northern 
Province. The fact that his land is parcelled aggravates the capital de­
ficiency even more. Tothills' investigation reveals that the taxes paid by 
the owner of a less than 3 feddans holding are in some cases higher than 
the net output of the land operated by the owner (53, p. 216). Heavy 
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indebtedness often places the small "sagia" oimer at the mercy of the money 
lender who, in extreme situations, can force him to pay over everything, in 
excess of subsistence, leaving him no incentive to increase his produc­
tivity. Money lenders give the farmer what he needs in the form of con­
sumption goods all the time during the season and only give him the 
smallest possible amount in the form of cash. They keep a separate record, 
which is very inaccurate, for each farmer. Some of them are dishonest. 
After the harvest, the farmer most often pays back in kind and the money­
lender is the one who decides what the price of the product will be. This 
price is usually fixed far below the market price. This sort of lender 
created what is known in the Sudan as "Sheil System". Under this system 
"credit is extended by the merchant-lender in the form of advances in money 
or kind against the next crop...." (99, p. 141). Three forms of this 
system are discerned. The oldest form is an advance of grain or seed 
valued at a price substantially above the estimated price of the next 
harvest. The borrower must settle the loan by returning at harvest time 
enough grain to make up the money equivalent of the loan. If a good crop 
follows a bad crop, with a resulting drop in market price, the lender may 
get back as much as five to six times the volume of goods he loaned out. 
A second form of the "Sheil System" is more in the nature of a middle­
man's service. Farmers may find it difficult to market their crops due to 
lack of funds to purchase sacks and meet transportation cost. The money­
lender will agree to take over the crop at the market price less an amount 
approximating the rate of short-term advances on crops. 
Still a third arrangement under "Sheil" — one for which Wilmington 
provides an example that could serve as evidence of the high interest rate 
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farmers pay - involves the advance of money against future crops. At the 
beginning of the season the farmer will request a sum of money (or some­
times consumer goods) to be repaid in a specified quantity of produce, say 
an ardeb^ of beans. The moneylender will set the amount to be lent against 
the future delivery substantially below the last harvest price or the 
anticipated value at the forthcoming harvest, whichever is lower. Thus 
when the borrower surrenders the pledged quantity of produce, the lender 
should derive a considerable "windfall" from the operation, namely the 
difference between the harvest value of the commodity pledged and the 
"Sheil" value set by him. A typical transaction reported in Wilmington's 
article is as follows: 
Piastres 
Value of ardeb of beans - end of season: 360 
"Sheil" value of beans - start of season: 200 
Gross profit of lender 160 
In other words, Wilmington concludes; 
.... at the start of the crop year the borrower 
received 200 piastres on loan. About ten months 
later, at harvest time, he was required either to 
surrender an ardeb of newly harvested beans or pay 
the current market price therefor. Owing to 
government controls, the lender probably knew that 
the harvest price would be 360 piastres; the 
borrower therefore was expected to pay 160 
piastres for a ten-month loan of 200 piastres. 
Converted on a per annum basis, this would mean 
a rate of interest of approximately 100 per cent 
(99, p. 142). 
Similarly, high costs of operation relating to services and dues as well as 
interest and payments on operating capital reduce the propensity to save of 
^An Ardeb equals 5.619 U. S. bushels. 
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Table 25. Estimates of recurrent expenditure and revenue of three M.C.P. 
Schemes for the 1951-1952 season^ 
Item Cost 
In Sudanese total in per Per-
pounds pounds feddan centage 
I. Expenditure 
1. Personnel, pay & 
allowances: 
a. Classified 9,680 
b. Unclassified 8,340 18,020 0.601 22 
2, Services 
a. Establishment of crop: 
i. Seed & treatment 2,090 
ii. Hire of machinery 19,530 
iii. Labor 1,860 
b. Harvesting 
i. Hire of machinery 5,670 
ii. Labor 1,575 
23,480 0.783 28 
7,245 0.241 
c. Transport of crop 6,440 0.215 
d. Water supply, hire 
of pumps 1,350 0.045 
e. Maintenance; 
i. Buildings 700 
ii. Roads 1,150 
iii. Kafirs 200 
2,050 0.068 
^Source: (54, pp. 81-82). 
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Table 25 (Continued) 
Item Cost 
In Sudanese total in per Per­
pounds pounds feddan centage 
f. Miscellaneous: 
i. Sanitary 300 
ii. Free rations 
(firewood) 360 
iii. Animal transport 160 
iv. Remuneration to 
Samads 1,140 
V. Control of pests 300 
g. Cost of sacks 
h. Departmental services: 
i. Mechanical transport 7,220 
ii. Stationery, etc. 250 
iii. Posts & telegraphs 475 
i. Contingent 
Total expenditure 
Add interest on capital 
Total 
2 , 2 6 0  
1 2 , 2 6 0  
7,945 
250 
81,300 
2,930 
84,230 
0.075 
0.409 
0.265 
.008 
2.710 
0.098 
2.808 
2 
15 
II. Revenue 
1. Sale of crop 
2. Recovery of sacks 
3. Miscellaneous 
Total revenue 
Deduct expenditure 
Net revenue 
90,375 
6,130 
580 
97,085 
84,230 
12,855 
3.012 
0.204 
0. 019 
3.235 
2.808 
0.427 
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both the Gezira tenant and the farmer of the mechanized crop production 
schemes. The high operational costs particularly of machinery shown in 
Table 25 for the mechanized crop production schemes in the season 1951-1952 
indicate horf difficult it would be for an ardent advocate of mechanization 
to reconcile its adoption in a country like Sudan with the adverse effects 
it places on capital formation. 
The capital sunk in the purchase of land in the Northern Province by 
retired government officials also entails the exhaustion of capital re­
sources. 
Because of the limited opportunity to channel savings into productive 
investment for reasons as suggested by Raeburn for instance, much of Gezira 
production is absorbed in consumption. A comparison of the movements in 
tenants' consumption with the corresponding changes in the tanants' share 
in the net proceeds could be secured from the Table shot-m belov/. 
Table 26. Consumption and income of Gezira tenants from cotton® 
Cotton Total Tenants' share 
Year piece Sugar Coffee Tea con­ in net cotton 
goods sumption proceeds 
1926 751 492 241 218 74.2 71.6 
1927 798 395 211 161 68.2 102.6 
1928 947 535 181 253 83.5 78.4 
1929 1,200 612 274 207 100.0 100.0 
1930 950 559 276 151 84.1 27.1 
1931 532 401 132 127 51.9 12.0 
1932 590 179 165 78 44.1 69.4 
1933 664 204 189 76 49.3 26.7 
1934 775 226 222 194 51.8 31.4 
1935 889 326 249 179 72.1 66.9 
1936 848 383 224 235 73.9 63.5 
1937 964 570 208 339 90.8 88.9 
1938 1,071 635 206 255 94.3 63.9 
^Source: (100,p. 76). 
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Such high levels of consumption relative to the income situation corId shake 
one's confidence in the financial soundness of the Gezira Scheme. It is 
the family system that affects adversely present savings rather than the 
tenure situation. To Kubinski such a deeply rooted system "....resembles, 
to some extent, the system of social insurance and welfare services 
administered by Governments or private enterprise in 'Western' countries" 
(18, p. 331). Thus whereas the transformation of tenure structures is 
essential for economic development if defined as a rise in per capita 
productivity, a change in social attitudes is also essential for the suc­
cess of such a transformation. 
The levy of a 10 percent tax on the gross returns of the mechanized 
schemes, which have been faced with adverse market conditions tends to 
restrict the size of the investment market. This is so because the high 
tax levy is not frequently being invested in expanding infrastructure which 
will widen the scope of investment opportunities. The lack of development 
so implied is reflected in McLoughlin's statement about the central rain-
lands where he points out that "....despite of having 21.80 per cent of the 
nation's people, the region obtains only 2.03 per cent of government 
spending" (33, p. 211). 
Regarding the prevention of outflow of capital formed in agriculture 
the high charges which are paid to moneylenders are frequently channeled 
into conspicuous consumption. This may also be true of some of the Gedaref 
district Imfcost producers who consume their profits instead of saving and 
reinvesting in on-farm improvements. Such behavior is largely the outcome 
of insecure tenure aggravated by a limited capital market. 
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Considering injections of outside capital into agriculture, the in­
security of titles to land coupled with water-hunger particularly in the 
Gedaref district, limits access to outside capital where property security 
is required. 
Eventhough tribal tenure has been described as an effective barrier 
against the evils of agricultural indebtedness, its existence does not give 
a security base for the acquisition of outside capital. In the tribal 
areas holdings are not clearly identifiable. The existence of barriers to 
mobility of land between users that are related to racial, tribal, clan, 
and other social divisions is nothing but a persistent tendency that slows 
doxfn the development of sound land tenure and credit arrangements. 
So far, we have enumerated some of the defects in Sudanese land tenure 
structures in terms of the diagnostic hypotheses stated previously (II. 
1, 2, and 3). Besides these defects there are also some potential success 
elements which provide the basis for improvement. 
The physical and human resources of the south could be of inestimable 
value to the internal and external economy of the country if it is ever 
possible to break through the tribal system of tenure and transform it into 
commercial practice that is geared for relatively high and rising pro­
duction, sufficient consumption and capital formation. 
Provision of better incentives, although most difficult, must be 
regarded as one of the most important methods of solving labor problems. 
Experience in other African nations indicates that changes in communal 
rights to land accompanied by the provision of complementary factors of 
production, such as credit facilities and the incentives to use them could 
stimulate productivity and improve resource use. Clayton, for instance. 
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feels that the strength of Kenya's recent agrarian reforms lies in per-
suation and demonstration. He argues that; 
....this applies to consolidation and private 
ovraership of land. It also applies, with less 
certainty of success to farm planning.... 
Incentives are placed at strategic points to 
encourage acceptance. But compulsion is absent 
from (the)...."plan to intensify the development 
of African agriculture..." One or two basic 
institutional changes have been achieved and for 
the rest (with some exceptions) hope is placed in 
the belief that individual initiative and enter­
prise will succeed where administrative contrivance 
failed (101, p. 53). 
The implementation of the Israeli moshav in Nigeria's Western and 
Eastern regions is another illustration of the success that could be 
achieved through the transformation of communal tenure. It is generally 
believed that such an innovation would have a strong "demonstration effect 
on established farmers as well as on school leavers, and that the settle­
ment project is an excellent extension device (70, p. 543). 
In southern Sudan the introduction of better hand tools and animal 
dravm implements has indicated favorable effects on agricultural output. 
The limited data available for comparison of efficiency of hand and animal 
dra\fn implements under the conditions of flood region shoim in Table 27 
indicate that positive increases in crop output could be achieved by the 
use of animal draxm implements. However, the use of draught power has not 
been adopted on a large scale because the innovation has not been preceded 
by a disturbance of the forces of traditional tenure arrangements. 
In the Northern Province where peasant farming due to fragmentation 
offers little possibilities for capital formation, the success of curing 
labor underemployment lies in consolidation and the opening-up of new job 
192 
Table 27. Comparative output per labor day using hand tools and animal 
dravm implements^ 
By animal dravm 
Operation By hand feddans implements feddans 
Breaking of new land JL 
30 
1 
3 
Cultivation of previously 1 
cropped land 10 1 
Light weeding 
1 
5 
2 
^Source: (40, p. 15). 
opportunities in other sectors of the economy. Mobility of labor could be 
enhanced if well planned settlement schemes are to be initiated where the 
land-labor ratio is very high. 
The attempts to replace the still persistent indigenous methods of 
land usage and social custom by large-scale mechanization in the Gedaref 
district have relieved a shortage of grain supply. But the eventual suc­
cess of such a farming experiment depends largely on its ability to recon­
cile the benefits of large-scale mechanization with the welfare of the 
nomads; for whom the development is intended and by whose active partici­
pation it could be achieved. 
The Gezira Cotton Scheme claims to have greatly improved the standard 
of living of the people who work there. Indeed the scheme is of the great­
est Importance to the whole national economy. Eventhough authority control 
has reduced the status of the tenant to almost that of a paid laborer, the 
tenant's "....tenure arrangement makes him, prima facie, an independent 
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farmer" (101, p. 60). One of the main incentive features of the Scheme is 
that within the limits allowed by the management the tenant can produce 
crops with no charges for land and water. This situation has grown out of 
the concept of a partnership where the tenant, in view of the high element 
of uncertainty in cotton income could at least be assured a minimal level 
of subsistence in food and fodder crops. Consequently, the diversification 
of the Scheme, through the introduction of new cash crops partially re-
placeing subsistence crops raises an organizational as well as a commercial 
issue. 
In sum, the Gezira Scheme must be considered as a unique example of 
economic cooperation between people and government. McLoughlin gives a 
clearer picture of this when he writes: 
Though resembling other but less efficient Sudan 
irrigation economies in some respects, its greater 
overall productivity, incidence of wage labor, and 
higher average incomes, all the result of concen­
trated government investment and research, combine 
to make Gezira production and expenditure profiles 
unlike those of other Sudan regions. The typical 
employer propensity to hire wage workers beyond 
those economically necessary, to relieve himself 
of hard work, not only increases the wage laborer 
ratio, but redistributes income still further..,. 
This in turn provides purchasing power for a 
relatively greater number of such a level that it 
creates demands for goods and services in volumes 
which a more skewed income distribution would not 
call forth.... (58, p. 199). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF LAND TENURE STRUCTURES 
The preceding analysis of domestic tenure structures and the identi­
fication of their defects and contributions to developmental goals offer 
partially a basis for the implementation of modifications in Sudanese 
tenure structures. These modifications may come out of individual cases of 
structures identified as success elements in the previous chapter or they 
may be borrowed from the experiences of other nations. I'Jhatever the source, 
the remedial hypothesis stated in Chapter Two (III) would serve as a guide 
for evaluating the success of alternative land tenure structures in terms 
of goal achievement. 
Recent discussions in the economics literature have been concerned 
with the objectives of agrarian reforms in less advanced countries in 
general (102, 103). Some have suggested that very little increase in agri­
cultural output can be expected in these areas unless major revisions in 
the ownership and tenancy pattern are first carried out (102). Included 
are usually such measures as forced acquisition of land by the government 
and re-allocation of this land in size units which can be cultivated 
efficiently using modern agricultural implements (102). 
Others have maintained that reforms policies aiming at larger units of 
cultivation and the establishment of large cooperative farms using heavy 
equipment are undesirable on the basis that increases in output per acre 
are a much more important criterion in these countries than increases in 
the output per man hour (103). All of these studies have used some world 
reform experiences to support their conflicting claims. 
Inasmuch as there are differences in natural production conditions 
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among the less developed countries, and in view of the different con­
straints conditioning a particular economic environment it is almost 
impossible to devise a generally applicable agrarian reform model to be 
pursued by any one particular less developed economy. Even within each 
country, the physical and economic factors may differ so much from locality 
to locality that various land tenure systems may probably have to be tried 
to suit each particular need. Tenure systems must, therefore, be judged 
each in relation to its own situation and time. l-That is suited for Israel 
or Russia, for instance, at a certain point in time in a particular space 
may not be a success at another time in another space. 
The complete socialization of land in Russia, for instance, which has 
made radical changes in the ownership pattern, but ignored individual 
incentives may have made its contribution felt in Eastern Europe where the 
provision of machinery has not been hindered by capital inadequacies. In 
the remote flood plains of southern Sudan, where agriculture depends large­
ly on primitive tools, the Russian model may be much less relevant. On the 
other hand, the adoption of "small peasant farming" in areas where the laws 
of inheritance are such that they encourage excessive fragmentation thereby 
sustaining chronic underemployment and lowering the rate of capital for­
mation, may not be consistent with the achievement of the goals pursued. 
Likewise, the Mexican reform which has made significant changes in the 
ownership pattern, but resulted in relatively smaller units of cultivation 
may have served its purpose in time and space, but may have no applica­
bility in the central rainland belt of Sudan; where the heavy capital 
expenditures for the opening-up of new lands and the provision of water 
supplies may justify large-scale operation. The owner-operated family-farm 
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in the U.S.A. may also not be relevant under Gezira conditions, for 
instance, where the complicated technical problems of land and water 
management which have arisen in connection with the irrigation of the semi-
arid Scheme have dictated entirely different farm sizes and techniques and, 
consequently a different tenure structure. However, "too much control" in 
the Gezira Scheme could be partially offset if the tenantry could have the 
private capital and the managerial skill to ovm and operate the holdings. 
The remedial hypothesis introduced for the modification of tenure 
structures is presented under the three conditions developed in Chapter 
Four, namely, incentives, knowledge and capital. The various kinds of 
possible modifications suggested by available literature on international 
tenure experiences and by the identification and analysis of domestic 
tenure experiences are presented within each of these three conditions. 
Modifications for the Promotion of Incentives 
Of the different tenure experiences of the world which may be 
encouraged for the provision of incentives, it is generally believed in 
most writings of tenure reform reviewed by the author that direct ownership 
provides an important incentive to improve land. The assumption is that 
since the owner knows that the capitalized value of improvements will 
accrue to him, he is encouraged to invest in improving his land. Whereas 
the emergence of private ownership will stimulate productivity of the human 
agent, low under communal tenure, if complemented with other factors of 
production, its persistence in the Northern Province appears to be remote. 
This is so because the fragmentation process with the continuous pressure 
on the land in the Northern Province has resulted in farms whose scale of 
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operation is neither beneficial to productivity per acre, nor productivity 
per unit of labor. In the case of Sudanese tribal tenure however, where 
labor is scarce, in relation to land, the transition from a subsistence to 
a cash economy could be achieved if the incentive factor is strong enough 
to stimulate labor beyond the point where subsistence needs are satisfied. 
Fisk maintains that such a point represents the start of a "take-off" from 
subsistence production into cash production. Below it the structure of 
incentives is such as to maintain production at the subsistence level. 
Above it, incentive traps are eliminated, and labor supply rises sub­
stantially with increases in cash returns. The implication here is that 
incentives to earn wages increase as a result of one or a combination of 
exogenous non-market influences: 
1. Increases in the level of cash production to lift 
it sufficiently above each stagnation point to reach 
another growth point through persuasion. 2. In­
crease in the cash return per unit of labor, at a lower 
labor input (and hence crop output) than would happen 
in response to market forces alone; through temporary 
subsidies to develop marketing, transport and process­
ing facilities; or by the provision of government-
operated services for these purposes prepared to 
operate at a loss for some years; and 3. Increase in 
the utility of money to effect a jump.... at lower 
total income than would have happened in response to 
market forces alone effected through temporary 
subsidies to provide goods and services for money in 
the area or by setting up government retail stores 
ready to operate at a loss for some years (104, p. 172). 
Therefore, to overcome the incentive trap under communal tenure, the con­
version to cash production could be achieved through the redistribution of 
tribal lands into individual units with freehold title. Adequate govern­
ment controls, however, are necessary to prevent the emergence of a large-
scale land-holding minority. Though owner-operatorship established under 
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government control and accompanied by the provision of complementary 
factors of production, such as credit facilities and the incentives to use 
them would provide an adequate incentive that will stimulate a relatively 
higher level of participation in the exchange economy, the prospect of 
other forms of tenure as a remedial alternative for insecurities and un­
certainties created by the prevalence of tribal tenure is not eliminated. 
In fact a United Nation's report claims that eventhough: 
A most important requirement in the interests of good 
agriculture is security of tenure.... individual free­
hold on the pattern of western Europe and North 
American does not appear to be an inevitable result of 
the extension of an exchange economy in Tropical Africa. 
A number of development schemes have been successfully 
based on an adaptation of customary land tenures, as, 
for example, the Gezira scheme in the Sudan, the Niger 
scheme in (the Republic of Niger)...., and land settle­
ment schemes in (the Republic of Congo) (105, p. 44). 
Frequently, the so-called "group-farming" has also been advocated in 
recent years as the answer to the search for an ideal organization to 
replace the customary form of tenure (20, p. 238), This is suggested on 
both social and economic grounds. The attempt is to find a system of tenure 
that would combine the best features of communal tenure with an incentive 
structure to secure the advantages of both large-scale and small-scale pro­
duction, A recent conference of experts, while endorsing this general 
objective, has not been able to arrive at positive recommendations: 
Rural development must be based on agricultural 
production. The types of organization which will 
enable a prosperous agriculture to be built up have 
not been fully worked out. Most changes nwf being 
introduced are regarded as experimental, and there 
is no clear idea of the pattern which should replace 
the present inefficient systems. What is known is 
negative rather than positive: the defects in 
present agrarian structures which future systems should 
avoid.... Uneconomic size of holding, fragmentation, 
insecurity of tenure, lack of capital and usurious 
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rates of interest and rents, are examples of those 
defects, some of which may be dictated by native 
law and custom which hinders development.... 
(106, pp. 70-71). 
Among the various experiences that could be conceived of as alternative 
forms through which ownership may be transferred to the tribal members are 
the moshav, the individually operated ejidatarios, the proportional profit 
farms and the cooperatives. Most of these forms have achieved success 
traceable in large measure to their combination of a system of individual 
tenure with sufficient economies of scale for management and operations. 
The cooperative form, with individual families ot-ming the land of the 
cooperative would be a possible alternative for adoption in the Northern 
Province of Sudan, By allowing the cooperative members to continue holding 
their title to land without furthering the fragmentation process, not only 
would the members be provided with the incentive to farm better and develop 
the land, but they will also be given the basis to voluntarily group them­
selves into the cooperative farming societies. Where the cooperative form 
is encouraged, the basis would be broadened for the creation of sufficient 
opportunities for greater diversification and employment since large group­
ing makes possible the initiation of suitable industries to meet the needs 
of agriculture. The merits as to the feasibility of land consolidation and 
the procurement of capital for improvement will be dealt with in subsequent 
sections. 
With respect to the annual-lease-hold in the Gedaref district, titles 
to land and water resources would have to be remedied to improve the 
certainty of expectations to the lessee. Inasmuch as the marginal value 
product of land exceeds the nominal rentals paid for land, it would be 
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economic for the government to raise the rental price of land. It is 
apparent from our previous discussion of the annual leasehold that rent 
would be an effective instrument for ensuring a fair share to government 
and for encouraging better farming. Increases in rents compatible with 
land productivity could be channeled into financing piece-meal settlement 
schemes through the development of new lands and the provision of water 
supplies. This would entail a trial and error process of experimentation 
that would gain the acceptance of the community and give the policy-maker 
the opportunity to learn more about the reactions of the community to the 
proposed programs. 
Detailed research would be required to discover the nature and degree 
of the "push" and the "pull" factors that would serve as a basis for 
planning such settlement schemes. By and large, it would seem that an 
effective "push" factor would come from the creation of an effective land 
market. This is not in conflict with cooperative ownership of land, since 
all land could be nationalized with the right to use land being marketed. 
In such a case the market price would be for usufruct or the right to use 
land rather than for possession. The creation of such a market besides 
augmenting the capital necessary for infrastructure, would also reinforce 
the concept that land is a valuable asset and might also lead to greater 
efforts to sustain the capitalized earning capacity of land. By the 
injection of water into "water-hungry" districts, the desire for higher in­
comes and the increased propensity to emulate following "demonstration" 
would become evident as "pull" factors. However, it is dangerous to easily 
assume that the nomadic tribes will be settled through a disruption of 
traditional institutions but it is thought-provocative to contemplate 
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matching the "pull" factors with the "push" factors to provide the maximum 
opportunity for settlement. 
With respect to the Gezira Scheme, the tenurial arrangements seem to 
have permitted the direction of land-use in the best interests of the area 
as a whole. They prevent land speculation, the concentration of land in 
the hands of the few, and the excessive subdivision of land among in­
heritors (107, p. 29). But, as mentioned previously, there are stringent 
conditions that do not provide security of tenure while the "conservative" 
attitude towards cotton production encourages absentee ovmership. Some 
injustice also results from the fact that the tenantry shares the production 
costs equally, eventhough they do not necessarily benefit equally. 
Stringent tenancy conditions could be modified by allowing compen­
sation for improvements and disturbance as well as for deterioration. 
Allowance for a fair amount of free play of individual choice will make for 
flexibility in production which could prove particularly rewarding in 
periods of adversity. To cope with population increases, and to increase 
the attractiveness of the share in the joint production irsentive, labor 
should be allocated to uses where its marginal value product is highest. 
This calls for efficient performance by the tenants, and the creation of 
stuitable industries that would prevent the drift of labor to the Gezira in 
the long-run. However, it remains to be seen whether the Gezira's ".... 
mixed system of control from above, enforced cooperation, and (with).... 
limited private initiative...." will evolve tovzards a new one which would 
allow more initiative to the cultivators (108, p. 48). Such could be the 
case, perhaps through autonomous cooperative organizations, and perhaps 
leading ultimately to the cultivator's cooperative which some have envisaged. 
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Modifications for the Improvement of Technology 
and Management 
In considering modifications in tenure structures designed to provide 
for improved technical and management innovations, the various tenurial 
arrangements adopted should not hinder an extension of farms in the di­
rection of the optimal size. Communal tenure which is characterized by a 
low level of technology, a low standard and level of living, and low liter­
acy and income levels, must give way to a form of tenure which will stimu­
late the participant to develop his initiative, and also to bear the re­
sponsibility. If a change from communal land-holding to Individual tenure 
is contemplated, then an impersonal distribution of land holdings with 
upper limits set on their size should be coupled with a drastic re-organi­
zation of production techniques. Land holdings would have to be clearly 
defined and identifiable. Contracts will have to replace oral agreements, 
and this will entail precise definitions of acreage. This will require 
surveys, allocations and demarcations. Land would no longer be "plentiful", 
tribal villages would have to be stabilized, and production techniques 
would have to change. Legal provisions would be necessary to prohibit the 
splitting-up of land holdings, and to put a stop to unfavorable develop­
ments, such as undesirable disintegration of land holdings by inheritance 
or sale. Hov/ever, the implementation of such modifications depends largely 
on the magnitude of "persuasion" and "demonstration" that the public sector 
would be willing to exert. For without new technical inputs and an improved 
farm management system injected initially by the public sector, the positive 
contribution that such modifications could make to total agricultural pro­
duction would be meagre. 
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In the Northern Province small and uneconomic holdings are at the root 
of many of the difficulties in the way of agricultural development. With 
the growing pressure on land, the number of fragments is increasing. Where 
agriculture requires investment in pumps for the provision of irrigation 
water, and where the natural conditions are not favorable, the average 
yield on fragmented farms would be lower than the corresponding yield for 
many of the larger farms. To secure a positive increase in agricultural 
production over the area now under cultivation, the application on a wide 
scale of scientific knowledge and increased capital investment in various 
forms is called for. These conditions are easier to obtain where land is 
worked and managed in fairly large units than in the form of fragmented 
holdings. In a farm of substantial size it is possible to eliminate 
several wasteful operations and to ensure better planning of the use of 
land, including selection of crops, rotation, soil conservation, develop­
ment of irrigation and introduction of improved techniques. Economies 
which cannot be attained by "fragmented" farms are available to large ones. 
By its very nature a larger unit of operation and management can secure 
more credit and finance and can apply these to greater advantage, can 
diversify its economy, and can make a relatively greater contribution to 
the goal of increased production. Accordingly, consolidation of holdings 
to bring together fragmented holdings should be encouraged. Through such a 
modification, it is possible to increase agricultural production sub­
stantially and to reduce farm-operating costs. Johnson and Barlowe in 
enumerating the benefits that accrue from the consolidation of scattered 
parcels under European experience write: 
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....official estimates of production increases range 
from 20 to 30 per cent and cost decreases from 10 to 
15 per cent. Of equal significance is the fact that 
the land-tenure patterns that follow land re-allocation 
provide a basis for improved land use and conservation 
practices and an impetus for more effective agricultural 
planning and programming. It is not possible to take 
reasonable advantage of mechanized production operation 
where land ownerships are composed of many o^raer-
ship parcels, or to carry on overall programs for 
agricultural credit, land improvement and other rural 
activities (9, p. 386), 
The solution to increased production in the Northern Province, seems 
to lie more in the direction of combining the small farms into cooperative 
"units assuming that a relatively higher level of management is maintained. 
The role that efficient and energetic management can play in the success of 
cooperative farming hardly needs emphasis. The management problems in the 
case of cooperative farms would be much more complicated than on indi­
vidually-operated farms. However, the economic success of cooperative 
farms would depend upon the balance struck between the advantages and dis­
advantages of cooperation.^ 
The fixation of a minimum holding below which subdivisions is not 
permitted could be enacted as a legal restraint on fragmentation of holdings. 
The lack of foresight and management ability under an annual leasehold 
could be remedied by the provision of public technicians. I'Jhen a large 
part of the lessee's capital is embodied in machinery and equipment, 
capital management becomes as much part of successful farming as good 
husbandry. If the standard of management could be improved, more care can 
^Factors leading to the deterioration of individual initiative would 
tend to lower the efficiency of cooperative farming, whereas factors such 
as internal as well as external economies, enhancement in risk bearing 
capacity, etc. would lead to increases in production and offer opportuni- • 
ties for investment. 
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be given by looking well after the farm machinery -which would reduce the 
tractor's depreciation and thus its annual running costs. Osman indicates 
that the finding of alternate employment for the tractor in the dead season 
for ridging and plowing in the cotton schemes can reduce the tractor's 
running cost by about one half (56, p. 11). 
In the Gezira Scheme, the delegation of a fair amount of responsibili­
ty on each holding to its tenant-manager would raise tenant productivity 
and lower the high expenditures incurred under central management. Reduc­
tions in managerial staff of the Gezira Scheme could have a desirable 
effect in spreading "Gezira" knowledge over more regions with more pressing 
problems. 
Modifications for Accelerating Capital Formation 
Improvements in land titles as mentioned previously would improve the 
basis for extending credit. The commercial banks, representing the most 
developed sector of the country's financial and lending institutions could 
thus diversify their activities by trying their hands at agricultural 
finance without taking great risks. Diversification of agricultural pro­
duction seems to be related to capital formation, since the production of 
crops with relatively stable markets, would also reduce the reluctance of 
the private sector to indulge into agricultural finance in the face of a 
falling demand for cotton. 
With ownership of land and/or joint cooperation accompanied by a 
strong demonstration effect, hoardings either in the form of gold and 
jewelry, or in the form of "cattle" could find their way to being invested 
in avenues which lead to the acceleration of capital formation. 
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The contraction of debt, particularly in the Northern Province is a 
necessary condition for securing capital for agricultural investment and 
development. The newly formed Agricultural Bank, a public corporation, has 
started advancing loans against the storage of the produce until such a 
time as the produce is disposed of. The seizure of crops for the payment 
of taxes apparently reduces the "appeal" of the agricultural bank's credit. 
Reductions in taxes following the principle of "the ability to pay" and the 
extension of credit to cooperatives preferably with efficient management 
could be thought of as a remedy to economize the use of scarce capital re­
sources. The encouragement of efficient cooperatives may serve to intensify 
the demonstration effect. 
In the Gedaref district, lessees' capital is largely financed out of 
profits. In addition, and to an increasing extent, farmers borrow from 
such non-institutional lenders as agricultural merchants, to meet the in­
creasing need for medium-term credit. Such credit should be obtained after 
careful examination of the costs involved. Here again managerial capabili­
ties are essential for exploring the availability of alternative sources of 
funds, and to weigh their relative cost. Farmers could make adenuate 
financial provisions for the periodic replace ;c of machinery. This would 
rid them of resorting to dearer credit under •. tringent conditions and at a 
time when produce prices do not rise sufficiently to alleviate the burden 
of high costs of operation. Such a situation could also be remedied by a 
readily available supply of medium-term credit if the bank's propensity to 
lend is increased by giving the farmers a basis of security such as land or 
shares. 
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The behavior of the Gezira tenants when met with windfalls in odd 
years of exceptional prosperity might not have been attributed to an 
ingrained habit of lavish consumption (64, p. 317) if readily available 
financial institutions could have existed at the time. Accordingly, such 
institutions for the mobilization of the savings of individuals on a volun­
tary basis coupled with persuasion could offer wide opportunities for 
capital formation. 
On the whole, the injection of capital into agriculture may well 
prevent the expansion in agricultural production in the short-run. In­
creased allocations for credit programs and other development services 
would not by themselves increase capital formation. They would, hoizever, 
improve the quality of resources and are important in increasing the produc­
tivity of resources already devoted to agriculture. Increased development 
services are a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for raising the 
rate of return on past investments as well as on future investments. The 
additional requirement is that the producers must be prepared to use these 
services. That is why modifications in land tenure structures that would 
remove the limitations on fixed cost charges and the stringent terms under 
which credit is provided could improve formation of and access to capital. 
The removal of such limitations may require the fixation of maximum legal 
rates of interest, the substitution of productivity for collateral as loan 
support, and the licensing of loans repayment schedules in accordance with 
productivity (5, p. 24). 
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CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONGLUSIONS 
Although defects in land tenure structures are recognized by the 
Sudanese policy-maker, usually basic reform in the agrarian structure has 
not been introduced as a means of achieving the goals of agricultural and 
overall economic development. Personal and discriminatory motives have 
frequently characterized the policy-maker's approach to agrarian reform. 
Consequently, the measures taken have not contributed satisfactorily to the 
achievement of improved resource use and increased production. 
The climate of opinion in Sudan seems to favor the view that in 
economic dvelopment, the agricultural sector must play an important role. 
In this study, it is proposed that within the agricultural sector, land 
tenure structures may either accelerate or impede the process of economic 
development. Little attention is accorded in the Sudan to the search for 
the most appropriate form(s) of tenure for agricultural production. Never 
in the history of the country since independence, has the choice between 
alternative forms of tenure been given serious consideration. For the last 
seven years, in the quest for political control, the policy-maker has 
regarded the establishment of irrigation projects and the opening up of new 
lands for cultivation as a tangible achievement which can be used to obtain 
public support. Such large-scale capital consuming projects are indicative 
of poor economic policy, since their implementation has neither brought 
about benefits compatible with the costs incurred, nor has it been effective 
in raising agricultural productivity. One of the important issues therefore 
in Sudanese agriculture is whether institutional changes in the systems of 
land tenure will lead to improved resource use and productivity. To this 
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end we have directed our attention in this study. The model of resource 
use developed in Chapter "Rzo is regarded as a useful framework for de­
termining the impact of the observed tenure relations on economic efficiency 
and development. Within this theoretical framework modifications in land 
tenure structures are considered as the enabling factors which will provide 
the maximum opportunity for the administrator to use policy instruments in 
order to stimulate overall economic dvelopment. Production function analy­
sis is believed to provide a basis for research to discover the defects and 
contributions of land tenure structures. Its application serves as a basis 
for successful adjustments in land tenure structures by testing the hypothe­
ses suggested earlier in this study. 
The view is held that incentives, technical knowledge and management, 
and capital are the main ingredients for agricultural and economic develop­
ment. As has been stressed in Chapter Three, the domestic systems of land 
tenure present obstacles to agricultural development. Incentive inefficien­
cies, technological and managerial limitations and capital inadequacies are 
all believed to be an array of defects characterizing land tenure structures; 
specifically described as "structural traps". In the southern Sudan the 
customary system of tenure is inhibiting the commercialization of agri­
culture and cost-price rationalization in production, both of which are 
necessary conditions for rational land use. In the Northern Province, 
although the laws of inheritance tend to satisfy an 'equitable' distri­
bution, nevertheless there is little doubt that productivity per acre and/or 
per man-hour can be increased within the existing framework of land holdings. 
In the Gedaref district the whole issue of land allotments under the annual 
leasehold system has not touched upon the indigenous cultivator. In the 
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Gezira Scheme the tenant's enterprise is stifled by a disproportionate 
allocation of rewards and costs. Even though the system of hired labor at 
present provides a satisfactory answer for the "tenant-manager" who desires 
to relieve himself of hard work, and redistributes income still further, in 
the long-run the persistence of such phenomenon is not compatible with in­
creased production. 
The five tenure experiences of international origin reviewed in the 
study indicate that tenure conditions exercise considerable influence on 
agricultural development. The U. S., for instance, in its effort to promote 
the objectives of equity, improved productivity and resource use and in­
creased production has chosen the family-farm, tenanted and owner-operated. 
Likewise, Russia, Mexico, Israel and Puerto-Rico have chosen the collective, 
the ejido, the Kibbutz and the proportional-profit-farm respectively. Every 
system has its successes and failures. The Sudan, in its quest for economic 
development can borrow from the contributions that such tenure experiences 
offer, but caution should be exercised in adapting imported structures to 
local structures. As suggested by Professor Timmons: 
....The ejido which may well have provided an 
essential thrust toward development in Mexico may or 
may not be applicable to another country in another 
time. The state and collective farm structures may 
have contributed greatly to development in Russia 
but may or may not be applicable to another country 
in another time. The family farm and private 
property which provided a strong impetus in United ~ 
States agricultural development may or may not be 
applicable to another country in another time 
(5, pp. 25-26). 
Consequently, modifications in Sudanese land tenure structures must 
come from within the country "....in a form and manner consistent with the 
values, culture and aspirations of the people" (5, p. 26). If modifications 
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in land tenure structures are to enable the simultaneous achievement of 
equity, productive efficiency and increased production then they should 
promote incentives, adapt to new economic and technical developments and 
encourage productive investment in agriculture. The customary system of 
tenure can be assisted to successfully overcome the "array of traps" by 
injections of outside capital in extension and demonstration and by a 
cautious application of an alternative system of tenure. The emergence of 
an alternative system of tenure can take the form of private ownership of 
land if the objective of changing the tribal system is to encourage the 
rise of progressive producers with secure self-oi-med and self-operated 
family farms. Another alternative that can be well adapted to the tribal 
tenure is the cooperative prototype modeled after the moshav for instance. 
By maintaining the "composite village structure", the adoption of the 
moshav experience can be an effective means of displacing subsistence pro­
duction by commercial production. 
Where modifications in land tenure structures include the consoli­
dation of holdings, as in the Northern Province, the establishment of 
minimum-size holdings and legal action to prohibit fragmentation are neces­
sary measures for the creation of "economic-holdings". Here, the organi­
zation of producers into multipurpose cooperatives accompanied by programs 
to encourage intensive production can yield increased incomes. Where land 
is scarce, such modifications may well result in an accelerated displace­
ment of the population. It is necessary that development in other sectors 
of the economy should be expanded at a rate sufficient to absorb the increas­
ing outflow of labor from agriculture. 
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The discovery of a solution for optimal production in the Gezira 
Scheme may lie in a tenure structure that will combine the merits of large 
scale production with local organization. Under this form, progress can be 
achieved if the tenants can be grouped into commercial communities with 
tenant shares that can replace government control in the long-run with the 
availability of technical competence in elected managerial boards. Here, -
"the ingenious innovation promoted by the Mexican ejido, in the provision 
that, while the majority of the tenants can elect the management.board, 
unless the vote is unanimous, the minority elects a vigilance committee 
charged with the duty of checking up the management board"- (20, p. 311), 
can be adopted as a means of ensuring efficient management. Provisions 
have to be made, however, to prevent family domination and "capital flight" 
from the Scheme. The scale of operation for the commercial unit merits 
serious consideration depending on the rotation to be adopted, the mechani­
cal equipment which will be used, the extent of diversification that the 
Scheme has to achieve and the water requirements. 
In the mechanized crop production schemes adequate security of tenure 
can be given by extending the lease contract. Increases in land values up 
to the economic rent level can be introduced to ensure returns to the State 
compatible with the expenditures incurred, and to encourage farming by 
progressive producers. 
So far, we have summarized some of the modifications that might be 
made in Sudanese land tenure structures to achieve the basic objectives 
under consideration. Whether the objectives of productive efficiency, 
equality of opportunity and increased production can be achieved by one 
system of tenure, or a combination of systems requires the empirical 
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application of the model which has been suggested in this study to test the 
hypotheses given in Chapter T(zo. The data needed to test the hypotheses 
proposed can be obtained through sampling procedures wherein various farms 
from within every tenure class by locality can be sampled. Resource cate­
gories and output values can be collected for the sampled farms within every 
tenure class. Such information can be of value for a comparative evaluation 
of the various tenure classes using the economic indicators that marginal 
analysis offers. However, for a comparative analysis to become meaningful, 
homogeneous areas of analysis should be chosen to remove or minimize the 
effects of influences that cannot be attributed to tenure such as variations 
in soil, weather, tj^pe of farming, etc. Here, the sampling technique to be 
used will have an important bearing on the results obtained. 
As a final remark, it may well be true that there is strength in 
a combination of several systems of land-holdings if this increases the 
adaptability of the general economy of the country" (11, p. 13). While it 
is desirable to investigate cautiously the merits of various tenure systems, 
it is doubtful whether any simple solution as to the best alternative form 
will emerge. Indeed it may in the long-run be the source of great strength 
to the Sudan if heterogeneity in the forms of tenure persists, particularly 
if such a "heterogeneous mix" can enable the realization of the simultaneous 
goals pursued. However, the future of Sudanese agriculture depends largely 
on the Sudanese producer himself and the environment within which he works. 
The producer is and should be the main decision-maker. Government develop­
ment services preceded by modifications in land tenure structures are 
essential ingredients of his environment if agricultural and economic 
development are to be realized. But it is the producer who must take 
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advantage of such a development. In this sense, the future of the Sudanese 
on the land depends largely on the Sudanese themselves and the incentives, 
capital and knowledge they require to pursue the path of progress. 
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